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Abstract 
 
Despite its importance to understandings of the contemporary political economy of 
Latin America and the Caribbean, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our 
America (ALBA) remains largely misunderstood.  Faced with opaque national and 
regional institutions, the existing literature of ALBA conflates this regional project’s 
discourse and design with its implementation and practice.  Aided by extensive primary 
research, this work tackles these deficiencies through a comprehensive, systematic 
analysis of the implementation of the three initiatives central to ALBA’s efforts to 
create an “economic zone of shared development”: the People’s Trade Agreement 
(TCP), the Unified Regional Compensation System (SUCRE), and Petrocaribe. 
 
Key concepts of endogenous development, autonomy, and legitimacy are drawn from 
existing accounts, with the latter split into its input (participation), output (problem 
solving), and control (accountability) aspects and implementation added as a measure 
and moderator of impact.  This analytical framework is then applied not only the states-
led “regionalism” of ALBA, but also to the unguided “regionalisation” with which it 
interacts to produce effects both integrative and disintegrative. 
 
This research reveals an uneven and somewhat incoherent ALBA, whose more 
impactful mechanisms institutionalise secular benefits (SUCRE, Petrocaribe) while 
more radical and potentially transformative initiatives become bogged down both within 
and across member-states (the TCP).  Close analysis shows that a focus on conscious, 
states-led regionalisation of endogenous-development strategies overlooks the influence 
of structural and inherited characteristics of hybrid national political economies.  
Sovereignty has been ceded to regional and international institutions with their own 
binding obligations, and while ALBA does promote autonomy, these institutions also 
circumscribe it.  Contrary to the ALBA literature, input legitimacy from participatory 
democratic reforms is secondary to issues of output and control.  Output legitimacy is 
crucial to broad-based support that facilitates implementation, whereas deficient control 
incubates practices noxious to ALBA’s stated goals.  Though the influence of Ecuador 
and Anglophone member-states has been misrepresented by omission, Venezuela’s 
central role has consistently been misinterpreted.  Being ALBA’s founder, funder, and 
father, its own stuttering advance towards Twenty-First Century Socialism has been 
characterised by tensions in its society, economy, and governance.  In Venezuela 
particularly – though not exclusively – the regional effects of contradictory and negative 
aspects of national political economy hamper implementation of ALBA’s states-led 
“regionalism”, frustrating in turn its intended impacts on development, autonomy, and 
legitimacy.  Ultimately, this undermines ALBA’s more transformative elements, 
leaving the future role of the organisation uncertain. 
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Notes on Terms and Symbols 
 
ALBA  
Since 2008 ALBA has been formally titled ALBA-TCP.  The TCP element refers to the 
People’s Trade Agreement (Tratado de Comercio de los Pueblos) adopted with 
Bolivia’s adhesion in 2006 and developed further in 2009 (see chapter four, p.95).  
Since it is common practice – and for the sake of brevity – I use the acronym ALBA 
throughout to refer to the overarching regional project. 
 
Anglophone Caribbean State Names 
Though it pains me to do so, knowing how fiercely important this issue can be to 
Caribbean peoples themselves, due to space limitations I sometimes abbreviate the 
names of multi-island Caribbean states to that of their first island, particularly St 
Vincent (and the Grenadines) and Antigua (and Barbuda). 
 
Specifying Precise Groupings within ALBA 
Since ALBA’s initiatives have variable membership, this work requires various terms to 
refer to precise groupings within ALBA.  Thus, “intra-ALBA” refers to the eight de jure 
members (Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Dominica, St Vincent and the 
Grenadines, and Antigua and Barbuda).  “SUCRE-zone” refers to the four members 
participating in the SUCRE virtual-currency initiative (Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, 
Cuba).  “Intraregional” and “regional” may refer to the regional organisation or the 
LAC region, though the difference should be clear from the context. 
 
Currency 
The dollar sign ($) utilised without further qualification always signifies US dollars. 
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Chapter One: Al Rayar el ALBA…1 
 
The Bolivian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) is the continent's retort to 
the Free Trade Area of the Americas, the now buried corporatist dream of a 
free-trade zone stretching from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego. Though ALBA is 
still in its early stages, Emir Sader, the Brazil-based sociologist, describes its 
promise as “a perfect example of genuinely fair trade: each country provides 
what it is best placed to produce, in return for what it most needs, independent 
of global market prices.” … ALBA is essentially a barter system, in which 
countries decide for themselves what any given commodity or service is worth, 
rather than letting traders in New York, Chicago or London set the prices for 
them. That makes trade far less vulnerable to the kind of sudden price 
fluctuations that devastated Latin American economies in the recent past. 
Surrounded by turbulent financial waters, Latin America is creating a zone of 
relative economic calm and predictability, a feat presumed impossible in the 
globalization era. 
(Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine, 2007, p.456) 
 
This depiction of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA)2 from 
Naomi Klein’s bestselling work on “disaster capitalism” reveals much not only about 
understandings of ALBA but also about the importance of these understandings to 
scholars and to the wider world.  Klein and Sader see ALBA as a functioning, 
alternative regional political economy which has managed to free itself from the dogmas 
and strictures of globalisation, at once reaping the internal benefits of this revolution 
and becoming a pioneering example for other world regions to follow.  In this they are 
not alone. 
On the contrary, precisely this vision is shared, first, by ALBA itself, being ever 
present in its summit declarations, policy documents, and in the rhetoric of its leaders, 
for whom ALBA initiatives represent “a model, a humble model, for the entire world, of 
how political, geopolitical, economic, and integration initiatives are launched in order to 
defeat asymmetries and reach the harmonic and homogeneous development of the 
region” (Chávez Frías 2008, p.48).  Second, it permeates the literature of the so-called 
“New Left” in Latin America, which attempts to understand the nature and significance 
of a series of election victories for left-of-centre leaders that began around the turn of 
the century.  Although much of this literature focuses on the newly statist national 
political economy of presidents like Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Evo Morales in 
Bolivia, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, Nestor Kirchner in Argentina, and Lula da Silva in 
Brazil, it also tends to view ALBA as an international outgrowth of national models.  In 
William Robinson’s words: 
                                                 
1 “At the break of day” or “approaching ALBA”.  “alba” translates as “dawn” and subverts the Spanish 
acronym for the Free Trade Area of the Americas, ALCA (Área de Libre Comercio de las Américas).   
2 In June 2009 “Alliance” replaced “Alternative” and “Peoples of Our America” was added.   
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The ALBA envisions a regional economic development plan for Latin America 
and the Caribbean involving solidarity with the weakest national economies so 
that all can cooperate and benefit from regional exchange networks and 
development projects … transnationaliz[ing] efforts at ‘endogenous 
development’ … and reject[ing] any trade agreements that would undermine the 
use of public policies to regulate the economy and redistribute wealth. 
(Robinson 2008, pp.351–52) 
 
Third, it informs the work of regionalism scholars who detect in Latin America and the 
Caribbean (LAC) a swell that could drive a distinct third wave of post-liberal, post-
hegemonic, or post-trade regionalism (respectively Sanahuja 2008; Riggirozzi & Tussie 
2012; Dabène 2012b) that is “not based primarily on trade liberalization but actually on 
welfare cooperation and solidarity, placing a distinctive emphasis on civil society 
participatory practices ... representing a radical, ideologically transformative project that 
extends Chávez’s twenty-first century socialism into a pursuit of regional integration 
scheme [sic], in direct opposition to neoliberalism” (Riggirozzi 2012a, p.26).  Much is 
riding on ALBA’s young shoulders. 
  The truth, however, is that much is riding on academic accounts of ALBA 
rather than on the organisation per se, for it is this ALBA literature that feeds into wider 
debates about the nature of contemporary LAC political economy.  Yet, although 
ALBA has provoked much academic endeavour, this growing collection of descriptive 
and theoretical accounts suffers from a severe lack of empirical substantiation.  It is 
telling that the main conclusion of the only literature review to date is that “a great deal 
of the literature reviewed here observes the romance of ALBA-TCP but not its operative 
reality” (Absell 2012, p.90), with just 21 per cent of studies providing empirical 
substantiation and critical analysis (p.84).  This leads researchers to fall back on official 
depictions of ALBA’s nature and impact which only reinforce what Christopher Absell 
describes as “the underlying assumption of nearly all of this work … that the 
organisation is a positive factor that could bring about an element of economic equality 
and social justice for the people of Latin America and the Caribbean” (Absell 2012, 
p.90).  This presumption that ALBA is normatively desirable and potentially impactful 
in one particular way represents a major failing of the ALBA literature.  
But this tendency to reproduce the official line is just one consequence of a 
deeper lack of reliable data from ALBA states and institutions themselves.  In Daniele 
Benzi’s straightforward terms, “truthful information – and this goes for every [ALBA] 
country – is very scarce” (2010, p.18).  The underlying problem is that this lack of 
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reliable primary data makes representations of the nature and impact of ALBA mutable 
and manipulable.  Essentially, practitioners and analysts alike use ALBA as a canvas on 
which to project their own preferences, picking and choosing from its complex, 
confused reality the elements which best support their interests or ideas.  Worse, the 
extremity of this data vacuum finds reflection in the extremity of attempts to fill it.  
Thus, at one end of the scale we find ALBA “inaugurat[ing] an age of cross-cultural 
collaboration to actualise all human potential [wherein] power, no longer the 
prerogative of Western standard-setters, will be diffused across regions and strata [and] 
the inequitable favouring of First World ideals and norms will be substituted by a new 
international legal paradigm of co-operation, justice and equity” (Al Attar & Miller 
2010, pp.360–61).  At the other, we find ALBA performing “peripheral warfare 
[through] ostensible medical offices for the poor that serve as recruitment and 
indoctrination centers for [Chávez’s] supporters in neighbouring countries … which it 
has utilized for years to infiltrate spies and agitators into neighbouring countries under 
the guise of doctors, coaches, and advisers to help the poor” (Perdue 2012, p.10).  
Rather more prosaically, for some it has achieved little and is “not much more than 
barter and rhetoric, with Venezuela footing the bill” (Sweig 2009, p.248), whereas for 
others it is “the most promising, if not the only meaningful, attempt at cooperative 
development anywhere in the world” (Hart-Landsberg 2010).  Overall, the question 
implicit in Noam Chomsky’s assertion that ALBA represents “a true dawn if its initial 
promise can be realized” (2008) has yet to be answered, and the most honest appraisal 
in the existing literature is simply that ALBA represents “a great experiment [whose] 
outcome is by no means certain” (Backer & Molina 2010, p.162). 
 This research is a response to the empirical and methodological failings in the 
existing literature, as well as to the zealous certainties and confounding uncertainties to 
which they give rise.  By first examining the literature in even greater breadth and depth 
than in Absell’s review (2012), it outlines the main theories, debates, and themes 
emanating from this literature, reducing them to five core arguments and three key 
concepts, all of which revolve around the issue of ALBA’s relationship to the 
development models of its New-Left member-states.  It then formulates an approach 
which allows for a more systematic reassessment that mitigates ALBA’s mutability by 
focusing explicitly on the nature and impact of three core economic initiatives across 
various member-states, rather than generalising from sporadic outbreaks of solidarity.  
This approach also involves a reappraisal of the political economy of five member-
states, sensitive not only to what is intentionally regionalised through state-led 
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initiatives, but also to quandaries and contradictions that arise both at the domestic level 
and in the interaction of complex and sometimes incoherent development models at the 
regional level.  Having set out a rationale and a roadmap for this more comprehensive 
approach, this work then focuses its central research question on the issue at the heart of 
the ALBA literature: 
 
To what extent does ALBA represent a coherent model of regionalism reflecting 
and reinforcing the reforms of its New-Left member-states? 
 
Since any investigation into this coherence must consider the internal dynamics both of 
ALBA regionalism and of member political-economies whose domestic and foreign 
commitments can easily impinge on their regional commitments, this question is broken 
down into four sub-questions: 
 
1) What does ALBA regionalise of member-states’ development strategies and of 
wider national political economies? 
2) Has this linkage had a discernible impact on the political economies of ALBA 
member-states?   
3) Does this linkage reflect and reinforce the New-Left reforms of ALBA 
governments or rather inherited continuities? 
4) What accounts for variations in the efficacy or “success” of different initiatives? 
 
These questions allow us to gain new insights into the impact of divergent accounts of 
member political economies on characterisations of ALBA, while also foregrounding 
problems arising from the regional interaction of states whose development models and 
insertions into the global political economy are widely different.  The innovation of 
focusing on implementation and impact renders absence and failure just as relevant as 
presence and success, with investigation of both crucial to achieving a fuller 
understanding of ALBA regionalism.  Coupled with a comprehensive and systematic 
research design, this consciously counteracts the “romantic” approach detected by 
Absell and allows detailed, demonstrable answers to displace speculative ones.  Though 
the existing literature of ALBA stands to gain the most from these answers, they can 
also indirectly inform other literatures which count ALBA amongst their empirical 
cornerstones.  
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An Introduction to ALBA 
Since this work contends that existing accounts of ALBA tend to default to the official 
line on its nature and impact – and also simply to introduce the key actors and 
institutions in this drama – we must understand the organisation’s basic history, 
development, and discourse. 
ALBA was founded by Venezuela and Cuba on 14 December 2004 but has since 
grown to include six other member-states (illustrated in Figure 1, below): these are 
Bolivia (joined 2006), Nicaragua (2007), Dominica (2008), Ecuador (2009), St Vincent 
and the Grenadines (2009), and Antigua and Barbuda (2009).3  As suggested by its first 
incarnation as the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas, it was designed as a riposte 
to the Free Trade Area of the Americas process, originally scheduled for conclusion in 
2005.  It grew out of an off-the-cuff remark, “a kind of mischief against the FTAA”, 
during the 2001 summit of Association of Caribbean States, with Fidel Castro later 
enquiring as to what exactly Chávez had in mind for this “ALBA” (Chávez Frías 2005, 
p.285).  The two then set about filling in the many blanks, adopting the ideas of anti-
FTAA social movements (Saguier 2007) and adapting them to the spirit of the Integral 
Cooperation Convention (2000) between their two countries.  This latter bilateral 
agreement was Venezuela’s first attempt to apply the principle of complementarity, 
whereby each state offers its own strengths in order to mitigate the other’s weaknesses.  
ALBA’s founding agreement built on this not only by setting its own core notions of 
solidarity, cooperation, and fairness against the competitive principle underlying 
traditional FTAs, but also by rejecting the commercial focus of most regional 
arrangements (ALBA 2004; ALBA Secretaría Executiva 2010a, p.3).  Thus, the 
agreement’s main body refers repeatedly to “mutual benefit” in terms of “economic and 
social needs” and incorporates policies as diverse as cultural plans to reinforce identity 
(ALBA 2004, Article X), exemption of state investment from local taxes (Article VI), 
elimination of illiteracy (Article V), and prioritisation of “useful employment” (Article 
III) all within one wide-ranging agreement that viewed all aspects of politics, 
economics, or society as potential channels through which to achieve cooperative 
development.  Having such diverse ends, it inevitably prescribed diverse means, with 
everything from scholarships and shared use of sports facilities to joint investment in 
                                                 
3 Honduras joined in 2008 under Manuel Zelaya but withdrew in 2010 following his ouster in a coup.  
Two more Caribbean states, Suriname and St Lucia, applied for full membership in early 2012, but this 
process had not been completed at the time of writing.  
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domestic level, most notably Venezuela’s communal councils or Bolivia’s “communal 
democracy” (Escobar 2010, p.35).  Commercial and financial measures, meanwhile, 
have been central to ALBA from the outset.  The 2004 agreement’s first substantive 
article promises the greatest possible exchange of goods and services (ALBA 2004, 
Article II) whereas its first concrete provision applies a zero tariff to all imports into 
Cuba from Venezuela and its second exempts all bilateral investment – state, mixed, or 
private – from local taxes (Articles XII and XIII).  The real thrust of ALBA ever since 
has been towards more comprehensive economic integration, as reflected in the many 
major policy initiatives developed in this domain. 
 The first of these was Petrocaribe (2005; see chapter six), which effectively 
provided soft loans to energy-dependent Caribbean states by allowing them to finance 
as much as 70 per cent of the cost of oil imports from Venezuela.  The second was the 
People’s Trade Agreement (2006 and 2009; see chapter four) proposed by new recruit 
Bolivia as a framework within which to develop cooperative trade deals compatible 
with ALBA principles.  The third was the concept of “Grandnational” companies 
(2007), essentially state multinationals jointly owned by ALBA states, which could 
provide investment and competition in an array of strategic sectors.  The fourth was the 
Unified Regional Compensation System (SUCRE, 2008; see chapter five), a unit of 
account (or virtual currency) that would reduce the role of the dollar in intra-ALBA 
trade and thereby reduce foreign-exchange expenditure both for the state and for intra-
ALBA exporters.  The fifth was the ALBA Bank (2008), which was to pool members’ 
foreign-exchange reserves and reassign them to developmental ends as productive or 
social investment.  With economic initiatives proliferating and performing a swathe of 
developmental functions, ALBA increasingly began to seek coordinated, 
complementary development on a regional scale.  This goal was first endorsed by all 
member-states in 2009 in the shape of an action plan for creation of an “Economic Zone 
of Shared Development”  (ALBA-TCP 2009a), but it was restated and renamed in 2012 
as the EcoALBA proposal, whose first article sums up ALBA’s own understanding of 
the organisation’s logic and purpose: 
 
…[the constitution] of an economic zone of shared, interdependent, sovereign, 
and solidaristic development, destined to consolidate and expand a new 
alternative model of economic relations in order to strengthen and diversify the 
productive base and commercial exchange, as well as to establish a basis for 
any bilateral or multilateral instruments that The Parties subscribe to in this 
domain, with the intention of satisfying the material and spiritual needs of our 
peoples. 
(ALBA-TCP 2012, Article I) 
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Union (ECCU), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and the CARICOM Single 
Market and Economy (CSME) initiative; Ecuador and Bolivia are members of the 
Andean Community customs union; Nicaragua is a signatory to the deep and wide-
ranging Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Area (CAFTA-
DR); Venezuela is a full member of Mercosur; Venezuelan and Ecuadorian oil 
production and pricing is defined by their membership of the Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); and all eight ALBA states are members of the 
WTO.  Four member-states – Venezuela, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and St Vincent and the 
Grenadines – can also be described as “hyper-dependent” on the US economy, with one 
export accounting for over 40 per cent of total exports to that market (Shadlen 2008, 
p.6).  In short, for all ALBA’s striving towards “shared development”, there is no 
guarantee that it will unfold unimpeded. 
  
Building on Existing Accounts of ALBA 
Lines of Best Fit in a Diverse Literature  
While the literature of ALBA is not entirely blind to the complications involved in 
creating a coherent model of regionalism out of such diversity, for the most part it 
reproduces the official line on the functioning and impact of ALBA, with a number of 
clear threads running through it.  As chapter two reveals (pp.36-49), in this literature 
ALBA is commonly seen to be: 
 
A) furthering the foreign-policy goals Venezuela and Cuba.  
B) regionalising endogenous-development strategies, with a return of the state to 
commanding guidance of the economy towards social and industrial policies that 
favour human development. 
C) regionalising concern for the autonomy both of member-states and of the LAC 
region vis-à-vis the global economy, with intraregional asymmetries targeted via 
cooperative development. 
D) garnering legitimacy for incumbent governments by implicating the regional 
level in provision of participatory democracy and effective welfare programmes. 
E) transforming the material conditions and mindsets of citizens and states alike. 
 
Central amongst these recurrent themes and arguments is the claim that the essence of 
ALBA lies in its cooperative and complementary regionalisation of commonalities in 
the endogenous-development models of Bolivia, Ecuador, and especially Venezuela, 
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driven and defended by their shared “region first” foreign policies.  In this vision, 
ALBA replicates and reinforces the political strength of incumbent left-of-centre 
governments by extending participatory reforms into ALBA’s governance structures 
and by facilitating internationalisation of domestic social programmes that have been 
beneficial to long-marginalised groups.  These regionalisations are implemented such 
that – as at the domestic level – their impact is transformative, thereby bolstering their 
sustainability.  
From these common arguments this work draws the central concepts of 
endogenous development (in A and B), reasserted autonomy (C), and legitimacy (D), 
whereas transformative impact (E) is subsumed into a consideration of impact more 
generally.  This forms the basis of an analytical framework which can both engage with 
existing accounts.  Yet, if this framework is to provide new insights into the nature and 
significance of ALBA regionalism, it must be geared towards tackling the persistent 
empirical and methodological failings that undermine the ALBA literature’s dominant 
arguments and admit an extreme degree of variation in competing interpretations.   
 
Empirical Weaknesses in the ALBA Literature 
 
[ALBA] is out on the table for whoever wants to see it.  As the Bible says: “Let 
he who has eyes, see; he who has ears, hear” the truth, the reality. 
(Chávez Frías 2008, p.27) 
 
Unfortunately for researchers of ALBA and LAC regionalism, Chávez’s confidence in 
the transparency of ALBA is entirely misplaced, and the effects of this deficiency 
inevitably permeate the literature.  Francisco Ullán de la Rosa distinguishes between 
ALBA as philosophy, as platform, and as concrete practice (2012, p.160), and the key 
problem in existing accounts is that the former two have received much academic 
attention, whereas the third has been largely overlooked.  While this was understandable 
in the years following its formation – fully functional institutions could not be expected 
to materialise overnight – with time there have been growing calls for a more thorough 
assessment of ALBA’s demonstrable extent and impact.  First, as Norman Girvan notes, 
ALBA’s guiding principles and overall philosophy exist only insomuch as they are put 
into practice (2011b, p.165).  Second, without evaluating concrete initiatives we cannot 
assess whether or not ALBA is – or ever will be – effective in achieving its 
developmental and social-justice objectives (Ullán de la Rosa 2012, p.161).  And third, 
in terms of ALBA’s wider influence, according to José Briceño Ruiz: 
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…it is not enough to claim that [ALBA] is a normative or ‘should be’ proposal 
for Latin American integration … because if a proposal cannot have an impact 
on the way in which the region’s integration processes are developing, it is 
worthless. 
 (Briceño Ruiz 2007, p.41) 
 
As Gian Luca Gardini rightly points out, “reality and utopia” dichotomies have 
long existed in LAC regionalism, but in ALBA’s case as in every other it is vital to 
“distinguish between what is the reality on the ground and what are aspirations or 
declamatory statements” (2011, p.105).  This work aims to address this growing 
frustration that ALBA’s functionality and impact have tended to be assumed rather than 
demonstrated, leaving a number of basic questions unanswered: 
 
We have learnt about the formation of “grandnational enterprises”, but do we 
know anything about their application? Concretely, how have ALBA-TCP 
development projects improved the wellbeing of the populations of their 
member-states? How do projects differ between countries? … many of its 
projects have been operating for a great deal of [ALBA’s lifetime]. An 
opportunity exists to examine the developmental results of ALBA-TCP. 
(Absell 2012, p.91) 
 
Since much of the confusion around ALBA arises from a lack of reliable data, we 
concur with Benzi that the best way to take advantage of this opportunity is through a 
thorough examination of the commonly neglected details of ALBA initiatives: 
 
…it would be hugely important to carry out research focused on the functioning 
of joint ventures, the execution of projects financed and to be financed by the 
ALBA Bank and all of the donations and credit lines opened up by the 
Bolivarian government. 
(Benzi 2010, p.18) 
 
A fruitful research strategy must address these problems by re-evaluating ALBA from 
the ground up.  But which ground represents the most relevant reality to be compared to 
the key ideas prevalent in the literature?  And where exactly is this ground?  That is, 
which initiatives merit attention and in which member-states? 
 
Locating the Reality of ALBA 
 
There exists no text that can look to contain ALBA in its totality.  [Its members] 
have set forth on a path that branches out with every new step. 
(Martínez 2008, p.227) 
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Beginning with the question of where to find an appropriate “reality on the ground”, this 
work heeds Osvaldo Martínez’s warning by addressing weaknesses in the existing 
literature.  First, the possibility of talking past other ALBA scholars is reduced by 
explicitly addressing the question of where ALBA begins and ends. 
 
Fixing the Boundaries 
Lourdes Regueiro Bello (2008, p.308) identifies three main approaches to ALBA’s 
limits amongst scholars and practitioners alike: 
 
1. ALBA as relations between its formal member states.6   
2. ALBA as above plus energy-cooperation agreements signed by Venezuela 
with countries of South America and the Caribbean. 
3. ALBA as an ongoing formal project coupled with a regionalist “offer” open 
to every state of the wider LAC region.7 
 
This schema can help clarify the sources of much of the confusion over ALBA’s extent 
and impact.  Crucially, many scholars opt – consciously or otherwise – for some form of 
the third variant, opting to study what Thomas Muhr calls the de facto region over the 
de jure region (2010, p.3)8 or what Edgardo Lander dubs the “broad sense” of ALBA 
versus the “strict sense” (2007, p.20).   This has the potential to make LAC in its 
entirety the subject of ALBA research, with some scholars taking as ALBA any 
Venezuela-backed proposal that involves other LAC states and roughly corresponds to 
ALBA’s principles, such as the intra-regional development bank, the Bank of the South, 
or the LAC-focused, publicly funded TV network TeleSUR.9 
This opening up of ALBA’s empirical basis also impacts on theoretical claims, 
as in Muhr’s influential work itself.  In his vision of ALBA as a counter-hegemonic 
alter-globalisation scheme challenging neoliberalism on all fronts, it acts on various 
levels and domains across member-states and non-member-states, taking in global, 
regional, national, or sub-national entities, “federal states, mayoralties, … social and 
popular movements, community and workers councils, cooperatives, and state-worker-
                                                 
6 At that time Venezuela, Cuba, and Bolivia. 
7 n.b. the idea of ALBA as “offer” emerged originally from a 2006 presentation in Havana by Jaime Estay 
that sadly appears not to have been developed further. 
8 Although “de facto” suggests a sense of uncovered reality and naturally validates the researcher’s own 
interpretation of the “real” extent of the region, the basic distinction remains useful. 
9 In their defence, ALBA’s most outspoken proponent, Hugo Chávez, often did the same.  (Bank of the 
South is used to characterise ALBA in Azicri 2007; Fritz 2007; Oliva Campos 2007; and Muhr 2010; as 
is Telesur in Tahsin 2009; Regueiro Bello 2008; Espinosa Martınez 2007; and Muhr 2012). 
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managed recuperated factories in, for instance, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela” (Muhr 2010, p.6).  While this approach has its merits – and indeed Muhr’s 
argument is amongst the most theoretically advanced and persuasive – it also has some 
serious downsides.  First, as Edgardo Langer points out, initiatives are “identified as 
part of ALBA, irrespective of the form in which they are taken up by other parties…” 
(2007, p.21); Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay are explicitly not members of ALBA and 
by ignoring that choice we render ALBA a vague signifier of certain political-economic 
characteristics rather than a concrete regional organisation (as in Espinosa Martınez 
2007, pp.17–18).  Furthermore, faced with a smorgasbord of novel LAC initiatives, 
scholars have discretion over what constitutes the de facto ALBA and can take as 
evidence of novelty and impact any interaction exhibiting a partial overlap with ALBA 
principles and some degree of Venezuelan involvement.  This leads them not only to 
elide political-economic continuities in ALBA and its members states which might 
contradict the narrative of a new dawn, but also to opt for superficial examination of 
numerous initiatives rather than thorough interrogation of fewer.  Thus, an all-
encompassing account mixing ALBA’s formal membership and its “offer” might endow 
the organisation with the capacity to integrate continental energy infrastructure 
(Petroamerica), to provide regionally sourced and allocated development financing 
(Bank of the South), and to challenge foreign communicational dominance (TeleSUR), 
while a more selective account would give ALBA no role in any of these ambitious 
schemes.  Little wonder, then, that assessments of its impact vary so widely. 
 
Whittling Down to ALBA’s Core Initiatives  
To counter this problem, this work focuses on de jure initiatives, falling somewhere 
between Regueiro Bello’s first “formal membership” and second “formal membership 
plus energy integration” options.  It draws on chapter two’s review of the literature in 
order to identify the ALBA initiatives taken as evidence to support in different measure 
the five key arguments re-evaluated here.  These are: 
 
 Structural Convergence Funds  
 The Social Movements Council (CMS) 
  “Grandnational” companies and projects 
 The ALBA Bank 
 Regionalised social programmes (misiones) 
 The People’s Trade Agreement (TCP) 
 The Unified Regional Compensation System (SUCRE) virtual currency 
 Petrocaribe 
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Clearly, even without including the de facto region, ALBA boasts too many important 
initiatives to allow for an in-depth investigation of all of them.  So as to avoid the 
superficiality observed elsewhere, this work whittles these eight down to three core 
initiatives central to ALBA’s goal of shared development. 
First, we eliminate those not amenable to in-depth study by virtue of their near 
or complete non-existence based on exploration of the literature and on fieldwork itself.  
Being so insubstantial these initiatives cannot be “core” to “shared development” or 
indeed to anything else.  Thus, although Structural Convergence Funds “orientated 
towards reducing asymmetries between levels of development and between existing 
productive sectors in the region” (Linares and Lugo 2010, p.322) have been considered 
a “cornerstone” of ALBA (Tussie 2009, p.185), the fact that they have never existed in 
any sense – let alone in regular, institutionalised, or regionalised form – means that they 
can safely be removed without toppling the whole analytical edifice.  This is also 
emphatically the case for the Council of Social Movements.10  Though it had already 
been hailed as a “permanent process of critical and propositive interaction of social 
control over the constituted power” which has made regional integration a people’s 
issue (de la Barra 2010, p.653), even the two people most eager to substantiate its 
existence, Hugo Chávez and Evo Morales, were later forced to concede that:11 
 
ALBA created a Social Movements Council, but it certainly does not exist; that 
is a piece of self-criticism, Evo, which we must offer ourselves as 
revolutionaries…  
(Hugo Chávez, in Rojas 2011) 
 
Given the centrality of participatory governance to many prominent accounts of ALBA 
(chapter two, pp.43-46), this early exclusion of the CMS is in itself a significant finding. 
 Second, we eliminate those initiatives judged peripheral by their nature, by their 
apparent lack of implementation, or by a combination of both.  First to go is the concept 
of “grandnational” companies and projects.  Were these entities – thirty three by the 
ALBA Secretariat’s reckoning (ALBA Secretaría Executiva 2010b, pp.2–4) – to 
function according to their design, they might well play a part in “articulat[ing] 
                                                 
10 During fieldwork for this project, the Venezuelan chapter was beginning to establish itself, but 
Ecuadorian social movements were cool on the idea and no chapter existed.  This will be covered in 
another major research project by Kaarlo Metsäranta of Helsinki University. 
11 This comment falls between the two periods of fieldwork involved in this PhD, Venezuela coming first; 
as such, any change in Ecuador or the Caribbean would have been picked up, whereas the Venezuelan 
“chapter” of the CMS was already taken into account at this point. 
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economic  and  social  policies  to promote regional development with inclusion [and] 
build[ing] new regional production chains linked to these strategies”, as in Maribel 
Aponte García’s depiction (2011, p.3).  But, as of late 2010 the ALBA Secretariat itself 
cited only three grandnational companies and projects as functional (I.10).12  The ALBA 
Bank, meanwhile, held to “encourage economic and social integration by easing 
inequality and promoting a more even distribution of investments, while urging Latin 
American countries not to depend on the US economy or place its reserves in it” 
(Altmann Borbón 2009a, p.6; see also Tahsin 2009, p.21), was by 2011 performing few 
of the functions for which it was designed (I.45).  Indeed, although it boasts 
headquarters in the same Caracas office block as the ALBA Secretariat, the ALBA 
Bank’s technical operations are run by a Venezuelan state bank, The Bank of the 
Treasury, and operations in which the ALBA Bank is nominally involved turn out to 
come from other Venezuelan state financial institutions (I.45).13 
 Third and finally, we exclude those initiatives about which most is already 
known.  This means overlooking the regionalised Venezuelan and Cuban social 
programmes (misiones) that some consider “with no fear of being wrong … the soul, 
essence, and substance of ALBA” (Varela 2007, p.76).  Amongst many others, the 
misiones underpin Pía Riggirozzi’s idea of ALBA as “transnational welfarist 
regionalism” engendering a socially cohesive regional community through 
“unprecedented trans-societal cooperation in social projects in education, health and 
housing that not only have an impact on human development but also create new state-
society contracts with regard to inclusion, welfare, security and dignity for long time 
excluded groups” (2012, p.435).  The impact of the misiones on literacy, health, and 
disabled rights is undeniable, but the focus on this impact early in ALBA’s development 
has also distorted understandings ever since.  Only Barrio Adentro’s provision of 
doctors to poor communities in Venezuela (and to a lesser extent in Bolivia) has a 
continuous impact (see Kirk 2011), whereas the remaining missions – mass removal of 
cataracts via Milagro, eradication of illiteracy via Robinson, and nationwide surveying 
of disability needs via José Gregorio Hernández – are inherently periodic activities.  
                                                 
12 This is difficult to corroborate.  It may be that the Secretariat does not fully know what is and is not 
functioning.  However, since its role includes promoting ALBA’s achievements, they could be expected 
to err on the side of impact.  It also depends on definitions of “grandnationality”; if the Literacy 
Grandnational amounts to internationalisation of Cuba’s Yo Sí Puedo programme, it certainly exists and 
functions, but the grandnational label adds nothing.  Primary research revealed that those involving 
Ecuador had stalled at their inception. 
13 Usually development funds at the discretion of the Venezuelan presidency, such as FONDEN.  This is 
evident also from the budget estimates of Caribbean members, which suggest that funds putatively 
coming from the ALBA Bank are in fact provided by other institutions. 
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Contrary to the idea of the missions as backbone and epitome of ALBA, by 2012 it was 
the economic aspect that had become, according to Cuban president Raúl Castro, 
“fundamental to ALBA’s success, and to the success of its other objectives” (Castro 
2012).14 
 
Identifying ALBA’s Core Initiatives 
Fortunately, having discarded Structural Convergence Funds, the CMS, Grandnational 
entities, the ALBA Bank, and the missions from our analysis, we are left with ALBA’s 
three core economic initiatives: the People’s Trade Agreement (TCP), the SUCRE 
virtual currency, and Petrocaribe.  The TCP is undoubtedly key to any attempt to 
achieve ALBA’s goal of “an economic zone of shared development” as it is this 
agreement that defines the principles which should govern trade and investment 
between ALBA members.  If ALBA truly represents a move towards regionalisation of 
endogenous development, as suggested in the literature, then we would surely find 
evidence of it here.  The SUCRE, meanwhile, encourages coordination of monetary, 
trade, and exchange-rate policy across member-states, while also having built-in 
development-finance mechanisms and a strong role in reasserting autonomy given its 
inherent removal of the US dollar from intra-ALBA trade.15  As with the TCP, its 
involvement of firms large or small, in social, state, and private sectors alike, means that 
it could have a significant effect on the entire economy. 
Somewhat more controversial is Petrocaribe, as inclusion of this initiative leaves 
our research design balanced delicately between Regueiro Bello’s first option of 
focusing on the formal region and her second of covering the formal region plus energy 
agreements signed with Venezuela by other LAC states.  Essentially, Regueiro Bello’s 
second option suggests that ALBA should include Venezuela’s LAC-wide Petroamerica 
energy-integration strategy, of which Petrocaribe is the Caribbean element.  But 
Petroamerica has barely merited a mention in ALBA’s official statements and 
declarations, being referred to just once between 2004 and 2010 (ALBA Secretaría 
Executiva 2010a, p.8).  This is mainly because no overarching Petroamerica scheme 
beyond Petrocaribe has materialised, with the initiative having euphemistically “lost 
strength” (I.32) since its conception.  Petrocaribe, on the other hand, has flourished, 
                                                 
14 This is not to deny the developmental and human significance of the missions.  One Caribbean 
ambassador (I.87) told me of Milagro that “every day without sight is one day too many”, and I fully 
agree.  Yet, this effect remains far less significant than the potentially wide-ranging socioeconomic 
impact of the ALBA initiatives studied here.  Though rarely mentioned, the same founding agreement that 
established the missions begins with the more prosaic business of tariff reductions. 
15 With the exception of Ecuador’s dollarized economy. 
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with seventeen Caribbean nations having signed up, and has from the outset been 
intimately linked to ALBA.  Not only were the two designed and negotiated 
concurrently, Petrocaribe has always been identified as an offshoot of ALBA (see 
Chávez Frías 2008, p.65, for example) and integrated with other initiatives explicitly 
under the ALBA banner (ALBA Secretaría Executiva 2010a, pp.76–84).  That said, 
since it does incorporate non member-states,16 it is clearly distinct from the TCP and 
SUCRE, representing something of a middle ground between the formal group of eight 
member-states and the permanently open “offer” of ALBA to any willing LAC country.  
Studying this initiative therefore has the further advantage of permitting some insight 
into the “offer” aspect of ALBA, which tends to be overlooked.  More importantly here, 
however, Petrocaribe is routinely viewed by scholars as part of ALBA, meaning that it 
plays a significant empirical role in accounts of ALBA (amongst many others, Altmann 
Borbón 2009b; Rosales 2010; Briceño Monzón 2011; Muhr 2012).  Since the five 
threads running through key debates in this literature depend to a significant extent on 
this inclusion of Petrocaribe, it would be difficult to critique this literature while 
excluding it. 
 
Identifying the Key Participants in Core Initiatives  
Although we have identified the core initiatives to be examined in greater depth, the 
question remains of where, in which member-states, to examine them.  As chapter two 
will reveal in greater depth, the existing literature is skewed towards Venezuela and 
Cuba, an issue that is only partially resolvable.  Given its relative weight in the global 
political economy and its position as founder and funder of ALBA, Venezuela has 
naturally become the centre of virtually all accounts of ALBA, and it remains the sine 
qua non.  The role of ALBA’s second founder Cuba has also been the subject of a great 
many studies, meaning that insights have already been gained into the nature of its 
relationship with other members, particularly Venezuela (notably, Romero 2009; 2010).  
The representativeness of Cuba’s role is also dubious given the peculiarities of its 
situation, not least its unusually high level of human development and its relative 
economic isolation – sometimes desperation – owing to the US embargo. 
The most suitable focus countries for this study are in any case defined by our 
choice of core initiatives; there would be little point in studying the nature and impact of 
the SUCRE in Dominica, for example, since Dominica does not participate, just as 
                                                 
16 Of eighteen Petrocaribe signatories (including Venezuela), a third (six) are ALBA members 
(Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, St Vincent and Grenadines, Dominica, and Antigua and Barbuda). 
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Grenadines, and Antigua and Barbuda.  While the status of these three as full ALBA 
members allows this work to contribute meaningfully to the meagre stock of research on 
ALBA in the Anglophone Caribbean, it does also introduce a doubt about whether 
Petrocaribe’s role in full ALBA members is comparable to its role in non-member 
states.  This work attempts to neutralise this issue by scrupulously separating out 
Petrocaribe interactions and impacts from wider ALBA relations or bilateral relations 
with Venezuela.  But ultimately, of course, there is no perfect selection of focus 
countries, nor any perfect justification for that selection; any exclusion risks skewing 
results in unpredictable ways.  Suffice it to say that this study and its related fieldwork 
examine the People’s Trade Agreement (TCP), the Unified Regional Compensation 
System (SUCRE), and Petrocaribe by reference to the involvement of Venezuela, 
Ecuador, Dominica, St Vincent and the Grenadines, and Antigua and Barbuda.17   
 
Taking a Comprehensive and Systematic Approach 
Aside from clearly delineating its empirical basis, this work also represents an advance 
on the vast majority of accounts of ALBA because of its systematic and comprehensive 
approach. 
 
A Comprehensive Approach to ALBA Regionalism and Regionalisation 
As discussed at greater length in chapter two, the comprehensiveness of this work’s 
approach stems from a basic sensitivity to the interplay of regionalism and 
regionalisation.  Although ALBA’s avowedly political, state-centric regionalism 
(ALBA Secretaría Executiva 2010a, p.7, Principle 1) naturally favours an approach that 
sees regionalism as a “a states-led project to reorganise a particular regional space along 
defined economic and political lines” (Gamble & Payne 1996, p.2),18 in reality the 
influences on all regional projects are many and varied (see Dent 2008, p.3).  The key 
distinction here is between the conscious, volitional state “guidance” of regionalism as a 
regional governance project and the multi-actor, multidimensional, spontaneous, 
unguided, and often “ungoverned” regionalisation processes (see Leander 2002 on 
‘ungovernance’; Hettne 2005, p.545, on regionalism/isation).  Even if the state’s role in 
actioning policy and shaping institutions makes it a uniquely valuable nexus to examine, 
                                                 
17 Where relevant, reference may be made to Bolivia, Nicaragua, Cuba, or non-ALBA signatories of 
Petrocaribe, but this will nowhere be as comprehensive or as regular as for the focus countries. 
18 As does the intergovernmental nature of regionalism in Latin America, where “non-state actors have 
not been very salient in any of the regionalist projects, and have always been dependent on states and 
reactive to state strategies, rather than agents of regionalization per se” (Phillips & Prieto 2011, p.129). 
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one of the lessons of the New Regionalism is that we must also take into account its 
interactions with other actors, processes, and structures.  Accordingly, this work also 
heeds Gamble and Payne’s warning that “regionalisation … cannot be excluded from 
the framework of analysis” (1996, p.2) through a triple recognition of the implications 
of taking regionalisation seriously. 
First, rather than focusing on ALBA as a disembodied supranational entity 
hovering above its member-states, it recognises that national political economies are 
intimately linked to regional-integration organisations in which they are enmeshed 
(Mansfield & Milner 1999, p.589).  To this end, chapter three explores the national 
political economies of ALBA members, so as to better understand the conflicts and 
complementarities that arise when they are brought into contact via ALBA initiatives.  
Second, unlike most accounts of ALBA, which have erred on the side of ALBA’s 
success on its own terms (Absell 2012, p.90), this work also adopts the New Regionalist 
position that disintegrative outcomes are equally possible and significant (Hettne & 
Söderbaum 2002, p.38).  Accordingly, we focus on implementation and 
“unimplementation”, interrogating equally the present and absent aspects of ALBA’s 
core initiatives, their advances and retreats, on the basis that the unachieved ALBA can 
provide as much insight into the nature and role of the organisation as its more 
commonly studied achievements.  Third, it considers regionalisation of elements of 
national political economies that are outside the control and intention of member-states’ 
conscious development strategies, meaning that darker informal processes can be taken 
into account (as proposed by Phillips & Prieto 2011, p.130).  Essentially, this work 
follows Nicola Phillips in treating the region space as a regional political economy 
which “accommodat[es] diverse  national  models  of capitalism  within  a  single  
regionalist  project  and,  moreover,  the  influence  of regionalising  forces  on  the  
shape  of  these  national  models” (2004, p.39).  This allows for the consideration of 
state-guided regionalism alongside market, social, or essentially unguided 
regionalisation, and it is also sensitive to the social nature of interrelated national and 
regional processes within the constraints of the wider global political economy (2004, 
pp.34–39). 
This focus on states-led regionalism as just one volitional element of wider 
regionalisation processes affects the three key concepts of our analytical framework – 
endogenous development, reasserted autonomy, and legitimacy – in a number of 
important ways.  Although endogenous development can still serve as a useful concept 
around which to organise our analysis and through which to engage with the existing 
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literature, the triple recognition above means looking beyond the conscious 
development strategies of New-Left governments so as to take into account elements of 
national political economies conferred by history, previous administrations, or actors 
outside the state.  From this perspective endogenous development becomes but one 
point on a spectrum that would register movement towards hybridity or even a 
deepening of neoliberalism if such a shift were to be observed.  Similarly, a focus on 
autonomy seems to suggest that because regionalism is a conscious, guided process, 
state cooperation can overcome the classic dilemma of left-of-centre LAC regionalism, 
wherein “pooling” sovereignty through regional institutions contradicts a parallel 
concern for national sovereignty (see Dabène 2012a).  But as with a focus on 
endogenous development, consideration of autonomy without its opposite of constraint 
might avert our gaze from potentially significant continuities such as resource 
endowments or existing trade structures.  As such, autonomy must also be considered 
one extreme of an autonomy-constraint spectrum, with ALBA potentially provoking 
movement in either direction.  Finally, the division of legitimacy into three component 
parts, as in Andrea Ribeiro Hoffman and Anna van der Vleuten’s comparative-
regionalism work (2007; building on Scharpf 1999), opens up new analytical 
possibilities to our reassessment.  As Berry Tholen explains (2007, pp.21–25), these 
three parts are: 
 
i) input legitimacy, or facilitation of  responsive government “by the people”  
ii) output legitimacy, or provision of effective solutions “for the people” 
iii) control legitimacy, or guaranteeing of accountability “to the people”19 
 
Where the ALBA literature focuses mainly on novelties in terms of input and output 
legitimacy, here we consider also the effect of control, allowing us to reveal the fine 
grain of the complementarities and contradictions involved in producing the real-world 
ALBA observed in this work’s empirical chapters. 
 
A Systematic Approach to Core ALBA Initiatives 
This work’s approach is systematic, meanwhile, not only because it focuses on specified 
initiatives in specified member-states, but also because its interrogation of this empirical 
material follows a specified pattern which treats absences and failures as seriously as it 
                                                 
19 While Tholen clarifies his first two concepts with “by” and “for” the people, the addition of “to the 
people” in the third line is my own, for the sake of consistency. 
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does structures and successes.  This militates against the natural risk of confirmation 
bias in studies of a regional organisation that consciously operates in many forms and 
forums while consistently failing to provide concrete data on the extent and impact of 
its activities (Benzi 2010, p.18).  This is applied first of all, in chapter three, to the 
development strategies of ALBA member-states.  Although the political economies of 
Venezuela, Ecuador, and ALBA’s Anglophone members are decidedly not the focus of 
this work, if we are to take seriously the importance of the national to the regional, we 
cannot rely on superficial depictions to substantiate accounts of regionalism.  As such, 
chapter three interrogates understandings of these political economies on their own 
terms and in terms of their specialist literatures, focusing on the implementation of 
development strategies and not just their formulation and proclamation. 
 This provides a base upon which to build this work’s central analysis of the 
TCP, SUCRE, and Petrocaribe (chapters four, five, and six), allowing us to consider the 
roots of the complementarities and conflicts that facilitate or hamper the progress of 
these initiatives.  The analysis of each initiative includes four specific stages, an 
approach designed to forestall any analytical adaptation to the peculiarities of the 
subject:  
 
1. Stage one provides a detailed description of the initiative’s emergence and 
functioning “on paper”.  Given the distinct lack of clarity on ALBA and its 
constituent initiatives, close and detailed examination of the workings – declared 
and actual – of core initiatives serves directly to put to bed some of the many 
misconceptions about even the supposed purposes and modes of ALBA.  In 
itself, this represents both a significant contribution to the literature and a 
labour-saving resource for others researching ALBA.  This is, in any case, 
necessitated by this work’s wider attempt to redress the credulity of the ALBA 
literature by comparing official, academic, and implemented versions of core 
initiatives: we need to know how they work “on paper” in order to compare this 
to the “reality” of their implementation. 
 
2. Stage two explores the role and impact of the initiative if taken to be 
implemented in accordance with its “on paper” functionality.  This is linked 
back to existing accounts of ALBA by considering this hypothetical version of 
the initiative in terms of the key concepts drawn from the literature: endogenous 
development, autonomy, and legitimacy.  This provides insights into the impact 
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sought by the initiative’s design, as well as into the extent to which this design 
itself is reflected in the ALBA literature. 
 
3. Stage three interrogates stage one’s idealised functionality through an empirical 
examination of the initiative’s demonstrable implementation and impact.  By 
mapping links to specific development aims and associated projects at the 
national level, this stage reveals how ALBA initiatives relate to the political 
economy of particular member-states.  Detailed accounts of the nuts and bolts of 
real-world attempts to implement and advance these ALBA initiatives highlight 
the convergences between member states and how they can produce significant 
impacts.  At the same time, absent and dysfunctional elements are highlighted 
and the impact of their troubled progress considered. 
 
4. Stage four evaluates factors that account for any absences and failures exposed 
in stage three.  These impediments help us to understand the “implementation 
gap” between the idealised ALBA “on paper” and the observed, implemented 
ALBA.  Mirroring the second stage, this section also considers the effects of 
impediments in terms of the same key themes of endogenous development, 
autonomy, and new sources of legitimacy.  This provides an account of each 
initiative’s real or practical impact that can then be compared to that of its 
desired impact in step two, with any divergence becoming a key focus of this 
work’s analysis. 
 
Broad brush, stages one and two focus primarily on the state-guided regionalism that 
has been the main focus of existing research into ALBA, whereas stages three and four 
consider also unguided and often unintended regionalisation processes that can involve 
elements of national political economies often overlooked in accounts of ALBA.  
Synthesising findings on individual initiatives allows us to achieve an evaluation of 
ALBA’s overall nature, impact, and coherence which can in turn feed back into debates 
within the literature of ALBA and within other literatures which count ALBA as a key 
element of their empirical grounding. 
 
Research Methods and Data Sources 
As has already been made clear, many of the confusions – and indeed the certainties – 
about the nature and impact of ALBA stem ultimately from the opacity of its initiatives 
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and of the national institutions with which they interact (Benzi 2010, p.18).  This fact, 
combined with our goal of providing a comprehensive reassessment of ALBA that is 
sensitive to regionalism and regionalisation, renders the question of methods and data 
sources a particularly important one. 
 In terms of states-led regionalism, Gardini finds that in LAC particularly there 
are three distinct levels of data with which we can engage:  
 
There is a first gap between what is declared by politicians or reported in the 
media and what is actually being discussed and agreed upon at the technical 
level. There is a second gap too between what has been agreed upon at the 
technical level and what is in fact applied or put into force in practice. This 
peculiarity extends beyond the domain of trade. It is therefore important to 
distinguish between what is the reality on the ground and what are aspirations 
or declamatory statements. 
(Gardini 2011, p.105) 
 
In the absence of consistent, micro-level data from ALBA institutions themselves, 
accounts of ALBA have tended to default to the output of ALBA’s most visible 
institutions, such as summit agreements, declarations, and speeches.  While these 
sources are undoubtedly significant, particularly to analyses of ALBA’s purposes, they 
often underwrite descriptive research that regurgitates dates, agreements, and proposals 
as if these were proof of significant change (e.g. Tahsin 2009, pp.16–21; Valencia 2009; 
Chinas 2011).  This approach favours data from the nebulous end of the spectrum, 
where one finds numerous proposed ALBA initiatives that have never materialised in 
any form.  The three initiatives covered here, however, are towards the more concrete 
end of the spectrum, which means that parts of their founding agreements verge on the 
technical level, thereby becoming more relevant and reliable to any analysis of their 
means, ends, and impact.  Specifically, the TCP as a statement of principles is not 
especially tangible, but between Ecuador and Venezuela it was codified more 
thoroughly through the Trade Agreement for Development (ACD) concept (see chapter 
four, pp.97-100);  the SUCRE agreement outlines the technical aspects of its 
functioning and requires ratification by national parliaments, making its content more 
relevant to the actual practice of SUCRE trade;   and the general Petrocaribe agreement 
is in fact only a template for a series of contractual bilateral agreements between 
Venezuela and the rest of its signatories.20  In all three cases, agreements themselves 
thus represented a valid source of insight into the nature not only of these initiatives 
                                                 
20 Although bilateral Petrocaribe agreements are not publicly available, meaning we can only assume that 
they do not deviate widely from the template. 
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themselves, but also through them ALBA.  The discourse of ministers and heads of state 
involved in promoting these initiatives provided complementary evidence, albeit in the 
form of interpretations of actors whose job it is to “sell” initiatives as both desirable and 
feasible.  Neither source advances beyond Gardini’s “declamatory” and “technical” 
levels. 
 
The Decline of Remotely Accessible Data  
Though taken up mainly with proposals and principles, remotely accessible institutional 
sources of primary data did occasionally reveal the brute reality of ALBA initiatives 
even before fieldwork was undertaken.  But such chinks of light came infrequently, 
irregularly, and – rather worryingly in terms of transparency – with declining frequency 
and clarity.  The first ports of call are two official websites: Portal ALBA 
(alianzabolivariana.org), and more recently the homepage of the ALBA Secretariat 
(ALBA-TCP.org).  Despite auspicious beginnings for both, the former has since taken 
to creating new content through reporting on the wider LAC left, whereas the latter now 
tends to report on ALBA meetings and initiatives only through brief bulletins with little 
substantive content.  Although various periodical publications have also sprung up to 
spread word of ALBA’s achievements, they have tended to follow the most notable of 
their number, ALBA Economía, by dying out after a few issues, taking with them their 
valuable “from the inside” perspectives on ALBA.21 
The websites of specific initiatives were also a useful resource 
(SUCREALBA.org and petrocaribe.org, for example), but again the depth and 
regularity of their reporting has developed in mysterious ways.  For example, in 2008 
PDV Caribe, the PDVSA subsidiary responsible for Petrocaribe, began to produce 
reports giving country-by-country breakdowns of oil supply, financing applied, levels of 
current debt, and even projections of future repayment obligations (PDV Caribe 2008; 
2009), but after just two such reports (one available in print only), the series was 
discontinued.  Less drastic, but equally difficult to comprehend, is the disappearance in 
SUCRE annual reports of country-by-country import and export totals and the absence 
of statistics used in technical meetings on the weight of each bilateral trade relationship 
in total SUCRE trade (SUCRE 2011a; 2013; and for bilateral weights, Trujillo 2012);22 
                                                 
21 ALBA Economía was produced by Venezuelan state bank Bancoex.  The Venezuelan Embassy in 
Bolivia has bucked this trend with its Correo del ALBA, although many historical and opinion pieces are 
required during frequent slow periods to make up for a lack of noteworthy developments. 
22 Other revealing statistics also disappear, as with the percentage of SUCRE trade carried out by 
Grandnational companies (0.01 per cent in 2011); this too could be politically sensitive. 
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without such data, it is impossible to calculate SUCRE trade balances by state or 
between states.  Yet, for both initiatives past publication proves that these data are 
produced internally, and since Petrocaribe’s central function is financial (chapter six, 
pp.162-163) whereas the SUCRE targets balanced trade (chapter five, p.129), these data 
are in both cases clearly relevant to policy-makers, yet they are no longer published.  No 
firm conclusions can be drawn from this, but it is notable that in both cases the withheld 
data are politically sensitive, revealing in Petrocaribe’s case the brass tacks of growing 
indebtedness for debtor states and in both cases the losses of Venezuela vis-à-vis other 
members.23 
 
The Unique Utility of Fieldwork 
Precisely such issues made fieldwork an indispensible element of this research project, 
as it allowed me access to documentation otherwise unavailable, and often to its authors 
or commissioners.  This fieldwork was carried out over eight months in two parts: a first 
visit only to Venezuela, from September to December 2010, and a second visit from 
May to September 2011 to Ecuador (May-July), Venezuela (early August), Dominica 
and St Vincent and the Grenadines (late August), and finally Antigua and Barbuda 
(early September).  The initial priority was to take advantage of local actors’ closer 
familiarity with the institutions and officials involved in designing and implementing 
ALBA policy in order to gain access both to more reliable documentary data and to the 
interpretations of these actors themselves through interviews.  Given my own status as 
an academic researcher, early ports of call tended to be my local counterparts, who were 
able to guide me towards relevant officials, activists, institutions, and indeed ideas.  
Since in LAC there is a close relationship between Politics as discipline and politics as 
profession, academic interviews represented a particularly useful gateway to the 
political elite.  A full list of interviewees is provided in appendix one (p.214), but 
indicative examples of their affiliation include the ALBA Secretariat, the Venezuelan 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Venezuelan Ministry of Petroleum and Mining, 
Venezuelan state oil company PDVSA, the Ecuadorian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
Ecuadorian Secretariat of Planning and Development, ALBA Coordinators in 
Anglophone Caribbean countries, officials of Petrocaribe joint ventures in the 
Caribbean, Venezuelan chambers of commerce, Venezuelan opposition-aligned media 
                                                 
23 This is compatible with ALBA’s logic of solidarity, but it remains a thorny issue in Venezuelan politics 
(see chapter six, p.142).  In Petrocaribe this could be mean losses from upfront payment for oil supply or 
from real-terms devaluation of debt (see chapter six, pp.143, 122), whereas for the SUCRE it would be 
via ultimate payment of a large SUCRE deficit in US dollars (chapter five, p.108).  
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(RCTV/Globovisión/El Nacional), and social movements in Venezuela, Ecuador, St 
Vincent, and Antigua.  In the early stages I also sought out pertinent documents and 
participants by visiting relevant institutions such as the Romulo Gallegos Latin 
American Studies Centre (CELARG, Caracas), the Venezuelan Central Bank library, 
the archives of the Venezuelan Casa Amarilla (housing the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs), national libraries/archives of the three Anglophone members, state diplomacy 
schools (Pedro Gual Institute, Caracas, and Institute of Higher National Studies, Quito), 
and in Ecuador most notably the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO), 
whose staff and graduates have taken up positions throughout the Correa administration.  
Both to gain greater insight into the political contexts in which ALBA operates and also 
to approach potential participants, I also attended numerous academic conferences and 
civil-society workshops. 
 
Regionalism and Political Elite Interviewing 
In some cases institutions themselves held documents relevant to this research but 
available only in print, as with the Libros Amarillos (Yellow Books) of the Venezuelan 
foreign service that record all significant diplomatic interactions with other states.  But 
more commonly it was interviewees who provided documents unavailable via other 
channels, including a number of unpublished texts, internal reports, and confidential 
analyses; this was the first key advantage of elite interviews.  But a second and more 
important consideration was that this work’s ontology sees regional initiatives as social 
processes rather than an epiphenomenon of structural position or national interest, 
meaning that access to the technical level and the “reality on the ground” could only be 
gained from the perceptions of those involved in implementation.  Key actors and 
institutions involved in ALBA initiatives had been identified in advance, and this 
informed purposive selection of interviews where possible.  However, it was nigh on 
impossible to pre-arrange interviews with a fixed set of officials and politicians, making 
a degree of snowball sampling inevitable. 
In practice, the range of elite political interviewees was wide, including one head 
of state, numerous current and former ministers, eight serving ambassadors, and a 
multitude of senior officials.  Some interviewees were the same high-level political 
actors whose public discourse had to be approached more critically, but the intimacy 
and interactivity of interviews on particular themes, as well as the option of anonymity, 
gives this data greater credibility.  This was in any case complemented by consultation 
with the lower-level officials getting their hands dirty on the nuts and bolts of ALBA’s 
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core initiatives.  Overall, despite the contingency inherent to elite interviewing, this 
work can draw on insights from key actors in each of the initiatives studied in depth: 
negotiators of the TCP-ACD process; designers, implementers, and users of the 
SUCRE; and officials at both the creditor and debtor ends of Petrocaribe agreements. 
 
Regionalisation and Wider Participation 
Yet, since this work also examines the regionalisation that occurs around ALBA 
regionalism, to focus solely on state actors would have been insufficient.  As Jean 
Grugel and Will Hout argue, agreeing upon a regionalist strategy and formulating 
technical means of its achievement guarantees neither the capacity nor the conditions 
necessary to its implementation (Grugel & Hout 1999, p.11).  Rather, once an initiative 
leaves the drawing board, it faces complex challenges, as: 
 
[a] great diversity of actors interven[e] during the different phases or at the 
different levels of regional integration politics, such as the social construction 
of national preferences, [and] the negotiations or the implementation of 
policies.  
(Dabène 2012b, p.23) 
 
That is, ALBA initiatives are executed and employed by the staff of regional 
institutions, member-state bureaucracies, and local end-users (businesses, NGOs, social 
movements), all of whom are subject to the pressures of domestic politics.  A well-
planned grandnational enterprise may emerge stillborn because it steals market share 
from a company owned by the agriculture minister’s brother-in-law; private 
ophthalmologists may be too powerful a constituency for a particular government to 
risk undermining them through regionalisation of Misión Milagro’s free eye operations.  
These are the small spanners in the intricate works of many a grand project, in LAC as 
elsewhere, and in order to understand them, this work also involves stakeholders from 
across the board – activists, journalists, opposition politicians, development agencies, 
and even the ultimate beneficiaries of ALBA social programmes. 
 
Considerations of Interview Content and Context 
The content of interviews changed over time and according to the interviewee’s 
relationship to ALBA, but all were semi-structured.  Essentially, the opacity of ALBA 
institutions meant that only a basic idea of implementation could be achieved from afar, 
but early interviews allowed me to sketch the lay of the land using participants’ superior 
local knowledge.  A growing understanding of the reality of ALBA then guided 
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selection of future participants and content.  Length and structure varied depending on 
time constraints and on intuitive adaptation to the interviewee’s preferred level of 
formality.  Ultimately, the aim was to gain sufficient trust to enable participants to 
speak openly and honestly about an organisation whose role remains a controversial 
issue within the polarized politics of its member-states.  Where this trust was achieved, 
discussions were disarmingly frank and diverse, often deviating into dialogues on wider 
issues of Latin American politics and society.24  But the central purpose of interviews 
was, in the first instance, to achieve a clearer picture of the extent of ALBA’s 
implementation from those charged with implementing its initiatives.  This then allowed 
me to probe the perceived causes of the success, unevenness, or outright failure of the 
initiative in question.  This was to counteract the paucity of data already described, as 
well as to allow for a more qualitative examination of actors’ own experiences of the 
conflicts and convergences that encumber or enable aspects of ALBA’s “shared 
development” 
 Overall, a total of 88 interviews carried out across seven countries (see Table 1, 
below) yielded enough high-quality data to enable this work’s close examination of 
ALBA’s three core economic initiatives. 
 
Table 1: Number of interviews by country 
Venezuela Colombia Ecuador Trinidad St Vincent Dominica Antigua 
32 4 27 1 10 9 9 
 
The vast majority of interviewees agreed to be recorded, increasing the reliability of 
direct quotations in this work.  Yet, many also feared that information disclosed could – 
in the wrong hands – be employed as a stick with which to beat them or their 
employers, and therefore requested anonymity.  The positions of participants are 
therefore specified only insomuch as is possible without jeopardising this anonymity; 
in-text references refer by number (e.g. I.34 = interview 34) to the interview list in 
appendix one (p.214). 
 The data-poor context of ALBA and this work’s inclusion of inherently furtive 
factors (such as corruption) also beg the question of the extent to which conclusions can 
be drawn based on absences of information or explicitly “off the record” information 
                                                 
24 Besides the fact that tangential discussions built a rapport crucial to trust and credibility, a secondary 
aim of this ESRC-funded project was to encourage my development as a researcher, and these were some 
of the most illuminating discussions on LAC politics that I have ever had. 
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(which I did receive on occasion).  If – returning to the hypothetical example above – 
the progress of a grandnational enterprise is blocked out of nepotism, no one will be 
shouting it from the rooftops, yet to overlook the possibility would severely undermine 
any understanding of its failure.  As this work deals in part with the damaging 
regionalisation of problems in national political economies, there are times when such 
estimations have to be made.  There is no simple solution to this dilemma beyond 
foregrounding the issue here and flagging up any later claims that cannot be fully 
substantiated for this reason.  “Off the record” comments, meanwhile, were useful in 
guiding my investigation, even if by their very nature they were debarred from overt 
discussion in this work. 
 
An Overview of the Thesis 
Findings and Argument 
This research finds that the implementation and impact of ALBA initiatives varies 
widely, yet in ways that reveal specific classes of problem which undermine common 
assertions about ALBA.   
 
First, while the theorised regionalisation of endogenous-development strategies does 
occur, fostering instances of cooperative development planning and indeed practice, 
there is no guarantee that complementarities exist or can be created.  On the contrary, 
the national political economies within ALBA come with structural properties and 
inherited characteristics that constrain their government’s efforts at cooperation.  The 
ALBA literature’s focus on the conscious endogenous-development strategies of 
ALBA’s New-Left governments has obscured the true hybridity of its national political 
economies, where in reality their continuities play an important role in producing the 
observed outcome of an unevenly implemented and somewhat dysfunctional ALBA. 
 
Second, radical though ALBA members and initiatives may be on paper, in reality they 
must operate within an array of international constraints.  Sovereignty has been ceded to 
all manner of institutions, including numerous regional and multilateral arrangements 
which come with their own binding obligations.  ALBA does promote a measure of 
autonomy, but these institutions often circumscribe it.  Further, ALBA’s own regional 
initiatives can result in one state’s attempts to achieve endogenous development and 
autonomy curbing another’s. 
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Third, though the existing literature focuses on the input legitimacy implied by 
participatory democratic reforms and the output legitimacy inherent in provision of 
effective solutions to the problems of marginalised groups, questions of output and 
control legitimacy – as well as their interplay – are more significant.  Output legitimacy, 
or the provision of effective solutions, is in fact crucial to the garnering of broad-based 
support for ALBA initiatives, which in turn modulates conflict over their 
implementation.  Control legitimacy, or the guaranteeing of accountability, is deficient, 
allowing practices noxious to ALBA’s goals to flourish. This regionalisation of 
dysfunctional aspects of national political economies hampers implementation of 
ALBA’s regional initiatives and weakens in turn commonly intended effects on 
development, autonomy, and legitimacy. 
 
Fourth, although accounts of ALBA rightly identify Venezuelan influence as defining, 
they overlook the divergence between rhetoric and reality in its pursuance of Twenty-
First Century Socialism.  Rather than producing transformative socio-economic shifts, 
the basic structure of Venezuela’s distinctly capitalist economy has endured throughout 
the Chávez era.  Establishment of parallel governance structures under presidential 
control alongside the traditional state has created a tense and dysfunctional political 
economy.  Given Venezuela’s dominance and ubiquity in ALBA, these problems also 
bleed into and undermine regional interactions under its auspices.  Ecuador’s often 
positive involvement, meanwhile, has been largely overlooked, whereas Anglophone 
Caribbean members are somewhat miscast as passive recipients of Bolivarian aid and 
ideology. 
 
Fifth and finally, contrary to much of the literature ALBA is not transformative.  
Though certain initiatives do empower poorer constituencies, it is those initiatives that 
are least prejudicial to existing social structures which see the fullest implementation 
and greatest impact.  Less successful are the genuinely integrative and potentially 
transformative elements promoting the kind of interdependence that might bring about 
the “economic zone of shared development” sought by ALBA.   
 
Contributions 
Through development of these arguments based on a comprehensive and systematic 
reassessment of ALBA, this work makes a number of contributions to the existing 
literature. 
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 The first contribution is empirical.  As we have seen, accounts of ALBA have 
suffered from severe empirical and methodological deficiencies, not least the fact that 
“save for a few exceptions, no field research whatsoever has been carried out” (Absell 
2012, p.79).  Since the national and regional institutions involved are generally 
unforthcoming in terms of transparency and reporting (Benzi 2010, p.18), the very act 
of gathering, marshalling, and analysing clear, reliable, first-hand data on ALBA’s core 
initiatives represents a significant contribution.  This will allow other scholars of ALBA 
– and of national, regional, and global processes in which ALBA is often implicated – 
to incorporate solid and sorely needed empirical data into their own work.  Further, 
since the three core initiatives studied here are themselves often used to substantiate 
wider trends in the global political economy – the SUCRE and regional currency 
arrangements, for example, or Petrocaribe and south-south cooperation – chapters four 
to six also serve as comprehensive standalone studies of individual initiatives upon 
which other IPE scholars can draw.  Since the SUCRE and especially Petrocaribe 
remain relevant political issues in their participant states, this work could also contribute 
to policy debates over the reinforcement or reform of these initiatives.  And with ALBA 
pressing ahead with plans for a multilateral EcoALBA economic zone, its practitioners 
might also learn from the mistakes of the Venezuela-Ecuador TCP-ACD process. 
 The second contribution is analytical.  This relates to this work’s review and 
critique of the literature of ALBA.  While there has already been one such review 
(Absell 2012), its coverage of nineteen works by sixteen authors is far from exhaustive 
and its analysis allows more theoretical accounts off the hook when it comes to 
empirical substantiation.  This work’s second chapter provides a more wide-ranging 
review which not only isolates the key themes and debates, but also effectively critiques 
the frequent empirical and methodological failings that distort the dominant 
understandings of ALBA.  Although this analysis is carried out here only en route to 
defining the purpose and approach of this work, it represents in itself a valuable 
contribution to the still largely uncharted territory of ALBA scholarship. 
 The third contribution is theoretical.  This work proposes that the literature of 
ALBA has consistently misunderstood the dynamics of ALBA by placing too great an 
emphasis on state-guided, volitional “regionalism”, thereby underplaying the 
contingent, unguided, unforeseen “regionalisation” of political-economic contradictions 
and tensions involving a multitude of actors.  This is complemented by the inclusion of 
implementation as an important measure and mediator of the impact of regional 
arrangements.  The ALBA literature is found to have focused too heavily on change 
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over continuity, particularly with regards the implementation of endogenous 
development and the types of legitimacy underpinned by ALBA initiatives. 
 
Thesis Structure 
 Chapter Two: Reassessing and Redressing Accounts of ALBA 
The main body of this work begins with a review and critique of the literature of ALBA 
that underlines the rationale and pressing need for this research project itself.  It 
sketches five key “lines of best fit” that run through the literature’s central debates on 
the defining influence of Venezuela and Cuba, the nature of ALBA’s national political 
economies, the nature of intra-ALBA relations in the face of globalisation, the 
legitimisation of incumbent governments through regionalisation of inclusive and 
effective governance, and ALBA’s potential for transformative impact.  From this 
emerges a set of five recurring arguments against which to compare the findings of our 
own reassessment of ALBA regionalism.  Accounts are then categorised in terms of the 
degree of criticality or credulity applied in their analysis, with a distinction drawn 
between those that take ALBA “at its word”, those that “question the word” of ALBA, 
and those that “twist” its words.  Finally, this work’s approach and analytical 
framework are laid out in terms of their relationship to the deficiencies of the existing 
literature. 
 
 Chapter Three: The National Roots of ALBA 
Since ALBA is commonly held to complement and compound the development models 
of its member-states, particularly founders Venezuela and Cuba, chapter three begins 
this work’s reassessment at the national level.  It finds that there are indeed significant 
overlaps between member-states, particularly with regards the role of the state in 
fostering inward-looking development, the foreign-policy promotion of LAC within a 
context of multipolarity, and legitimacy garnered both from new participatory 
institutions (input) and from welfare provision to the newly politicised poor (output).  
Yet, the development strategies of ALBA’s New-Left governments retain significant 
differences and have in any case achieved different levels of implementation.  In 
Venezuela particularly – though not exclusively – the clash between new development 
ideas and inherited characteristics of is political economy has created tensions that will 
later be implicated in debilitating conflicts around ALBA initiatives.  
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 Chapter Four: The People’s Trade Agreement (TCP) 
Analysis of the TCP initiative concludes that despite attempts at both multi- and 
bilateral versions, the TCP remains entirely unimplemented within ALBA.  This 
seriously undermines the claims of many accounts of ALBA, as well as the rhetoric of 
its heads of state about the imminent arrival of a credible zone of shared development.   
The TCP’s failure thwarts the ultimate aim of fostering regional value chains with 
higher value-added that would key into endogenous-development reforms at the 
domestic level and produce tangible benefits in terms of employment, prices, stability of 
supply, and popular wellbeing.  The multilateral TCP process especially was hindered 
first by the sub-regional commitments of ALBA states, particularly Anglophone 
members committed to the OECS and CARICOM, and then by a wider concern for 
WTO rules and the dangers of their contravention.  The bilateral process was hindered 
by a lack of state capacity, with officials unable to produce a workable format that 
would go beyond principles and generalities to applicability, and ultimately by 
problems of corruption in Venezuela and internal division in Ecuador.  Essentially, 
these domestic problems were regionalised alongside the proposed solution of the TCP, 
condemning it to failure. 
 
 Chapter Five: The Unified Regional Compensation System (SUCRE) 
Analysis of the SUCRE initiative concludes that it has been implemented and employed 
unevenly, meaning that it has performed to some degree the role for which it was 
designed.  Thus, it does underwrite and reinforce shared endogenous-development 
strategies at the national level, albeit with caveats.  It provides actors of all shapes and 
sizes with a well-designed technical mechanism that provides a competitive cost 
advantage – a secular rather than ideological benefit.  It has achieved a healthy level of 
credibility and sustainability through its ratification by national parliaments, a level of 
institutionalisation rare in ALBA.  Since benefits to states involved are proportional to 
uptake, this combined sense of utility and permanence cements the SUCRE’s success.  
This success is qualified, however.  First, imbalances in its central Venezuela-Ecuador 
trade relationship, which by design should tend towards equilibrium, mitigate much of 
the SUCRE’s impact.  Second, aspects of national endogenous-development strategies – 
and the malpractices arising around them – further limit its commonly theorised 
beneficial effects on autonomy and endogenous development. 
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 Chapter Six: Petrocaribe 
Analysis of Petrocaribe shows this initiative to have had a remarkable impact, at once 
reducing the inherent vulnerability of its Caribbean signatories and underwriting the 
social, human-development aspects of their national political economies.  This has come 
about mainly through the central oil-price buffering function of Petrocaribe, but also 
through provision of grant funds and soft-loan financing that allow incumbent 
governments to follow developmental trajectories that might otherwise be blocked by 
contextual constraints.  Even so, the barter-trade element of Petrocaribe – a mainstay of 
the literature – is found to be entirely unapplied here (and underdeveloped in general).  
Beyond problems inherent to contracting external debt, the long-term sustainability of 
the initiative is called in question by its dependence on parallel structures in Venezuela 
that revolve around PDVSA and the presidency. 
 
 Chapter Seven: ALBA Reassessed 
The concluding chapter revisits the five arguments outlined above, highlighting their 
empirical basis in preceding chapters on national political economies and specific 
ALBA initiatives.  It discusses ALBA’s troubled regionalisation of continuity and 
change, the difficulties of asserting autonomy amidst international constraints, the 
importance of broad output legitimacy, the misinterpretation of member-states’ 
individual influences on ALBA, and how failings in implementation undermine hopes 
for transformation.  After returning to this work’s central question and reaching an 
overall conclusion, it queries the extent to which this conclusion was shaped by issues 
of research design.  Finally, ALBA’s incomplete implementation is considered in terms 
of its implications for scholars, for future research, and for the future of ALBA itself. 
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Chapter Two: Reassessing and Redressing Accounts of ALBA 
 
The job is to ask questions – it always was – and to ask them as inexorably as I 
can. 
(Arthur Miller, in Crow 2011, p.34) 
 
This chapter reviews and critiques existing accounts of ALBA, whilst also underlining 
the ways in which this research responds to their failings.  It reveals how ALBA’s 
opacity gives rise to two clear tendencies: a severe paucity of data means either that 
scholars are forced to “give ALBA the benefit of the doubt” by echoing official 
depictions of its nature, purpose, and impact, or that scholars use ALBA as a blank 
canvas on which to paint their own caricatures of the New Left’s regional element.  This 
means that there exist both mainstream “lines of best fit” through key debates in the 
ALBA literature, and also numerous extreme accounts suggesting that ALBA represents 
everything from a transformative anti-capitalist regional arrangement to an echo 
chamber for the rhetoric of ineffectual leaders.  Outliers and “lines of best fit” alike are 
explored here in the context of debates on the defining role of Venezuela and Cuba, the 
nature of intra-ALBA relations in the face of globalisation, legitimisation through 
regionalisation of inclusive and responsive governance, and the potentially 
transformative impact of ALBA’s cooperative regional development.  From this first 
stage of analysis emerges a set of five recurring arguments with which the findings of 
our own reassessment of ALBA regionalism will go on to engage.  In the second stage, 
accounts are categorised in terms of the degree of criticality or credulity applied in their 
analysis, with a distinction drawn between those that take ALBA “at its word”, those 
that “question the word” of ALBA, and those that “twist” its words.  This outlines the 
various routes towards the wide range of judgements of ALBA’s impact found within 
the literature.  The concluding section explains how both this work’s methodological 
and analytical approaches respond to common failings in the literature, thereby enabling 
a more thorough reassessment of ALBA. 
 
Understanding Accounts of ALBA 
The existing literature’s uncertainty in the face of this work’s central research questions, 
resulting primarily from empirical weaknesses, necessitates a more sustained and 
detailed examination of the nature and impact of ALBA’s initiatives across its member-
states.  While this work cannot hope to resolve these questions conclusively, it is at least 
acutely and explicitly aware of existing problems and mindful of the need to address 
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them, ALBA’s inherent opacity notwithstanding.  This is already an advance on much 
existing work.  Yet, this existing literature can act as a guide for any new analysis, 
highlighting points of contention and consensus, as well as the key ideas upon which 
they hinge. 
As Edgardo Lander was quick to realise, “We can distinguish a very wide range 
of versions of ALBA [and] very diverse things are said in its name…” (Lander 2007, 
p.20).  Diverse as this literature is, it does remain within certain bounds; no one is 
claiming, for instance, that ALBA represents a mechanism for locking-in radical free-
market reforms that serve the interests of multinational corporations.  More than that, in 
fact, within this diversity there exist common assumptions and assertions about the role 
and impact of ALBA (Absell 2012, p.90), many of which echo the rhetoric of ALBA 
and its leaders.  The ways in which official depictions of ALBA filter into the academic 
literature are threefold.  The first is direct, with researchers simply taking official 
accounts at face value.  The second is an accident of academic form, with one 
researcher taking another’s claim as evidence, where in fact the original claim is merely 
a reproduction of an official statement.  Thus, when Riggirozzi claims that “Tahsin 
shows” the value of Cuban-Venezuelan bilateral projects in ALBA (Riggirozzi 2010, 
p.27; emphasis added), closer investigation reveals that the work in question only 
relates official claims rather than demonstrating them.  Tahsin’s own data refers in fact 
only to “signed” rather than delivered projects and emanates from ALBA’s own 
website, though the exact source is not given (2009, p.15, footnote 36).  The more 
difficult it is to find reliable primary data, the more scholars must look to secondary 
sources for corroboration, favouring this kind of obfuscation (albeit accidental).  And 
since there are few scholars working specifically on ALBA, individual accounts 
purporting to “show” anything are pounced upon and quickly become part of a small, 
self-referential literature where – as one prominent ALBA scholar lamented – “we’re all 
just citing each other” (I.35).  The third – and least significant – way in which official 
ideas infiltrate the literature is through use of grey literature from NGOs and social 
movements.  Such groups are also faced with the same paucity of data, and since they 
tend to support ALBA in principle, they are also predisposed to a “benefit of the doubt” 
position that favours the official line.  Given the thinness of the ALBA literature, many 
scholars also take grey-literature accounts as a substitute for scholarly work, meaning 
that their assertions and their empirical grounding can also be masked in the same way 
as described above. 
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These factors favour the emergence of common assumptions and assertions 
about ALBA’s role and impact within the literature.  The following examination of 
these debates reveals how certain arguments predominate and motivate a particular 
vision of ALBA against which the findings of this work can later be compared.  These 
debates revolve around: 
 
1.) The Defining Influence of Venezuela and/or Cuba 
2.) The Nature of National Political Economies within ALBA 
3.) The Nature of Intra-ALBA Relations in the Face of Globalisation 
4.) Legitimisation through Inclusive and Effective Governance 
5.) The Transformative Regionalisation of Endogenous Development 
 
The Defining Influence of Venezuela and/or Cuba 
Within the first debate, there is widespread agreement that ALBA’s functions and 
impact are closely related to the foreign and domestic policies of founders Venezuela 
and Cuba. 
The first common argument here is that ALBA is shaped by Venezuelan foreign 
policy rather than any truly regional interaction.  From this perspective, even the FTAA 
was essentially brought down by domestic Venezuelan politics, since it was the 1999 
constitution that consecrated new social, cultural, economic, and environmental rights 
which eventually came into conflict with the deeply liberalising reforms of the FTAA 
(Mora García 2007, pp.21–22).  From the Venezuela-centric perspective, ALBA reflects 
new internal concerns for social justice and participatory democracy, as expressed in the 
Venezuelan foreign-policy objective of gaining acceptance for a hemispheric Social 
Charter (Linares 2007).  This is evident in the extension of domestic policies, 
particularly social policy (misiones), to the regional level through utilisation of oil 
revenues (see Kellogg 2007, p.189; and Katz 2007, p.3).  Indeed, it is Venezuela’s 
massive resource wealth, along with its relative geographic and political centrality, that 
make it the inevitable “epicentre” of the project (Katz 2007, p.3).  This has sometimes 
been seen as a Venezuelan attempt to counteract US expansionism, albeit with 
differences on the desirability and effect of this move (cf. Katz 2007; and Corrales 
2009).  For Javier Corrales ALBA represents “soft-balancing” of the US through a new 
form of “social power diplomacy” whereby the projecting nation attracts allies through 
providing foreign governments with more latitude in domestic spending – as opposed to 
the “soft power” gravitational pull of a particular ideology or set of values (2009, p.97).  
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Briceño Monzón observes the same process to the same anti-US ends, seeing ALBA as 
an integration mechanism “sustained only by the aid that Venezuela can give to those 
countries that form part of these agreements” as opposed to a genuinely integrative 
process (2011, p.96).  Elsewhere, ALBA is seen as a form of leveraging through which 
to force other members into following Venezuela’s ideology and development model, or 
“petrol [in exchange] for adhesion to Bolivarian principles defined by Venezuela” 
(Kourliandsky 2011) – though what Venezuela stands to gain from this adhesion itself is 
left unsaid. 
A second argument here is that ALBA is more fundamentally inspired by Cuban 
interests and ideology.  Of course, the two are not mutually exclusive given the 
longstanding influence of Castro’s Cuba on developments in LAC politics (including in 
Venezuela).  Indeed, support for Cuba could be seen as a Venezuelan foreign-policy 
aim, given the prioritisation of Latin American relations in the 1999 constitution 
(CRBV 1999 Article 153).  But for some it is Cuba that is both the foremost influence 
on ALBA and also its main beneficiary.  Luis Suárez Salazar, for example, traces 
ALBA’s roots back to the 1976 Cuban constitution, which – like ALBA – counterposed 
Panamericanism and Latin Americanism, supported ideologically aligned governments, 
practiced international solidarity, and preached special and differential treatment to 
combat asymmetries.  From this perspective, ALBA represents a “milestone in the 
projection of the Cuban revolution into Latin America and the Caribbean” (Suárez 
Salazar 2005, p.42).  Kepa Artaraz shares this view, seeing ALBA as a vehicle for a 
Cuban vision of regionalism based on social-policy delivery and exchanges of solidarity 
(2012, p.25).  For Backer and Molina this regionalist channelling has been broadly 
successful; indeed, it constitutes “one of Cuba’s greatest triumphs and also its greatest 
challenge to the normative tenets of the current framework of economic globalization” 
(2010, p.109).  According to Emine Tahsin, the result is not only external, however, as 
compensated trade deals within ALBA have also plugged many holes in the Cuban 
economy, counteracting the US embargo and providing new opportunities to local 
manufacturers (Tahsin 2009, p.22).  Carlos Romero’s detailed accounts of ALBA’s 
Cuba-Venezuela core  (2009; 2010) find that political and economic relations are 
perhaps even stronger than Tahsin makes out, since even the “high politics” of security 
coalesce towards a pact of mutual assistance and a strategic military alliance (Romero 
2009, pp.6–7).  The basis of this central alliance – so strong as to “[suggest] the 
possibility of an eventual convergence [of political systems] at some point down the 
road” (Azicri 2009, p.106) – is both deeply ideological, drawing on the enduring ideas 
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and imaginary of Simon Bolivar (Mora García 2006; Azicri 2009), and deeply personal, 
depending on the warm relationship between Chávez and Castro (Azicri 2009), which 
was crucial to the radicalisation of Venezuelan politics following the coup in 2002, 
during ALBA’s 2001-2004 “fleshing out” period (Sweig 2009, p.202; Jones 2009, 
pp.468–69). 
 
The Nature of National Political Economies within ALBA 
Rather than focusing on ALBA as a reflection of the foreign policy of its founders, a 
second debate revolves around the question of whether ALBA simply represents a 
natural outgrowth of the development strategies of its member-states. 
This most frequently cited source of ALBA’s political-economic character is a 
shift towards endogenous development (Briceño Ruiz & Linares 2004; Suárez Salazar 
2005; Linares 2007).  For Riggirozzi (2012b), Muhr (2010), and Aponte García (2009), 
endogenous development involves a transition away from capitalism towards 
socialisation of the economy via the establishment of cooperatives and community-
based “popular economy” initiatives in which people’s needs trump private profit 
(Riggirozzi 2012a, pp.26–27; Muhr 2010, p.11).  This also implies state intervention for 
redistribution (Riggirozzi 2012a, p.27), as demonstrated by the newly strategic use of 
natural resources, the creation of “commanding heights” state enterprises (especially 
“grandnational” companies), and the promotion of a plurality of forms of property 
(Aponte García 2011, p.7).  Despite Ecuador and Bolivia’s idiosyncratic flirtations with 
the concept of Twenty-First Century Socialism (Escobar 2010),25 Cuba’s planned 
economy, Nicaragua’s involvement in the CAFTA-DR FTA with the US, and the 
inherent economic vulnerability of ALBA’s Anglophone small-island states, many 
influential depictions of the political-economic direction of ALBA member-states 
continue to take these changes as evidence of the defining influence of Venezuela’s 
Twenty-First Century Socialism within ALBA (amongst others, Cardozo 2007; Aponte 
García 2009; Riggirozzi 2012a).   
However, where scholars avoid this common resort to ALBA as a reflection of 
Venezuela’s endogenous-development model or more radical Twenty-First Century 
Socialism, there are marked differences in their understandings of Venezuelan political 
economy.  Rosalba Linares and Edith Guerrero Lugo borrow Osvaldo Sunkel’s term 
                                                 
25 While both Morales and Correa have sometimes used the term, Morales (and particularly his deputy 
Álvaro García Linera) ultimately opted for an unambiguously non-socialist “Andean-Amazonian 
Capitalism”, whereas Correa has stuck with the flexible, catch-all term “Citizens’ Revolution”. 
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“sociocentric phase of capitalism” to describe society’s imposition of policies in line 
with social needs and aspirations via a state that governs the market rather than vice 
versa (2010, p.322).  Less radically, Ullán de la Rosa describes ALBA only as a social 
democratic project, “a kind of ‘third way’ in Latin America between neoliberalism and 
the old economic models of Marxist statism” (2012, pp.140–41).  Regueiro Bello finds 
that competitive insertion in the global economy is only relativised – rather than 
displaced – vis-à-vis new concerns for social problems and human development, as well 
as the related prioritisation of the internal market to create socially beneficial 
employment (2008, p.301).  Gardini takes this relativisation even further, suggesting 
that the many distinct development models within ALBA share only a certain 
resurgence of the state and reassertion of the political domain over the economic, 
whereas there is no consistent application or institutionalisation of the much touted 
concept of endogenous development based on local needs and conditions (Gardini 
2010).  Antulio Rosales, meanwhile, agrees that these descriptions are simply attempts 
to impose order on what are very different national processes, leading him instead to 
focus on their main characteristics rather than any coherent model: 
 
Despite the lack of clarity at the heart of ALBA with regards the development 
model followed by its members, national productive investment prioritises 
satisfaction of social needs and the productivity of national – as opposed to 
transnational – sectors. 
(Rosales 2010, p.12) 
 
 Overall, then, there is a clear tendency – particularly in more influential accounts 
– towards the idea of ALBA as “regionaliser” of Venezuela’s endogenous-development 
model or more radical Twenty-First Century Socialism, wherein the state returns to 
commanding guidance of the economy towards social, redistributive ends that favour 
human development.  Yet, there is also great diversity in conclusions on the real 
influence and application of this model in the workings of ALBA. 
 
Intra-ALBA Relations in the Face of Globalisation 
There is discord, too, over the nature of relations between ALBA member-states.  
Gardini, for instance, echoes Kourliandsky’s vision of ALBA as a diffusion and 
reinforcement mechanism for Venezuela’s programme, since “only those countries that 
adhere strictly to the Bolivarian ideology are welcome to join” (Gardini 2010, p.18; 
Kourliandsky 2011).  Linares, meanwhile, sees ALBA rather less coercively “proposing 
[to the region] the need to introduce endogenous development at the domestic level as 
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an active instrument to reduce poverty, unemployment, and social inequality, and to 
achieve socioeconomic development and growth for the country and its citizens” (2007, 
p.35; emphasis added).  This ties in with ALBA’s official discourse of complementarity 
and cooperation as a means of overcoming asymmetries between members and enabling 
bloc-wide endogenous development.  But there are differences of opinion on the 
prevalence and evidence of this new mode of relations, as well as on the overarching 
aim of this cooperative region-centrism. 
One extreme view is that ALBA essentially closes the door on the global 
economy, representing a dominant Venezuelan-Cuban preference for “autarky and 
strictly endogenous development” (Altmann Borbón 2008, p.6).  A slightly more 
moderate conclusion is reached by Claudio Alberto Briceño Monzón, who associates 
ALBA with a Venezuelan preference for “secessionist autonomy”.  This concept, 
developed by the Argentine scholar and foreign minister Juan Carlos Puig, implies the 
achievement of the maximum possible degree of national control by means of “a global 
challenge …  cutting the umbilical cord that united [the country] with the metropolis: its 
decision-makers spontaneously or obligatorily reach decisions without taking into 
account the global strategic interests of the dominant power driving the bloc from which 
the country is retreating” (quoted in Briceño Monzón 2011, p.97).  Martin Hart-
Landsberg tempers this position again in seeing ALBA not as a drive for complete self-
sufficiency but rather as a “middle-ground delinking” which can “provide the protection 
they need to engage in the coordinated planning and production required to overcome 
existing economic distortions and weaknesses” (Hart-Landsberg 2010).  Muhr’s account 
of ALBA, however, explicitly rejects the accounts above, on the grounds that “an 
interventionist and policy coordinating mode of governance does not mean a de-linking 
from the global economy” (2010, p.11; see also Benzi 2010, p.9). 
Where Hart-Landsberg, Muhr, and many others do concur is in their finding that 
in ALBA development becomes an intra-regional concern rather than a strictly national 
one.  In this view, endogenous development is regionalised via ALBA initiatives, 
thereby traversing the limits of any single state and becoming a form of coordinated 
regionalism that Hart-Landsberg dubs “cooperative development” (2010).  For Muhr 
this kind of pooled development represents a means to greater – though not complete – 
autonomy: 
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The ALBA-TCP constructs a regional developmentalist political economy 
governed by solidarity and cooperation rather than competition and profit-
maximisation.  The objective is to increase LAC independence… 
(Muhr 2011, p.112) 
 
This reflects a common trope in the official discourse of ALBA, according to which 
ALBA is constructing a “Zone of Shared Development” (ALBA-TCP 2009a).  But for 
de la Barra (2010), Benzi (2010), Burges (2007, p.1346), Cole (2008), and especially 
Muhr (2010), ALBA’s relationship to globalisation goes beyond defensiveness or 
accommodation, becoming counter-hegemonic.  In de la Barra’s more down-to-earth 
usage, this means countering the (US) hegemon, but Benzi, Burges, Cole, and 
particularly Muhr refer to a Gramscian counter-hegemony.  In Benzi’s reading, this 
implies “resistance and progressive construction of alternative networks vis-à-vis a 
dominant model, culminating in the institution of new policies” (2010, p.9).  Muhr goes 
even further, seeing ALBA as a potentially successful alternative globaliser whose 
initiatives extend beyond LAC to become a “counter-hegemonic globalisation project 
that competes with capitalist globalisation across the global, regional, national and a 
range of sub-national/local scales” (2010, p.6).   
 Overall, then, a cooperative regionalisation of endogenous development which 
takes asymmetries into account is seen to reinforce the autonomy of ALBA and its 
member-states – if not beyond.  Yet, at the same time there is much uncertainty about 
the extent to which this shared development reconfigures links within ALBA and vis-à-
vis the global economy in ways that afford member-states and the region greater control 
over their own development. 
 
Legitimacy through Inclusive and Effective Governance 
The commonly observed political underpinning of changes in the economic models and 
international relations of ALBA states is a shift towards more participatory forms of 
governance, both domestically and regionally. 
ALBA is seen to achieve greater legitimacy through mirroring the advances 
associated with domestic political arenas that have channelled the demands of social 
movements not only into electoral success but also into governance structures such as 
communal councils in Venezuela, juntas vecinales in Bolivia (“neighbourhood 
committees”), Civic Power Councils in Nicaragua, or – to a lesser extent – 
Revolutionary Committees in Ecuador.  This process is regionalised in the shape of 
ALBA’s Social Movements Council (CMS), through which national agglomerations of 
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social movements come together both to engage in a direct dialogue with its highest 
institution, the Presidential Council (Muhr 2011, p.111), and to deliver empowering 
public services, as in the case of literacy programmes in Bolivia (Artaraz 2012).  For 
many, this inclusive regional attempt at bottom-up governance is the one feature that 
gives ALBA a truly “transformative” character (Gürcan 2010), distinguishing it both 
from other “third ways” emerging of late in Latin America (Ullán de la Rosa 2012, 
p.146) and from traditional economic regional-integration projects (Fermín Torres 2010, 
p.357).  The effect is to repoliticise and relegitimise all levels of governance across 
ALBA member-states; or, even more ambitiously, to “[infuse] public opinion into 
international law … by endowing community groups with a direct route to top-level 
decision-making processes” (Al Attar & Miller 2010, p.357).  For Al Attar and Miller 
this amounts to “constructing an international integration model guided by popular — 
not by elitist or academic — articulations of justice” (2010, p.358) in a way which 
supports Muhr’s view that “it is above all in the Social Movements Council where 
LAC’s local and national organised societies are becoming inter- and transnationally 
integrated for concerted collective action in the de- and reconstruction of the hegemonic 
structures” (Muhr 2010, p.21).   
Yet, as with other key aspects of ALBA political economy, the true extent and 
significance of any new democratic inclusiveness at the regional level is a matter of 
debate in the literature.  There is clear evidence that social movements, particularly the 
Hemispheric Social Alliance (Saguier 2007) and the wider alterglobalisation movement 
(Ullán de la Rosa 2012), greatly influenced the development of ALBA between coinage 
in 2001 and concretisation in 2004, but institutionalised participation since then has 
been harder to discern.  Despite this, an average account of ALBA might simply take 
the CMS’s existence and significance as a given, even where it is one of just four 
factors that define ALBA as a “paradigmatic break” with past models of integration 
(Fermín Torres 2010, p.362).  The most sympathetic analyses go even further despite 
the same lack of fuel: 
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With the emergence of ALBA, regional integration has stopped being a 
predatory commercial mechanism and transformed into an inclusive and 
hopeful people’s process … as with the transit from representative democracy 
to participatory and protagonic democracy, participation has stopped being an 
isolated event in which the constituting power limits itself to instituting the 
constituted power and disappears from the protagonic scene. It remains in a 
permanent process of critical and propositive interaction of social control over 
the constituted power … ‘regional integration is no longer only a government 
issue; it has turned into a peoples’ issue’ 
(de la Barra 2010, pp.651, 653) 
 
Some support for this view is offered in a frequently cited paper by David Harris 
and Diego Azzi of the Hemispheric Social Alliance (2006), which identifies a number 
of instances where social movements have participated in ALBA events and meetings.  
And Ullán de la Rosa flags up at least one important conflict – over the necessity of an 
ALBA-wide military body – in which the stance of social movements trumped that of 
the presidential council (2012, p.149).  However, these instances of significant input 
have been case-specific rather than institutionalised, with social movements entering 
only temporarily into ALBA’s “summit diplomacy” style of governance (Fermín Torres 
2010).  The fact that the idea of an ALBA-wide defence council has not gone away 
(resurfacing at the 2012 summit) and that controversial megaprojects opposed by social 
movements continue to be approved by ALBA presidents (Hart-Landsberg 2009) is 
indicative of the serious tensions inherent to this ALBA governance initiative (García 
Guadilla 2009).  In fact, deficiencies in consultation with wider society were noted in 
the very earliest analyses of ALBA (Briceño Ruiz & Linares 2004, p.41), reiterated 
some four years later (Altmann Borbón 2008, p.4), and continue to be emphasised by a 
growing number of sceptical scholars like Benzi, for whom:  
 
The Mar de Plata Summit, in 2005, marked the point of maximum convergence 
between leftist governments and popular movements.  From then on, apart from 
their common opposition to the FTAA, the difficult path towards practical 
articulation of these two actors has become ever steeper in all of the [ALBA] 
countries. 
(Benzi 2010, p.9) 
 
Even those recognising instances of social-movement input, such as Harris and 
Azzi, conclude that direct popular participation in the creation of ALBA’s principal 
summit agreements is scarcely visible (2006, p.13), whereas Thomas Fritz finds that 
despite rhetorical openness to social-movement input, “all relevant decisions to date 
have been taken on the governmental side” (2007, p.24).  Perhaps unsurprisingly then, 
even ALBA’s once close relationship with organisations such as the HSA has vacillated 
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between enthusiasm and distrust (Lander 2007, p.21), with mobilisations in favour of 
ALBA having fallen off due to its failure to provide “institutionalised participatory 
spaces” (Serbin 2011, pp.9–10).  Andrés Serbin’s evaluation of the potential for a new 
Latin American “citizens’ regionalism” based on popular participation pessimistically 
concludes that ALBA and other nascent LAC regional organisations “do not achieve an 
effective change in levels of participation and empowerment of the citizenry in regional 
integration, either in the definition of their agendas or in pushing for and promoting 
public policy of a regional character” (2011, p.30).  Martin Hart-Landsberg (2009) 
attributes these problems to an unresolved contradiction between the resurgence of a 
controlling, top-down state and a putative openness to bottom-up demands from 
grassroots social movements.  Backer and Molina’s comprehensive and meticulous 
analysis overlooks social-movement involvement altogether, finding ALBA governance 
to be so fundamentally statist that the best comparator might be the monopolistic state 
of Marxism-Leninism (2010, p.159). 
Many accounts of ALBA emphasise effective governance as a second, less 
obvious source of legitimacy, here tied up with a shift towards endogenous, people-
centred development and a more inclusive stance towards social movements.  Since 
most New-Left governments were carried into power by social movements challenging 
the reforms of the neoliberal “lost decade” of the 1980s (not least in Venezuela, Bolivia, 
and Ecuador), their underlying political movements were committed to redistribution 
and welfare provision that would serve the most vulnerable.  Many scholars of ALBA 
make the link between “the application of the endogenous model or ‘development from 
within’ in response to changes demanded by global and regional integration processes” 
and “the need to construct a model that achieves economic and social development and 
growth to allow for the combating of prevalent socio-territorial imbalances, disparities, 
and inequalities in the region so as to improve the quality of life of its inhabitants” 
(Linares 2007, p.34).  For Fermín Torres this is the “rescue of the state’s social 
function”, through which it becomes an agent of socioeconomic wellbeing for the 
pueblos, both within and between countries (2010, p.362).  This final point is key, since 
it implies a process of legitimisation at the domestic level (Hart-Landsberg 2009) that is 
reinforced – more unusually – at the regional level.  As Alberto Montero Soler explains, 
ALBA policies engage once-excluded citizens in the development of social-inclusion 
strategies that look to tackle the longstanding problems of the region’s poor majorities, 
associating tangible improvements in wellbeing with a form of regionalism that 
prioritises society over economy and solidarity over competitiveness: 
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For once, the pueblos feel that integration translates into direct and immediate 
wellbeing, an objective improvement of their conditions, and as such they are 
willing to support it. 
(Montero Soler 2006, p.97)  
 
Essentially, ALBA and the governments of its member-states are seen to be 
legitimised both by inclusive, participatory governance structures, and also by their 
regional cooperation to resolve the problems of formerly marginalised groups.   
 
The Transformative Regionalisation of Endogenous Development 
This latter notion of ALBA’s impact on the material conditions of its poorer citizens is 
frequently linked to the success of regionalised misiones.  However, many scholars go a 
step further and endow ALBA with a subjectively transformative aspect.  Though  
Riggirozzi, for example, equates “transformative power” with socio-economic impact 
(2010, p.27), her work frequently extends deeper into ideational territory.  Muhr 
interprets ALBA regionalism as a counter-hegemonic strategy aiming to imbue not only 
international relations but also individual subjectivities with moral values of solidarity 
and cooperation that are unfavourable to global capitalism (Muhr 2010, p.4).  Cole 
(2008; 2010) sees this process of subjective “concientización” (awareness raising) as the 
central purpose of ALBA, a process “essentially about the human mind understanding 
and appreciating the experience of existence” (Cole 2010, p.326), from which emerges a 
socialist consciousness (2008, p.7).  For Montero Soler this has an extra-regional 
dimension since ALBA’s core members Venezuela and Cuba provoke this “awakening 
of revolutionary and class consciousness” in order to promote a definitive left turn 
across the whole continent (2006, p.101).  Venezuelan historian J. Pascual Mora García 
a considers this a question of cultural rather than ideological awakening, seeing ALBA 
as a means of validating and asserting autochthonous, “non-Cartesian” modes of 
thought over a colonially imposed rationalist modernity (2006; 2007), as has been 
observed in ALBA members Venezuela, Ecuador, and especially Bolivia (Escobar 
2010).  Indeed, for many other scholars, ALBA’s links to social movements have seen 
Andean indigenous worldviews becoming part of the endogeneity of new development 
models (Escandell Sosa 2011; Aponte García 2011, p.7; Valencia 2009; Emerson 2013, 
pp.13–14).  This usually entails reference to either Ecuador’s Sumak Kawsay or 
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Bolivia’s Suma Qamaña,26 although concrete changes that substantiate the influence of 
these concepts are rarely provided.27 
In both Riggirozzi’s transformative regionalism and Muhr’s counter-hegemonic 
account, ALBA also forces a reassessment of the nature of regional integration itself.  
For Riggirozzi ALBA reopens the fundamental question of what regionalism is for 
(2012a, p.35); for Muhr (2010) it demonstrates a novel, tentacular, inter-level, inter-
domain institutionalisation, dubbed “flexible networks of variable geometry” by Ullán 
de la Rosa (2012) or “à la carte” regionalism by Norman Girvan (2011b); for Mora 
García it has dissolved the national-international distinction in the theory and practice of 
international relations (2006, p.51); and for Linares and Lugo (2010, p.338) and 
(Riggirozzi 2012a, p.28) it exemplifies an unusually “non-geographic” regionalism 
since none of its member-states share borders. 
If nothing else, the sheer variety of these potentially transformative effects 
demonstrates that ALBA offers a shared regional space in which to re-evaluate existing 
models and construct alternatives, which in itself is no small contribution (Backer & 
Molina 2010, p.136).  But for the most part ALBA is considered to be both materially 
and subjectively transformative, although there are doubts about the extent of this 
transformation, both individually and geographically. 
 
Lines of Best Fit: Common Arguments About ALBA 
On the whole, we find in these debates both clear “lines of best fit” that tend towards a 
certain set of assertions, and also extreme outliers to either side of these lines, albeit 
within certain bounds.  The level and degree of variance in these debates is extreme, 
rendering adjudication at once more difficult and more necessary.  In effect, it means 
that the existing literature provides conflicting answers to the research questions at the 
heart of this study.  ALBA might at one and the same time be a means of merging the 
Cuban and Venezuelan economies; a Venezuelan tool of geostrategic influence; a 
mechanism for regionalising the non-capitalist economic initiatives of Venezuela’s 
Twenty-First Century Socialism; a process of delinking from the global economy; a 
functioning form of cooperative development; a bulwark against (neoliberal) 
globalisation outside of LAC; a transformative channel for autochthonous worldviews; 
or a novel intra-regional political consolidation of like-minded incumbent governments.  
                                                 
26 Respectively Quichua and Aymara terms translated into Spanish as Buen Vivir and Vivir Bien, both of 
which usually cross into English as “Living Well”. 
27 Ullán de la Rosa being a partial exception (2012, p.154). 
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Even if many might see ALBA as a coherent model of regionalism, there is little 
agreement on its nature.  Despite this internal variation, we can discern certain 
assertions that feed into a wider set of common arguments about ALBA: 
 
A.) ALBA serves to further the foreign-policy goals Venezuela and Cuba. 
B.) ALBA regionalises reforms associated with endogenous development, most 
notably the return of the state to commanding guidance of the economy towards 
social and industrial policies that favour human development. 
C.) ALBA regionalises a resurgent concern for the autonomy both of member-states 
and of the LAC region vis-à-vis the global economy, with intraregional 
asymmetries targeted via cooperative development. 
D.) ALBA is legitimised by newly inclusive and impactful governance that extends 
participatory democratic reforms and effective welfare provision from the 
domestic to the regional level. 
E.) ALBA is transformative and impacts upon the material circumstances and 
mindsets of individuals and states. 
 
This work evaluates the strength of these arguments in light of a thorough interrogation 
of the ALBA initiatives upon which they are constructed.  To this end, it draws from the 
existing literature three key concepts around which these arguments pivot: endogenous 
development, particularly in the Venezuelan mould (in arguments A and B); reasserted 
autonomy (C); and new sources of legitimacy (D), whereas transformative impact (E) is 
subsumed into a wider consideration of impact more generally.  These concepts form 
the basis of an analytical framework that is carried through the entire work, from the 
national level, via regional initiatives, and into concluding considerations of the 
implications of ALBA’s incomplete implementation. 
In developing our own reassessment of ALBA, however, it is also important to 
recognise the role of different degrees of criticality towards ALBA in shaping this 
literature.  Essentially, the force of these arguments is mediated by the degree of 
criticality involved in different approaches to the scarce empirical material upon which 
the literature can draw.  As the following section reveals, the few sceptical accounts of 
ALBA have shown that there is much to be gained from adopting a more critical stance 
to the official line, though this requires a series of minor modifications to our core 
concepts.   
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Approaches to ALBA: Criticality, Credulity, and Corroboration 
As was noted at the outset of this examination of the literature, variation in the 
approaches and “rigour” of different accounts underlies arguments made both in the 
mainstream and at the extremes of the ALBA literature.  There are two main elements to 
this: scholars’ positions on a credulity-criticality scale and the nature of the evidence 
used to corroborate their accounts.  Though in reality different approaches may be taken 
in relation to different initiatives within a given study – perhaps also a function of 
differences in availability of reliable data – broad-brush we can divide the literature into 
accounts that: 
 
i) Take ALBA at its word 
ii) Question the word of ALBA 
iii) Twist ALBA’s words 
 
ALBA “At its Word” 
As Absell (2012) has shown, within the ALBA literature there is a clear prevalence of 
“at its word” accounts which “look kindly upon” ALBA and its aims.28  A hard core of 
these tend to take readers down a well-trodden path, starting from ALBA’s emergence, 
going via its institutional development at a series of summits, taking in its principles and 
achievements to date, and ending with some challenges that have yet to be overcome 
(see, for example, Chinas 2011 or Espinosa Martínez 2007).  In the worst cases, there is 
a near-total absence of analysis of the meat on ALBA’s institutional bones or of the few 
potential problems highlighted.  More commonly, however, research in this category 
might include relatively complex consideration of the significance of ALBA for LAC 
and the wider world order, excluding at the crucial moment a more detailed 
investigation of the initiatives underlying theorised changes in the nature of LAC 
models of regionalism and development.  Can we say, for example, that the ALBA 
Bank embodies a new intra-regional development model and simply leave it at that?  It 
seems that we can, since this is precisely what a great many scholars have done, even if 
they have distributed their superficial attention unevenly.  Thus, some opt to treat the 
ALBA Bank and regionalised misiones with little critical depth (Cole 2008), while 
others do the same with the People’s Trade Agreement or grandnational enterprises 
(Gürcan 2010, pp.24–27; Emerson 2013, pp.14–15).  Even much-cited, theoretically 
and empirically sophisticated accounts evince this failing in places (e.g. Grandnationals 
                                                 
28 Indeed, Absell’s review is entitled “Looking Kindly Upon the ALBA-TCP” (mirado con buenos ojos). 
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in Muhr 2010, p.13; Riggirozzi 2012a, pp.27–28).  Given the poverty of empirical 
material available on ALBA initiatives, one common and somewhat understandable 
response is to fall back on unsubstantiated declarations (e.g. Kellogg 2007, pp.200–
203).  Though it could conceivably be argued that the discursive element of ALBA is 
significant in itself, this is not the approach commonly adopted; rather scholars take a 
leap of faith and discourse comes to be treated as effective and functional policy.   
 
Questioning the Word of ALBA 
Instances of questioning the word of ALBA, meanwhile, provide evidence of the 
benefits of more critical, empirically informed inquiry.  Instead of reading off ALBA’s 
functions and motivations from its founding documents, early work by Briceño Ruiz 
and Linares (2004), for example, made good use of primary-source documents from the 
Presidential Advisory Commission on FTAA Negotiations to establish convincingly the 
roots of ALBA in Venezuela’s ideological opposition to the FTAA.  Instead of taking 
for granted that the LAC regional “spaghetti bowl” (Bhagwati 1995) can expand 
indefinitely without the sauce getting ruined – and despite a clear normative preference 
for ALBA-style regionalism – Claudio Katz (Katz 2008) opted not to gloss over the 
potential contradictions of Venezuela’s simultaneous pursuit of full Mercosur 
membership and a fully-functional ALBA, given the two regional arrangements’ vastly 
different aims and modes (similarly, Fritz 2007, pp.5–8; on Bolivia, see Costoya 2011).  
Instead of assuming that democratisation “all the way down” is occurring in line with 
ALBA’s principles, Fritz finds that despite a declared commitment to participatory 
governance, state enterprises still operate in an “antidemocratic” manner, potentially 
undermining positive achievements in other areas (Fritz 2007, p.22).  Instead of 
supposing that the TCP has delivered a fairer mode of trade between ALBA member-
states, Rosales compares the proposal with real changes in trade relationships, finding 
that “from 2006 to date [2010], there have been no great achievements towards putting 
into practice the projects enshrined in this agreement” (Rosales 2010, p.7).  Instead of 
presuming that trade via grandnational enterprises necessarily produces social and 
socialising benefits, Aponte García begins to analyse the links between domestic 
private, state, and mixed entities both up- and downstream of these region-level actors 
(2011, pp.11–15); quite apart from the intriguing specifics of her findings – not least 
that ALBA trades more in food than in oil (p.10) – her in-depth investigation and 
analysis hints at how novel development ideas and practices might begin to be diffused 
and embedded across member political economies.  Instead of trusting that ALBA’s 
 52 
 
anti-neoliberal proclamations are reflected in political-economic practice, Backer and 
Molina examine bilateral investment treaties (BITs) between members and discover that 
despite their putative grounding in radically divergent principles, their substantive 
content differs only marginally from that of US BITs (2010, pp.151–156).  These 
examples of more critically or empirically sophisticated approaches to particular 
initiatives serve to illustrate how deeper questions can be foregrounded so as to achieve 
a fuller understanding of ALBA regionalism, but they tend to represent only pointed 
departures from more credulous wider interpretations. 
 
Twisting ALBA’s Words 
For the most part, scholars appear to have a favourable view of ALBA and its potential 
impact (Absell 2012, p.90), but there is also a hyper-critical end of the scale where we 
find polemical accounts which go out of their way to discredit ALBA or even to present 
it as a serious threat to peace in the Americas.  Since their pursuit of this happy 
conclusion requires some intense massaging of the facts, this kind of work falls into the 
third and final category of research: accounts that twist ALBA’s word.  At the thin end 
of the wedge, Javier Corrales unfavourable take on ALBA presents some valuable ideas 
on the regionalisation of Venezuelan problems of state incapacity and corruption, but he 
unnecessarily “sexes up” his dossier with unsubstantiated denunciations of local 
“indoctrination units” (ALBA Houses) from Peru’s García-led opposition and with 
accusations about the fallibility of Venezuela’s electoral process that were long ago 
dismissed by those best-placed to comment  (Corrales 2009, pp.100, 103; on elections 
see McCoy 2004).29  Depictions of ALBA at the thick end of the wedge are far more 
misleading.  Most notable here are Joel D. Hirst, formerly of the right-wing Council on 
Foreign Relations, and Jon B. Perdue, director of Latin American programmes for the 
free-market-promoting Fund for Latin American Studies.  Hirst’s monograph on ALBA 
(2012) contains chapters on “The ALBA as a Narco-Organization” and “The ALBA, 
Iran, and Terrorism”, whereas Perdue’s apocalyptic “The War of All the People: The 
Nexus of Latin American Radicalism and Middle Eastern Terrorism” (2012) adds a 
touch of fire and brimstone to an alarmist argument already advanced by Sean Goforth 
(2011).  One might argue that sympathetic visions of ALBA are equally misguided, and 
indeed positive and negative accounts at the very extremes do share a disregard for 
                                                 
29 Jennifer McCoy, often associated with the Carter Center, has carried out exhaustive investigations of 
Venezuela’s electronic voting system and consistently found it trustworthy.  Various other observation 
missions of international institutions have reached the same conclusion. 
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proper empirical substantiation.  Extremely positive accounts may indeed be willing 
victims of ALBA’s lack of transparency, eagerly offering the benefit of the doubt to 
official depictions, but rarely do they stray into the realms of pure speculation.  
Scholar’s like Joel D. Hirst, however, are willing to claim a nuclear link between 
Venezuela and Iran based merely on off-the-record conversations with unspecified 
“people in Venezuela and abroad” and the defiant expression of a hunch: “to the 
naysayers, I ask: why wouldn’t [Chávez assist Iran in its nuclear program]?” (Hirst 
2012, p.227).  Like the most extremely credulous accounts of ALBA, these poorly 
supported depictions of ALBA are of little interest here.  Their real significance is as an 
indication of the extent to which ALBA’s often ambiguous words lend themselves to 
twisting. 
 
The Inconclusive Impact of ALBA Regionalism 
With judgements of ALBA reached by such varied means – and sometimes to rhetorical 
ends – even debates on specific themes and particular initiatives within the literature are 
characterised by extreme differences of opinion.  Unsurprisingly, their aggregation into 
a conclusive verdict on the impact and importance of ALBA is problematic if not 
impossible. 
There are those that see in ALBA the dawning of a “new Latin America 
philosophical anthropology” (Mora García 2007), the “[inauguration of] an age of cross-
cultural collaboration to actualise all human potential” (Al Attar & Miller 2010, p.360), 
or even “the transcendental power of love prevailing over cólera [cholera] (la 
globalización [globalisation])” (Cole 2010, p.328).30  In more straightforward terms, it 
has been seen as a potential continental federation (Vascós González 2010), “a concrete 
alternative to the present form of neo-liberal globalization” (Deacon et al. 2007, p.3), a 
“total rupture with the classical economics driven vision of integration [which] signals a 
way forward to post-neoliberal and emancipatory paths ... not only for Latin America 
but for the entire world…” (de la Barra 2010, pp.651–52), the “most promising … 
attempt at cooperative development anywhere in the world” (Hart-Landsberg 2010), and 
the harbinger of “a new era of trade and commerce whose primary interest is the welfare 
of all people, and not merely just profits, as the standard mode of  operation” (Backer & 
Molina 2010, p.163). 
                                                 
30 Cole is drawing an analogy with García Marquez’s Love in a Time of Cholera.  Neither the florid 
language nor the recourse to literature troubles me; my intention is not to belittle this approach.  
Nevertheless, it does illustrate the extremity of some assertions about ALBA. 
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Yet, it is difficult to square these conclusions with those of other scholars, for 
whom ALBA “is, more than anything, a concept” (Gardini 2010, p.18), a “declarative 
proposal … anchored more in values and political alternatives than in concrete content” 
(Lander 2007, p.19).  Even if this version of ALBA has partially “displac[ed] the 
‘orthodox’ neoliberal model as the model for the region” (Emerson 2013, p.12), these 
more sceptical accounts conclude overall that “for the moment, [ALBA] isn’t changing 
the world” (Ullán de la Rosa 2012, p.163).  Ultimately, Backer and Molina capture the 
essence of the debate in asserting simply that ALBA represents a “great experiment 
[whose] outcome is by no means certain” (2010, p.162). 
 
Improving on Existing Approaches 
One way to gain an insight into the real results of this “great experiment” is to tackle the 
two deficiencies that underpin “at its word” accounts, which is precisely the aim of this 
work. 
 
The Dangers of Data Scarcity 
The first key deficiency is a distinct and widespread lack of reliable first-hand data on 
ALBA and its initiatives (Benzi 2010, p.18).  The clearest constraint here is that most 
researchers simply have neither the time nor the money to address this problem through 
fieldwork, meaning that “save for a few exceptions, no field research whatsoever has 
been carried out” (Absell 2012, p.79).  One possible response is to accept that the 
everyday reality of ALBA is simply off-limits to most research, as suggested by Ullán 
de la Rosa: 
 
…an honest piece of research that does not intend to add greater confusion to 
the phenomenon must, in our opinion, for now focus fundamentally on the 
study of ALBA’s platform [programa], limiting its analysis of praxis only to 
small and cautious incursions that are very well documented. 
(Ullán de la Rosa 2012, p.145) 
 
But given what we have seen of the ALBA literature, this would seem, first, to run the 
risk of inviting scholars to re-tread ground already trodden and re-trodden by any 
number of others; second, to describe in any case the approach already taken, whereby 
scraps of empirical material are seized upon for depth while areas demanding first-hand 
investigation are brushed over; and third, to preclude the possibility of obtaining data 
that is not served up on a plate by interested parties.  Were this suggestion to have 
emerged in the years immediately following ALBA’s launch in 2004, its logic would be 
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more justifiable.  But with ALBA celebrating its eighth birthday in the same year that 
Ullán de la Rosa made this recommendation, he might legitimately have expected 
ALBA to be able to stand on its own two feet (or many tentacles). 
 Further, although a paucity of data naturally promotes “at its word” accounts, 
my own experience has revealed that even remote digging beneath the surface of key 
initiatives can unearth serious doubts about their functionality and impact.  The question 
then becomes one of why the literature turns a blind eye to such doubts in favour of 
“observ[ing] the romance of ALBA” (Absell 2012, p.90), with ALBA taken broadly to 
be functional, impactful, and therefore as significant as its member governments would 
have us believe.  James Comaroff’s frank depiction of the left-wing scholar’s dilemma 
in analysing the 2008 financial crisis is germane here: 
 
I want to see millennial hope in this moment; I want to see radical change 
emerge from some of the more egregious contradictions of neoliberal capitalism 
come visibly home to roost; I want to see the so-called “masters of the 
universe”  punished for their grotesque excesses … but desires and satisfactions 
are one thing, diagnostics quite another. 
(Comaroff 2011, p.142) 
 
Transposing to the case of ALBA, if Latin Americanists in general are in some sense 
“on Latin America’s side”, then it follows that this is particularly true of a subgroup that 
has opted to research a radical proposal for cooperative integration as a means of 
reasserting national and regional autonomy.31  Thus, despite the misgivings that 
inevitably arise out of data scarcity, even “sceptics give ALBA the benefit of the doubt, 
[whereas] those fighting for a better world build their hopes with it” (Regueiro Bello 
2008, p.327).  This normative disposition towards the benefit of the doubt represents the 
second key deficiency of the existing literature as it combines with the opacity of 
ALBA institutions and the verbosity of its leaders to produce credulous analyses. 
 
The Value of Fieldwork in Taking Regionalisation Seriously 
Yet, there is an alternative to Ullán de la Rosa’s call to rein in our ambitions and simply 
accept the data-related problems involved in studying ALBA.  This involves changes 
both methodological and analytical, many of which are expressed by Benzi’s own 
prescription for advancing the ALBA literature: 
 
                                                 
31 I cannot claim to be any different, since I too would like to see ALBA succeed in line with its design 
and principles.  Yet, like Comaroff I am aware of this issue and of its potentially damaging consequences.  
Essentially, I agree with Oscar Wilde that “your friends stab you in the front”. 
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It would be extremely important to open up new spaces for field research, both 
in cases of triangulation [of initiatives between member-states] and also about 
the Cuban contribution to Bolivarian missions [in Venezuela] and in the other 
countries, given that extraordinary examples of active participation in the 
design of social policy can very easily become routine “handout” mechanisms 
that do not strengthen popular sectors but instead reinforce clientelist dynamics 
and the power of old and new bureaucracies germinating within states.  In 
Venezuela’s case there exist many signs of this, being evidenced here and there 
by the deterioration of experiences like Barrio Adentro and other misiones that 
were once very successful. 
(Benzi 2010, p.18) 
 
That is, rather than accepting data scarcity, the manifest but largely unacknowledged 
travails of even a relatively successful aspect of ALBA like Barrio Adentro require that 
first-hand data be unearthed, and this not only in the areas of volitional, states-led 
regionalism that are covered by “at its word” accounts built around member-states’ own 
depictions of ALBA’s progress. 
 The rationale for fieldwork involving documentary analysis and elite 
interviewing has already been detailed in some depth (chapter one, pp.23-30), but the 
need for an analytical broadening merits further attention.  What is unusual about 
Benzi’s statement is its implicit call for consideration of a number of areas obscured or 
ignored by a focus on states-led, institutionalised regionalism over the spontaneous, 
unguided, and often unintended elements of regionalisation that can impinge upon state 
action.  In essence, Benzi is advocating for a more thorough investigation of 
implementation and impact, whilst recognising the potentially mitigating effect on both 
of tensions between the aims, actors, and actuality of even this emblematic ALBA 
initiative.  Benzi’s example also hints at the nature of these frequently underplayed 
tensions: 
 
a) The aims of a regional initiative can be subverted by elements of national 
political economies (in Benzi’s example, the welfare effects of regional social 
programme Barrio Adentro being undone by a deterioration caused by 
corruption in one member-state); 
b) These elements may be continuities inherited from previous administrations 
rather than the conscious innovations of governments’ development strategies 
(longstanding clientelism over the empowering participatory design of the 
missions); 
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c) Just as a regional initiative can reinforce and diffuse innovations, by accident or 
design it can also cement continuities, even those that are damaging (patronage 
relations being reinforced where Barrio Adentro is misapplied or abused); 
d) The interaction between states via regional initiatives means that continuities in 
one domain of national political economy can have detrimental effects in 
another domain in other member-states (the wider efficacy and legitimacy of 
Barrio Adentro being tarnished by corruption in Venezuela). 
 
Thus, Benzi’s one simple example points up a number of failings of analyses that adopt 
a states-led vision of ALBA regionalism.  Any approach that looks to address Benzi’s 
criticisms must find ways to tackle these oversights and account for the kinds of 
dynamics that he describes. 
 
The Oversights of States-Led ALBA Regionalism 
The first problem is that by making the regional level the object of study, a focus on 
states-led regionalism neglects the national level, often falling back on simple 
caricatures of member-states’ political economies.  Yet, if indeed “the contents of any 
integration process are strongly determined by the internal economic, political, and 
social scenario of the participating countries” (Estay 2008, p.139), superficial depictions 
at the national level can easily deform analyses of the regional level.  This research 
tackles this issue by analysing the national level via primary research and via the 
specialised literatures of particular states before looking at member-states’ regional 
interactions within ALBA.  Accordingly, if continuities and tensions in Venezuela’s 
national political economy have become clearer to Venezuela specialists over time as 
Benzi would seem to suggest, this combination of first-hand research and specialist 
knowledge can enable a fuller analysis of any knock-on effect on ALBA. 
Second, Benzi’s example speaks to the fact that contrary to influential early 
models (Balassa 1961), regionalism never traces a smooth path from absolute 
sovereignty, via several stages of growing interdependence, to a defined endpoint of 
“integration”.  Rather, as New Regionalism scholars Björn Hettne and Fredrik 
Söderbaum put it, “integration and disintegration go hand in hand” (2002, p.38). 
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Since regions are political and social projects, devised by human actors in order 
to protect or transform existing structures, they may, like nation-state projects 
before them, fail.  Regions can be disrupted from within and from without by 
the same forces that build them up. Since a region can be constructed it can also 
be deconstructed… 
(Hettne & Söderbaum 2002, p.38) 
 
That is, particular initiatives may advance just as others are failing, with net regression 
of the overarching project just as possible as net progress.  Yet, regionalism as an 
academic concern focuses more on institutions that tally with the intended designs of a 
regional project than it does on elements that languish or never materialise at all.  Julia 
Gray has described this as regionalism’s “implementation gap”, arguing that a focus on 
the legal and “rational” aspects of regional agreements, coupled with data-availability 
problems, has resulted in the conflation of institutionalisation with efficacy (2013, p.4).  
With its tendency to take summit agreements and incipient institutions as effective in 
the absence of clearer data, Gray could equally be describing the ALBA literature.   
This second issue is dealt with by explicitly making implementation our central 
concern and recognising its importance both as a yardstick and as a mediator of impact.  
This counteracts the ALBA literature’s basic neglect of a common-sense approach that 
is as old as the language itself: 
 
Anyone with gumption and a sharp mind will take the measure of two things: 
what’s said and what’s done. 
(Beowulf, translated by Heaney 2000, p.21) 
 
Although the sharp minds conducting a rather more recent review of regional-
integration indicators agreed that implementation was “essential” to any evaluation of a 
project’s success (De Lombaerde & Van Langenhove 2006, p.12), this problem persists 
in the wider literature of regionalism, as Gray’s work attests (Gray 2013).  Though her 
research into the implementation gap analyses economic agreements using quantitative 
methods, its rationale is equally applicable to this study of ALBA, particularly given its 
shared recognition of the importance to regionalism of the properties and problems of 
national political economies: 
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…without taking into account the characteristics and limitations of member 
states, we risk being left with an overly optimistic view of the possibilities of 
international agreements to constrain or otherwise change the behavior of those 
states.  Furthermore, without explicitly measuring how these agreements work 
in practice – and not just what they look like on paper – we cannot correctly 
identify the real degree to which states have tied their hands.  Thus, an 
understanding of the extent to which international agreements of any sort 
compel states to make credible commitments is incomplete without seeing how 
states actually internalize those agreements, as well as giving serious 
consideration to the conditions on the ground in those states that make 
implementation possible in the first place. 
(Gray 2013, p.21) 
 
Benzi’s example also hints at the need to consider the role a third class of factor, 
namely the socially noxious elements of regionalisation that tend to be overlooked in 
studies of states-led regionalism (see also Phillips & Prieto 2011, pp.127–28).  The 
important point is that states do not enjoy full control of regionalism or regionalisation 
and so to focus on the processes that states are attempting to submit to the control of 
regional governance is also to turn away from potentially significant processes outside 
of states’ control or intention.  The term “ungovernance” was coined to describe those 
elements “which are not a matter of politics among states or institutions set up by 
states” (Leander 2002, p.2) and has since been successfully employed in the case of 
African regionalism to explore the often perverse outcomes of economic integration 
there (Meagher 2007).  This concept is useful here because even where “at its word” 
accounts of ALBA do consider processes beyond the state, their reliance on official 
depictions of the project’s progress still directs their gaze towards those domains that 
the state claims to be acting upon.  This explains, for example, the disconnect between 
the academic depiction of ALBA’s interaction with social movements and the reality of 
its non-existent Social Movements Council (chapter one, p.14).  With ALBA 
regionalism as with other issues, “developments which are not regulated and guided by 
states tend to fall off the agenda of politics and academic research” (Leander 2002, 
p.15). 
As with the integration-disintegration issue already explored, half of the solution 
to this problem lies in its very acknowledgement, for this at least primes the researcher 
to consider possible links between regional “ungovernance” and states-led regionalism.  
Indeed, focusing on implementation complements sensitivity to “ungovernance” since it 
foregrounds dysfunctional elements of regional projects that may have been hindered by 
“ungoverned” social processes.  Yet, the key impact of this work’s triple recognition of 
the importance of continuities and contradictions in national political economies, of 
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possible disintegrative outcomes, and of the potential impact of “ungovernance” is that 
we must revisit and open up the three key concepts already drawn from the existing 
ALBA literature – endogenous development, reasserted autonomy, and legitimacy – in 
order to increase their sensitivity to these issues. 
 
Achieving a More Nuanced Analytical Framework 
In the case of endogenous development, this triple recognition forces us to look beyond 
the development strategies consciously fashioned by governments and into wider 
features of national political economies – state-guided and otherwise, novel and 
inherited – which might equally come into play in regional initiatives.  This is because 
the ALBA literature’s focus on a conscious shift towards endogenous development 
obscures the influence both of structural characteristics of given states and also of 
continuities from the prior neoliberal period.  In the broader scholarship of LAC 
political economy – particularly the debate over the use of “postneoliberalism” to 
describe a distinct and actually existing mode of regulation (see Yates & Bakker 2013 
for a comprehensive summary) – the hybridity of the New Left is considered a pertinent 
but unresolved question.  Yet, accounts of ALBA have not assimilated this question of 
whether New Left reforms are more “chimera or epochal change” (Yates & Bakker 
2013, p.1), and the problems of data scarcity described above have encouraged a 
tendency towards the “epochal change” end of the spectrum.  In order to allow this 
question to better inform ALBA scholarship, this work will therefore consider 
endogenous development – the first of the three key concepts drawn from the literature 
(p.49) – as just one extreme on a spectrum that would also admit middle-ground 
hybridity or even a deepening of neoliberalism if that were to be observed. 
Similarly, a focus on autonomy seems to suggest that because regionalism is a 
conscious, guided process, state cooperation can overcome the classic sovereignty 
problem of LAC regionalism (and indeed beyond), whereby both national sovereignty 
and regional integration are sought, despite the fact that involvement in regional 
institutions can make the preferences of one member-state the constraints of another (on 
Latin America, see Dabène 2012a; on the Caribbean, see Bishop & Payne 2010).  
Further, if ALBA’s national political economies are only hybridised, then many of the 
elements which can impact upon autonomy are also structural or inherited continuities, 
such as resource endowments or existing trade structures underpinned by prior regional 
and multilateral commitments.  Again, although these continuities may not be the 
central concern of ALBA states’ development planning, there is no guarantee that they 
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will not shape the outcomes of this planning in unpredictable ways.  Thus, as with the 
concept of endogenous development, autonomy will here be considered only as one 
extreme of an autonomy-constraint spectrum, with ALBA potentially provoking 
movement in either direction. 
A more nuanced understanding of legitimacy, meanwhile, can be achieved by 
dividing it into its three component parts, as in Andrea Ribeiro Hoffman and Anna van 
der Vleuten’s comparative-regionalism work (2007; building on Scharpf 1999).  As 
Berry Tholen explains (2007, pp.21–25), these are: 
 
i) input legitimacy, or facilitation of  responsive government “by the people”  
ii) output legitimacy, or provision of effective solutions “for the people” 
iii) control legitimacy, or guaranteeing of accountability “to the people”32 
 
This serves to open up the possibility of studying the kinds of tensions highlighted by 
Benzi, even where they relate to unimplemented or dysfunctional initiatives whose 
progress has been hampered by aspects of “ungovernance”.  For example, if Barrio 
Adentro, which uses regional complementarities mainly between Cuba and Venezuela 
to improve healthcare provision, is afflicted by problems of delivery (output), top-
downism (input), or corruption (control) within given member-states, then this division 
allows us to explore the peculiarities of each aspect, as well as the dynamics of their 
interaction.  This also allows us to consider the possibility of de-legitimisation when 
input, output, or control legitimacy is lacking. 
 
Conclusion: Engaging with and Enriching the Literature 
This chapter has provided a wide-ranging review which not only isolates key themes 
and debates, but also effectively critiques the frequent empirical and methodological 
failings that distort the dominant understandings of ALBA.  Lines of best fit sketched 
through five key debates in the literature reveal that ALBA is frequently held to serve 
Venezuelan and Cuban foreign-policy interests; to regionalise reforms associated 
particularly with Venezuela’s model of endogenous development (and later Twenty-
First Century Socialism); to reassert the autonomy of ALBA states and the wider LAC 
region; to legitimise incumbent governments by extending participatory institutions and 
welfare provision to the regional level; and to produce material – and even subjective – 
transformations.  However, a severe scarcity of primary data is dealt with in different 
                                                 
32 To reiterate, the addition of “to the people” in point “iii” is my own. 
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ways, with scholars forced to choose between “taking ALBA at its word” by relying on 
discursive and official portrayals of its progress; “questioning the word of ALBA” by 
targeting inconsistencies between ALBA’s rhetoric  and rare glimpses of its reality; and 
“twisting ALBA’s words” by exploiting its ambiguities to associate it with the more 
nefarious aspects of international relations.  In order to combat these ambiguities, this 
work adopts an approach sensitive both to conscious states-led regionalism and 
potentially unguided, multi-actor regionalisation.  It also recognises the importance of 
studying implementation in order to reveal the coalescence and conflict within and 
between states that modulate the success of individual initiatives.  Consideration not 
only of areas of “ungovernance” beyond states’ volitional control but also of possibly 
disintegrative outcomes opens up the possibility of new insights into the nature and 
impact of ALBA regionalism.  Ultimately, concepts of endogenous development, 
autonomy, and legitimacy are drawn from the literature and modified to facilitate this 
sensitivity, forming the basis of an analytical framework that can engage with and 
enrich the existing literature. 
 Having thus considered this literature and developed a viable means of engaging 
with it, this work now turns to a reassessment of ALBA from the ground up.  This 
necessarily begins with an examination of the political economies of Venezuela, 
Ecuador, and the Anglophone ALBA states, key players in the core economic initiatives 
that are the focus of this work. 
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Chapter Three: The National Roots of ALBA 
 
After a decade spent observing Chavismo, it is not clear to me that concepts 
such as participatory democracy and twenty-first-century socialism explain very 
much about how decisions are made in Venezuela. 
(Trinkunas 2010, p.247) 
 
Harold Trinkunas here neatly expresses a growing sense in scholarship on Venezuelan 
political economy that the bold conceptual innovations of the Bolivarian revolution 
have not been translated into observable reality.  Rather, the novel policies of this 
archetypal New-Left government have only been partially delivered, whereas the basic 
features of its political economy endure.  Yet, this recognition of the hybridity of New-
Left political economies has been neglected in the literature of ALBA, its initiatives 
being understood as extensions of ambitious domestic reforms, with little attention paid 
to faltering implementation or the contradictory legacies of pasts both recent and 
distant.  In effect, faced with this work’s central research question regarding the 
relationship between ALBA regionalism and New-Left reforms to national political 
economy, they quickly connect the two without going beyond superficial depictions of 
ALBA member-states.  Chapters four to six of this work address this weakness by 
looking more critically, at the implementation and effects of ALBA’s core initiatives.  
However, to avoid the disembodiment of ALBA that weakens existing accounts, the 
current chapter first reconsiders the real extent of novel development models in ALBA 
member-states, gauging at the same time any tensions or contradictions that could also 
be regionalised via ALBA initiatives despite the best laid plans of states-led 
regionalism.  This reveals many policy areas and innovations in which ALBA members 
overlap, with cooperation in these areas often motivating specific ALBA initiatives, as 
detailed in sections of chapters four to six that deal with the intended effects of ALBA 
initiatives.  But equally it reveals areas of tension and divergence which come into play 
in the real-world interactions provoked by ALBA, as demonstrated in sections of 
chapters four to six that deal with the implemented reality of ALBA initiatives and any 
impediments to their progress. 
 Since the ALBA literature deems Venezuela to be the key influence on ALBA’s 
model of regionalism – and because it is the project’s dominant force in economic, 
commercial, and political terms – particular attention is paid to the evolution of its 
development strategies.  The idea of Venezuela as the source of central ideas of 
endogenous development, reasserted autonomy, and new sources of input and output 
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legitimacy is well-supported prima facie.  However, upon closer scrutiny we find that 
Chávez’s reforms have been implemented only partially and with limited – rather than 
transformative – impact, meaning that Venezuelan political economy has made only 
limited progress towards Chávez’s development goals.  This poor implementation and 
moderate impact reflects the continuation of many features of Venezuelan political 
economy in the pre-Chávez era, and these legacies frequently undermine ALBA 
initiatives at the regional level.  Attempts to overcome these problems – particularly the 
creation of parallel state institutions centred around the state oil company – have only 
created new tensions that also affect the implementation of ALBA, particularly in the 
case of Petrocaribe (chapter six).  This is not solely a Venezuelan problem, however, 
and although Ecuador’s less radical endogenous development model has been 
implemented more successfully, its political economy is also characterised by divisions 
that encumber trade policy and ultimately hamstring its engagement with the TCP 
(chapter four).  The political economy of Anglophone small island developing states 
(SIDS), meanwhile, is so vulnerable to external events and constraints that application 
of a clear development model proves extremely difficult, though ideological overlaps 
with ALBA’s Latin American members do exist.  This creates the unfortunate 
conditions that make Petrocaribe so necessary and so significant. 
 Essentially, if we wish to know whether ALBA’s model of regionalism reflects 
and reinforces the reforms of New-Left governments, we must know what they are.  
Yet, since chapter two has shown that the existing picture of ALBA regionalism was 
painted from a restricted palette of states’ conscious development strategies, this chapter 
seeks to open up that palette to every shade of members’ political economy.  This 
ultimately allows us to achieve a more lifelike depiction at the regional level. 
 
Venezuela: The Dysfunctional Development of Twenty-First Century Socialism  
Scholars of Venezuelan politics commonly map out phases of growing radicalism, from 
Chávez’s allusion to Tony Blair’s Third Way in 1999 to his ultimate commitment to an 
ever-deepening Twenty-First Century Socialism by 2012 (Lander & Navarette 2007; 
Buxton 2009; López Maya 2010; Ellner 2013b).  We follow Lander and Navarette 
(2007) in locating the fulcrum in mid-2003 when a failed coup and oil strike radicalised 
Chávez and led to creation of the novel social programmes that prefigured ALBA.  We 
then divide the latter 2003-2012 period, first, into an “endogenous development” phase 
up to 2005 that coincided with the design and launch of ALBA, and, second, the 
Twenty-First Century Socialism phase between 2005 and 2012 which saw the marked 
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radicalisation of Venezuelan political economy alongside ALBA’s maturation and 
expansion.  Particular attention is paid to the endogenous development and Twenty-
First Century Socialism phases as it is here that ALBA acquires its character, with its 
initiatives beginning to regionalise elements of Venezuelan political economy and forge 
significant links to the development models of other member-states.  However, as will 
be demonstrated below, the version of this regionalisation commonly adopted in the 
ALBA literature is at odds with the reality of Twenty-First Century Socialism’s tense 
and contradictory implementation. 
 
Chávez Light (1999 to mid-2003) 
Phase one is commonly viewed as the “Chávez light” period, with many scholars 
recalling Chávez’s own allusion to Blair’s third way in the UK (Lander & Navarette 
2007, p.7; Coronil 2008, p.13; López Maya 2010, p.201), but this is somewhat 
misleading.  In reality, the new Venezuelan constitution of 1999 sowed the seeds of 
much of what followed, not least the reassertion of national and LAC autonomy, 
pursuance of an endogenous development strategy, and achievement of legitimacy in 
the eyes of newly enfranchised sectors of society.  Thus, in international affairs the 
state’s right to use selectively protectionist trade policy for developmental ends was 
underlined (CRBV 1999, Article 302); LAC integration was specifically favoured as a 
means of “common development” (Article 153); and treatment of foreign investment 
was guaranteed never to trump national treatment (Article 301).33  The right of the state 
to strategically guide the economy was reaffirmed (Article 302), whereas the previous 
trend towards “opening up” of natural resources was abruptly nixed (Article 303).  
Though the private sector remained integral and private property was protected, the 
active promotion of socialising, participatory forms of popular economy (Articles 118, 
184) and worker management (Article 70) were enshrined alongside a recognition of 
collective property (Article 308).  New input legitimacy would come from the 
introduction of bottom-up “protagonistic” democracy at every level of government 
(Article 62), whereas output legitimacy would come from the guarantee of social rights 
and welfare to various long-overlooked groups (Chapter V). 
 In order to facilitate this change Chávez took greater control of the oil industry, 
the beating heart of Venezuela’s economy.  He doubled the royalties payable per barrel, 
lobbied OPEC members to stick to quotas, and shook up state oil company PDVSA’s 
                                                 
33 This is a direct rebuttal of the North America Free Trade Agreement’s chapter XI, which allows private 
companies to pursue claims against states. 
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top-level management.  With oil prices sky-high following 9/11, this provided funds for 
productive investment and social spending, but it also provoked the ire of the political 
and economic elites that had long controlled PDVSA.  It was their subsequent coup 
attempt and oil strike that served as the spark for Chávez’s new advocacy of socialism, 
whereas US complicity led to a redoubling of his anti-imperialism (by his own 
admission in Jones 2009, pp.468–69).  These changes in Venezuelan policy shaped the 
rationale and functioning of ALBA, just as they created many of the tensions which will 
be seen to mitigate its impact in subsequent chapters on specific ALBA initiatives. 
 
Endogenous Development: Stirrings of Twenty-First Century Socialism (2003-2005) 
The failed oil strike forced the opposition to return to the democratic path through a 
dialogue sponsored by the OAS, resulting in the 2004 recall referendum.  Faced with 
declining middle-class support, Chávez realised that electoral success was no longer 
guaranteed and shifted his focus towards providing immediate concrete benefits to his 
core supporters.  While he had previously laboured at reforming existing institutions, he 
now realised that the blights of “waste, inefficiency and corruption” in Venezuelan 
politics persisted (Buxton 2009, pp.165–66, 171).  But the imminent recall election 
meant that he could no longer wait for state inefficacies and internal opposition to be 
overcome.  He responded by making a series of sweeping changes at home and abroad 
which bound up foreign policy, domestic development, and electoral success.  
 The key concept in this transition phase was the same endogenous development 
frequently noted in accounts of ALBA (chapter two, p.40).  This involved a conscious 
shift from development ideas considered “exogenous” that involved “more market and 
less state” towards a model driven by the state in partnership with the citizenry.  It 
called for a return to strategic planning based on “our” capacities and resources, with 
bottom-up community participation “mainstreamed” across economic, social, and 
political life, these three domains being seen as inevitably interrelated.  And it focused 
explicitly on repaying Venezuela’s “social debt” to its most marginal groups in the C, 
D, and E social categories (Ministerio de Trabajo 2004).  The model proposed 
democratisation of property, capital, and the market, with new organisational forms of 
the social economy creating employment in deprived areas and promoting self-reliant 
productive communities (Ministerio de Trabajo 2004, p.8; Wilpert 2007, p.80).  These 
would form one part of a “national system of productive and social inclusion” that 
linked social-economy reforms to the provision of social programmes in a virtuous 
circle of human development (Ministerio de Trabajo 2004, p.14).  So as protect 
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endogenous-development reforms against the destabilising effects of capital flight and 
currency collapse, Chávez also created the Foreign Exchange Administration 
Commission (CADIVI) to oversee allocation of foreign currency.  Since this body 
restricted allocation of dollars only to companies with clean labour-law records and 
whose imports would not displace local producers, CADIVI also served as a means for 
the state to shape trade flows in favour of its broader developmental ends.34 
 The main weapon in achieving human development, however, was the novel 
misión (mission) mechanism.  The missions are social programmes targeted at 
fundamental problems which undermine broader development strategies, provided 
within communities, and administered with extensive participation from the receiving 
community.  The earliest and best known of these targeted illiteracy (Misión Robinson), 
primary healthcare deficiencies (Misión Barrio Adentro), access to higher education 
(Misión Sucre), access to social and political rights (Misión Identidad), and rising food 
prices (Misión Mercal).35  The modes and ends of these programmes tied in with the 
wider political and economic priorities of the National Development Plan 2001-2007 
(Ministerio de Planificación y Desarrollo 2001): inclusion through formal recognition 
(Identidad) allowed community participation that empowered recipients politically; the 
meeting of basic needs improved chances of wider human development (Barrio 
Adentro); and outputs from the social economy could be used to meet the social needs 
of the poorest (through Mercal, for example).  One mission in particular, Misión 
Vuelvan Caras,36 was designed to bring about a “productive revolution and cultural 
transformation” by educating communities in the solidarity logics and cooperative 
practices of the social economy (Wilpert 2007, p.81). 
 Crucially for ALBA, the success of the missions in facilitating human 
development was explicitly tied to south-south cooperation in foreign policy, 
particularly within the LAC region (Ministerio de Planificación y Desarrollo 2001, 
p.156).  Robinson, for example, utilised Cuban pedagogical expertise both in building 
on its Yo Sí Puedo! (“Yes I Can!”) literacy programme and in having the mission’s local 
facilitators trained by Cuban educators.  Most famously, Barrio Adentro placed Cuban 
doctors in primary-healthcare clinics deep within impoverished communities that had 
never before enjoyed access to healthcare, let alone free healthcare.  In exchange, 
                                                 
34 It does this via the requirement of certificates of local non- or insufficient production. 
35 “Robinson” was the pseudonym of Bolívar’s tutor Simón Rodríguez; Barrio Adentro means “within the 
neighbourhood”; “Sucre” is named for Venezuelan liberator Antonio José de Sucre, advocate of mass 
education; Identidad means “identity” and provides ID cards necessary for interactions with the state; and 
Mercal abbreviates Mercado de Alimentos (“food market”). 
36 Vuelvan Caras equates to the military command “about face!” 
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Venezuela provided Cuba with the daily supply of 53,000 barrels of oil.  This 
complementary exploitation of respective national strengths to enable self-sufficient 
development reflected Venezuela’s twin foreign-policy goals of reinforcing national 
sovereignty by reducing (extra-regional) dependence and pushing for the creation of a 
Latin American bloc within a multipolar international order (Ministerio de Trabajo 
2004, p.9).  Aside from providing the boost in output legitimacy that Chávez needed 
before the recall referendum – which he won with nearly 60 per cent of the vote – this 
bilateral arrangement also provided the inspiration and template for ALBA’s early 
attempts to regionalise complementarity and move towards what it would later term “a 
zone of shared development” (ALBA-TCP 2009a). 
 Although Chávez had pursued an activist foreign policy from the outset, this too 
became more radical in the aftermath of the oil strike.  Where previously it centred on 
achieving an “international balance”, reinforcing national sovereignty, and promoting 
multipolarity, now it took on a more direct opposition to the US (Serbin 2009, pp.147–
48).  In August 2004 Chávez floated the idea of a regional development bank, the Bank 
of the South, which would perform a similar role to the World Bank only under LAC 
control (Montilla 2009).  This proposal was enthusiastically adopted by Ecuador in 
particular, later becoming part of the wider New Regional Financial Architecture project 
from which emerged the SUCRE (chapter five, p.143).  In early December 2004 Chávez 
successfully proposed creation of a new South American regional association 
comprising every independent state on the continent, including the previously isolated 
non-Latin countries of the north-east, Guyana and Suriname; this Community of South 
American Nations would go on to become UNASUR (the Union of South American 
Nations).  Just a week later ALBA itself was launched by Venezuela and Cuba, giving 
life to what had previously been only a theoretical alternative to the FTAA, albeit 
promoted with ever more vigour and detail (see Chávez Frías 2003). 
 This stage coincides with the birth of ALBA as an academic concern, and early 
studies were not inaccurate in reading much of ALBA’s character and impact off the 
Venezuelan model that was its clear inspiration.  However, this transition phase also 
saw another change which scholars of ALBA have neglected, even though it has shaped 
the course of Venezuelan political economy ever since.  Essentially, towards the end of 
this phase, Chávez brought in new rises in taxes on oil exports, a new role for PDVSA 
in funding and executing social programmes, and changes in control of oil earnings.  
There are two significant aspects to this: the emergence of parallel governance 
structures and the persistence of traditional institutions. 
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Since the misiones in particular had been designed to provide immediate 
solutions to basic social problems, they had to be funded and executed in ways that 
would not be obstructed by the institutional deficiencies and internal ideological 
conflicts that plagued the inherited bureaucracy (Monedero 2010, p.239).  At the close 
of the oil strike in 2003, 40 per cent of PDVSA’s staff – including many of the strike’s 
orchestrators in senior management – had been removed.  This left the company free of 
much of the internal opposition present in other ministries, with those that remained 
having witnessed a very graphic demonstration of the dangers of obstructionism; 
PDVSA was well-placed to implement radical new ideas.  Reassertion of state control 
in 2001 had already helped to swell state coffers, but royalties and taxes were raised in 
2004 and again in 2005 in order to capture a larger share of rising oil prices (PDVSA 
2013, p.151); PDVSA also had the financial muscle to implement large-scale initiatives.  
And third, greater control of this bonanza was ensured by Chávez’s installation of 
unassuming loyalist Rafael Ramírez as Energy Minister and by legislation that diverted 
a share of oil receipts to development funds at presidential discretion, such as the 
Venezuelan Economic and Social Development Bank (BANDES) and the National 
Development Fund (FONDEN).  Yet, since traditional institutions already existed with 
their own budgets and many of the same responsibilities – illiteracy and access to higher 
education in the Education Ministry rather than Misiones Robinson and Sucre, for 
example – this amounted to establishment of parallel structures controlled by the 
presidency (López Maya 2010, p.207).  The fact that the misiones were so successful 
both electorally and in their own terms – eradicating illiteracy and increasing university 
attendance threefold in the education case, for example (Wilpert 2011) – only 
encouraged Chávez to put this burgeoning parallel state to other uses.  However, it also 
signified a profound split in Venezuelan political economy that would only intensify 
problems of centralisation, service delivery, improvisation, lax oversight, and tension 
with traditional institutions.  As this work’s investigation of specific ALBA initiatives 
reveals, both the sclerotic traditional institutions and the flexible parallel state come into 
play in ALBA, with often unintended and sometimes unsavoury consequences. 
 
Twenty-First Century Socialism (2005-2012)  
Chávez’s switch to open espousal of socialism came in 2005, but his was a new 
“Twenty-First Century” socialism, bringing a radicalisation of endogenous 
development, an expansion of PDVSA-backed social programmes, more direct political 
and economic participation, and an even stronger push for cooperative LAC integration, 
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 The state also reasserted its role through nationalisation of basic services, heavy 
industry, and financial institutions.  In 2007 the state spent over $1bn to acquire a 
number of private electricity companies; $1.3bn was paid to Verizon for the 
renationalisation of telecoms company CANTV; in 2008 local subsidiaries of cement 
multinationals Holcim, Cemex, and Lafarge were nationalised; in 2009 a key part of 
Venezuela’s heavy industry was renationalised in the shape of SIDOR, the largest steel 
producer in the Andean region; and Banco de Venezuela was acquired from Spain’s 
Banco Santander, instantly creating a nationwide network of state banks (Severo 2009, 
p.108).  In an attempt to socialise and empower workers, many nationalised enterprises 
have been given over to worker self-management or to co-management with 
involvement of ministries (see Lander & Navarette 2007, p.31).  This is consistent with 
the idea common in the literature of ALBA that the Venezuelan state is re-establishing 
control over the commanding heights of the economy in order to protect consumers and 
reinforce transformative, participative, social-economy initiatives.  
 Social policy continued to be dominated by the misiones, whose range and depth 
had grown dramatically by 2007 via a tripling of their funding (particularly from 
PDVSA), amounting to some 25 per cent of public spending (Aponte Blank 2010, p.52).  
Barrio Adentro in particular moved into its second and third incarnations with the 
creation of large health centres (Integral Diagnostic Centres) that required more 
advanced facilities and equipment to treat serious illnesses.  Roving eye clinics and 
dental surgeries were added under the banners Milagro (“miracle”) and Sonrisa 
(“smile”) respectively.  The Mercal distribution network grew to include larger 
Supermercal branches, and was complemented by addition of Bicentenario 
(“bicentenary”) outlets nationalised from the French chain Casino.37  Mercal even 
moved into providing subsidised white goods from Venezuela’s friends abroad through 
the Mi Casa Bien Equipada programme (“my well-equipped house”).  With Misión 
Robinson having effectively eliminated illiteracy, Misión Ribas set about ensuring all 
adults had achieved secondary-equivalent education.38  Misiones Habitat (“habitat”) and 
later Vivienda (“housing”) saw massive state investment in social housing, while 
Madres del Barrio (“neighbourhood mothers”) and Amor Mayor (“greater love”) 
provided new transfer benefits for poor housewives and the elderly.   
 This intensification of social programmes has been accompanied and 
complemented by political reforms, most importantly the establishment of a new form 
                                                 
37 The bicentenary in question is of independence from Spain. 
38 José Félix Ribas was a Venezuelan general and independence hero. 
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of local government, the communal council.  These bodies, made up of citizens, 
community organisations, and social movements in groups of up to 400 families, are 
charged with planning, implementing, and monitoring community projects (Goldfrank 
2011, pp.43–44).  By late 2010 there were over 20,000 such councils, receiving $2.3bn 
in funding from central government alone, as well as further funding from federal and 
municipal governments.  Not only do these bodies carry out or sub-contract thousands 
of community projects (Ellner 2009), they also intersect with the social economy in 
their partial role as Communal Banks, trainers to workers within state enterprises, 
administrators of social missions (Azzellini 2011, p.141), and even “social auditors” 
with the power to force inspections of institutions suspected of corruption or 
incompetence (Wilpert 2007, pp.61–62). 
 In the international arena, Chávez’s earlier moves to strengthen LAC integration 
through the Bank of the South, the Community of South American Nations, and ALBA 
were extended to the entire Caribbean with the introduction in June 2005 of Petrocaribe 
(see chapter six), which partially insulated the region’s energy-dependent states region 
from skyrocketing oil prices.  These initiatives helped to weaken the sense of 
inevitability surrounding the FTAA process, which finally ran aground in December 
2005 at Mar del Plata owing to opposition from Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, 
and Paraguay (Deblock & Turcotte 2007).  When in 2006 the US agreed bilateral FTAs 
with Colombia and Peru, preventing completion of the Andean Community customs 
union in which Venezuela also participated, Venezuela signalled its rejection of foreign 
interference in LAC affairs by withdrawing from CAN; it was the resulting expiry of 
CAN trade rules five years later in April 2011 that necessitated negotiations towards a 
new trade agreement within ALBA’s TCP framework (see chapter four).  Three months 
later in July 2006, Venezuela began the process of becoming a full member of the LAC 
region’s largest regional bloc, Mercosur, reinforcing at the same time its relations with 
Mercosur’s member-states by purchasing government bonds from Argentina and 
proposing transnational infrastructure projects such as the Southern Gas Pipeline, which 
was to stretch from Venezuela to Argentina via Brazil.39  The push to replace external 
dependency with LAC interdependence continued with Venezuela’s early payment of 
its remaining obligations to the IMF and World Bank.  Finance Minister Rodrigo 
Cabezas dismissed the two as a “manifestation of savage capitalism … dominated by 
US hawks”, reiterating Venezuela’s desire to replace them with local equivalents like 
the Bank of the South “in order to maintain our wealth and use the region’s financial 
                                                 
39 The Gasoducto del Sur ultimately failed to materialise. 
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resources for [the region’s] own development” (El Tiempo 2007).  The development-
bank proposal was soon complemented by Chávez’s demand in 2008 for a new virtual 
currency for regional trade, the Unified Regional Compensation System (SUCRE; see 
chapter five).  With the help of a special Ecuadorian presidential commission (chapter 
five, p.129), the SUCRE began to operate just a year later in 2009, becoming an integral 
part of ALBA.  The same trend away from existing institutions and towards specifically 
LAC-bound alternatives continued in 2011 with the Chávez-led push for creation of the 
Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), whose remit mirrored 
that of the OAS only with the US and Canada excluded and Cuba pointedly included.  
As claimed within the literature and echoed in later chapters’ analyses of their intended 
effects, ALBA’s core economic initiatives are designed to reinforce this dual push for 
multipolarity and increased autonomy for LAC states. 
 
Twenty-First Century Socialism Undermined: Contradictions and “Unimplementation” 
Yet, over time scholars focusing on Venezuela have increasingly acknowledged that the 
declared means and ends of Twenty-First Century Socialism are at significant variance 
from the reality of Venezuelan political economy.  This recognition has not filtered 
through into accounts of ALBA, however, which continue to focus more on 
revolutionary discourse than on the complex tapestry of continuity and change that 
country specialists observe in practice.  As a result, accounts of ALBA tend to overlook 
the regionalisation of tensions, contradictions, and continuities in Venezuelan 
development.  Given Venezuela’s political, economic, and geographic centrality to 
ALBA, this creates a sizeable blind spot in the literature.  Essentially, while the basic 
ideas of endogenous development and reasserted autonomy are pursued, the former in 
particular has not been achieved.  This is especially true of the input and output 
legitimacy expected to derive from socialisation of the economy and more direct 
participation in democracy.  Both have been deficient, the economy remaining 
decidedly capitalist and governance remaining centralised and top-down.  Since a wider 
social transformation was predicated particularly on these two changes, their failure to 
materialise has meant a continuation of many of the worst practices of the pre-Chávez 
era.  Indeed, a severe lack of control mechanisms has allowed short-termism, 
improvisation, opacity, and corruption to prosper, these longstanding problems thereby 
also undermining the materially transformative aspect of Twenty-First Century 
Socialism and the output legitimacy associated with it. 
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 First, the central economic aim of diversifying away from oil by strengthening 
the role of the social economy and the state has not been realised.  Despite massive 
investment in the associative sector and a numerous nationalisations, the basic structure 
of the Venezuelan economy has barely changed since 1998, and even that change has 
not accorded with national development plans.  Where the social economy was to 
partially displace the private, with the help of a resurgent state (Presidencia de la RBV 
2007, p.24), in reality by 2009 the social economy had grown by only one percentage 
point from 0.5 per cent of GDP to 1.6 per cent (Álvarez R. 2009, pp.254–55).  This does 
represent a tripling in size, admittedly, but any social or economic impact is surely far 
from transformative.  The state’s role, meanwhile, declined from 35 to 29 per cent of 
GDP, whereas that of the private sector grew from 65 to 69 per cent.  As one of the 
architects of the social-economy drive, Victor Álvarez, laments: 
 
…official data reveal that, far from shrinking, the weight of the private sector 
in GDP has instead increased.  Its share continues to be the major one, thereby 
defining the capitalist nature of the current Venezuelan productive model. 
(Álvarez R. 2009, p.250) 
 
 Looking more closely at the associative and state sectors, the reasons for this 
unrealised revolution are clear.  Cooperatives in particular have failed to flourish despite 
being a central plank of this development strategy.  As usual where information on 
Venezuelan public spending is concerned, clear data are hard to come by, but the 
Popular Economy Ministry’s outlay of around $1 billion from 2004 to 2006 (Piñeiro 
2009, p.847) gives some indication of the sums involved.  Yet by 2010, of the roughly 
310,000 cooperatives established as of 2001, only 40,000 (13 per cent) remained in 
operation, with nearly 270,000 having ceased to exist (PROVEA 2011, p.43).  There is 
little reason to believe the that massive public financing highlighted by López Maya 
(2010, p.220) was ever recovered.  On the contrary, Venezuela-based scholar Steve 
Ellner reveals that most of the cooperatives were made up of the minimum five (often 
blood-related) members required to secure funding, whereas others were private 
companies moonlighting as cooperatives simply to secure contracts, concessionary 
financing, and tax breaks (Ellner 2011b, p.430).  Further, within many cooperatives, 
work practices were no better than in the private sector, with workers contracted outside 
of labour law or any collectivist protection (Ellner 2008, p.157), which squares with 
Camila Piñeiro’s finding that “many Venezuelan cooperatives have prioritized 
maximizing their net revenue (i.e. their individual and collective benefits) over social 
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interests such as including more members to decrease unemployment, and selling their 
production locally at lower prices” (2009, p.855).  There are exceptions, of course, but 
even a staunch supporter like former Minister of Basic Industries Victor Álvarez bitterly 
concludes that Venezuela’s social economy has “a flat tyre and no spare” (quoted in 
García 2010).40 
 Nationalisation, meanwhile, has long since descended from the commanding 
heights of the economy and into areas as diverse as household coffee brands (Fama de 
América), agricultural wholesalers (Agroisleña), airlines (Aeropostal), and even hotels 
(the Caracas Hilton having become the Hotel ALBA, no less).  The notion of “strategic 
industries” has been lost (I.16), and nationalisation has instead become a threat with 
which to discipline business interests opposed to the Chávez government and frequently 
accused of provoking shortages through hoarding and underproduction.  Here too the 
participative, transformative gains from nationalisation have also failed to materialise: 
 
Rather than a process in which workers have been transforming themselves in 
production through self-management, they have been dominated from the top 
… demoraliz[ing] militant workers [and] confining them to the adversarial role 
that they play in capitalism. 
(Lebowitz 2007) 
 
As in the social economy, there are also doubts about the efficiency and 
propriety of many state companies, with massive amounts of public money being 
invested but no marked improvement in their output.  The case in point here is the state 
steel giant SIDOR, nationalised in 2008.41  Immediately prior to nationalisation, it 
produced a record annual 4.2 million tonnes of liquid steel, but by 2012 this figure was 
hovering around 2 million (Ramírez Cabello & León 2013), and this despite investment 
worth billions of dollars (Vivas Medina 2011).42  The main reason has been an 
intractable labour conflict between supporters of worker self-management and pro-
PSUV loyalists who place the government’s political and economic needs before those 
of the workers per se (Ellner 2013b, pp.70–73); the conflict remained unresolved in 
2013, with regular walkouts resulting in multimillion-dollar losses.  Furthermore, there 
have been serious cases of corruption in its subcontracting and sales practices, most 
                                                 
40 The Cuban economy is often conflicted in similar ways, albeit the change coming in the opposite 
direction, towards the introduction of market mechanisms (see Morin Aguado 2012). 
41 It is impossible to ascertain the true performance of most state enterprises.  Where official sources 
report success, private media report failure.  SIDOR is a partial exception because of the high level of 
scrutiny implied by its importance to the economy both as a producer and as an employer.  Other state 
industries such as Inveval (valves), Invepal (paper), and Alcasa (aluminium) have had similar problems. 
42 2010 was slightly lower than 2 million, 2011 slightly higher, and 2012 slightly lower again.  Production 
was affected by electricity rationing in 2010, but not thereafter. 
 76 
 
gravely the trafficking of steel rods (cabillas) essential to construction.  These were 
being provided at low cost to the massive housebuilding programme Gran Misión 
Vivienda – the centrepiece of Chávez’s social policy at the time – but then being 
smuggled into Colombia to be sold at black-market prices (Ellner 2013b, p.70).  An 
“Iron Cartel” along similar lines also emerged, with the perverse addition of a military 
anti-corruption official extorting money in exchange for exclusion from his reports 
(Rangel Jiménez 2013).  These are just two notorious examples, however, of the kinds 
of corruption scandals that crop up with gloomy regularity in Venezuela.  Far from 
being a matter of purely private-sector vice, increased state involvement has meant only 
that a new elite – dubbed the “Bolibourgeoisie” (Bolivarian bourgeoisie) – has been 
drawn into a state-private nexus of corruption that predates Chávez by decades (see 
Coronil 1997; Karl 1999). 
 One solution to such problems has been the passing on of supervisory 
responsibility to participatory democratic institutions such as communal councils, but 
this too has proved ineffective.  For example, after various foreign cement companies 
were nationalised to reinforce the government’s housebuilding drive, partial control of 
supply was given over to communal councils.  However, diversion of subsidised 
materials into the black market and smuggling into Colombia have been so severe as to 
mean, according to Industry Minister Ricardo Menéndez, that internal demand can no 
longer be met, which only reinforces the incentive of black-market prices (AVN 2013b).  
This is far from an isolated example.  Surveys of council members show a large 
majority agreeing that these institutions suffer from both corruption and “financial 
disarray”, an ill attributed in Benjamin Goldfrank’s even-handed analysis to a lack of 
transparency or clear rules on financing (2011, p.52).  Although quantitatively speaking 
participation has been impressive, Goldfrank concludes that while “there is no clear 
evidence that communal councils in Venezuela threaten democracy … the problems 
exposed suggest that neither do they do much to deepen it” (p.53). 
 Though massive improvements in social indicators mean that the overall impact 
of the missions is not in doubt, with time even their efficacy and standing has been 
degraded by similar problems.  The most notorious example is undoubtedly the 
“PDVAL Case”, wherein this major food-distribution subsidiary of PDVSA was found 
to have allowed over 130,000 tons of imported food to rot portside, rather than duly 
distributing these goods at low prices via the Mercal network (Loaiza Figueroa 2011).  
Another flagship social programme, Barrio Adentro, also suffered serious problems in 
sustaining its initial success, with Chávez admitting in 2009 that 2000 of its primary-
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healthcare clinics had been abandoned (El Nacional 2009; Maldonado Lira 2009).  
Worse, as Carlos Aponte Blank notes in his thorough analysis of mission financing:  
 
…in 2006 and 2007 at the point at which spending on the misiones grew so 
markedly, the coverage of many of them tended to recede. … Amidst the 
massive spending there could be a large proportion of diversion of funds 
through embezzlement or corruption.  This risk is compounded by the weak 
institutional control to which these initiatives are subject. 
(Aponte Blank 2010, p.53) 
 
Essentially, the early “unqualified success” (Monedero 2010, p.240) of the missions, 
initially unburdened by the bureaucratic failings of traditional institutions, soon had to 
be qualified.  Indeed, deprived even of the admittedly dysfunctional monitoring of 
traditional institutions, many missions were “barely in sync with themselves” and 
certainly not with existing public services, leading to friction and inefficiency in the 
longer term (Burchardt 2012, p.91).   
 Widespread inefficiency, waste, and corruption not only reduce the functional 
impact of endogenous-development reforms, they also represent an acute 
haemorrhaging of the resources required for the state to meet its ever-expanding 
commitments both at home and abroad.  But even the foreign-exchange commission 
itself (CADIVI), created to prevent such haemorrhaging via capital flight, has been 
abused as a means of appropriating state resources through currency arbitrage.  
Individuals engage in a practice known locally as “[credit] card scraping” (raspando 
tarjetas [de crédito]) whereby they apply to CADIVI for dollars at the fixed exchange 
rate for use on fake foreign trips, only to swap them for Bolivars on the parallel 
currency market which satisfies demand unmet by the bureaucratic CADIVI (Correo del 
Orinoco 2013b).  Since this process requires capital to purchase dollars and fake 
journeys, it is inherently favourable to the wealthy rather than the government’s poorer 
core supporters, counteracting the government’s redistributive policies.43  Businesses 
can also take part on an even larger scale, presenting CADIVI with import contracts for 
fictitious products.  As President Maduro acknowledges, “there are people that request 
dollars to bring 100 cars into the country and they end up bringing 20, which they then 
sell at three times the [regulated] price” (Correo del Orinoco 2013a).  Worse still, the 
massive demand for government-rate dollars combines with the discretionary nature of 
CADIVI approval to create corruption within CADIVI itself, since its staff hold the key 
                                                 
43 This is not to say that the poor do not take part.  On the contrary, this is common practice for anyone 
who can take part.  My point is only that the wealthy can always take part and have the most to gain, 
thereby undermining the wider push towards redistribution towards the worst-off. 
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to this process, which is as lucrative for participants as it is costly for the state.  This 
problem is compounded by contraband fuel sales.  At the Brazilian and especially 
Colombian borders the filling-station queues stretch for miles, this trade amounting to a 
Venezuelan subsidy to development in neighbouring countries (Hidalgo López 2013).  
Alongside the ever-expanding financial commitments of the state – and especially of the 
parallel state centred on PDVSA – this unrelenting bleed of state resources has led to 
serious cash-flow problems, particularly when oil prices have stuttered (Cruz 2013).  
The fact that Chávez’s international diplomacy initiatives – including Petrocaribe – also 
rely on PDVSA-derived foreign-exchange has allowed opposition politicians to promote 
the idea that the government is “giving away the oil” abroad despite local need.44  Since 
so many public services remain uninstitutionalised and have no clearly defined funding 
sources – particularly in the off-budget parallel state – cash-flow problems can affect 
their provision, whereas the lack of foreign exchange for imports leads to shortages of 
basic products.  This shows how longstanding problems of state incapacity and 
widespread corruption in Venezuelan political economy can subvert reforms designed to 
favour endogenous development.  Rather than creating control mechanisms to address 
these issues, Chávez has tried to sidestep them by increasing the role of the parallel state 
under his direct control.  But ultimately these inherited features of Venezuelan political 
economy have undermined his novel development model, with this lack of control 
legitimacy weakening delivery of the public services which have been crucial to his 
government’s output legitimacy.  
 
 This brief examination of the problems of the Bolivarian Revolution cannot but 
be incomplete, but it serves nonetheless to demonstrate that even for its sympathisers, 
“after more than a decade of Chávez’s rule, the widening gap between the regime’s 
claims and its accomplishments has become increasingly visible and onerous” (Coronil 
2011, p.39).  This divergence and the many noxious continuities evident in Bolivarian 
Venezuela are all but ignored in the literature of ALBA, which tends to see ALBA 
purely as an extension of Venezuela’s model of endogenous development.  Yet, later 
chapters will reveal that the same incapacity, lack of control, and hybridity undermines 
the TCP and SUCRE in particular, while Chávez’s attempts to sidestep them using 
parallel governance structures both enable and jeopardise Petrocaribe’s remarkable 
impact.   
                                                 
44 “Regalando el petróleo” is an established phrase in Venezuelan politics and a common line of attack 
for opponents of Chávez’s PSUV. 
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Ecuador: Endogenous Development over Twenty-First Century Socialism 
Dominant though Venezuela undoubtedly is in ALBA, it is not solely responsible for its 
success and failures.  Rather, ALBA’s progress is often underpinned by overlaps in 
development strategies, particularly in terms of endogenous development, reasserted 
autonomy, and new sources of legitimacy.  Yet, with Ecuador under Rafael Correa (as 
of 2007) usually grouped with Venezuela and/or Bolivia as a prime example of the 
region’s left turn (see, for example, Robinson 2008; Escobar 2010; Ellner 2011a), these 
overlaps can easily be overstated.  In reality there are also significant differences in 
Ecuadorian political economy that both strengthen and weaken individual ALBA 
initiatives. 
 
Correa’s Citizens’ Revolution 
Correa’s election in 2007 does bear some striking resemblances to the context from 
which Hugo Chávez emerged nearly a decade earlier.  As in Venezuela there was 
widespread discontent and social upheaval relating to the neoliberal policies of his 
predecessors; his rise relied on the mobilisation of previously marginalised sectors of 
the population; and his most significant move upon election was to push for a 
constituent assembly that would serve as an anchor to his development strategies.  But 
the key difference between Ecuador and Venezuela is that Correa’s “Citizens’ 
Revolution” did not undergo a profound radicalisation comparable to the shift towards 
Twenty-First Century Socialism in Venezuela.  Gustavo Larrea, one of the founders of 
Correa’s Alianza PAIS (“Countrywide Alliance”)45 movement proclaimed during the 
constituent assembly that “the constitution that we propose is not going to label the 
country socialist by a long shot” (quoted in Lucas 2007), and this has proved prescient.  
For where Chávez’s Venezuela moved to create new institutions through which to 
implement its revolution, Correa’s focus has been on reinvigorating existing institutions 
and improving their performance.  Given what we have seen about the performance of 
public services and implementation of development strategies in Venezuela, the 
potential significance of this difference is clear. 
 In Ecuador the tone was set by national development plans formulated in the 
wake of Correa’s election in 2006 and following conclusion of constitutional assembly 
in 2008 (SENPLADES 2007; 2009).  These plans served to reorientate development 
                                                 
45 Literally “Country Alliance”, with the PAIS acronym signifying “Proud and Sovereign Fatherland” 
(Patria Altiva i Soberana). 
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away from the interests of major agricultural exporters and towards the internal market, 
producers, and especially the wellbeing and human capital of citizens.  The similarities 
with Venezuela are clear enough from the fact that its eight “strategies of change” 
prominently include internal development, sovereign international relations, productive 
diversification, and economic democratisation with social protagonism (SENPLADES 
2007, pp.6–7).  Yet, even at this early stage, there was also an acknowledgement that in 
order for this shift to be successful it had to be accompanied by the recuperation of the 
state’s “effective capacities of planning, regulation, and administration” (SENPLADES 
2007, p.6), which had been lost during what Correa routinely terms “the long and 
miserable night of neoliberalism”. 
 Thus, when Correa like Chávez moved to bolster state revenues by increasing its 
share of oil profits (from 50 to 70 per cent), he also reinforced the new royalty regime 
by seizing extracted oil in lieu of debts owed by non-compliant multinationals 
(Tockman 2010, p.4; Acosta 2009a, p.10).  This was complemented by a significant 
beefing-up of the inland revenue, the two changes combining to double tax revenues 
between 2006 and 2010 (Ponce & Acosta 2010, p.2).  Although the economy’s reliance 
on oil exports was less acute in Ecuador than in Venezuela, Correa’s officials at the 
National Planning and Development Secretariat (SENPLADES) were conscious of a 
process of ongoing “reprimarization” whereby the value of non-oil exports in the 
current-account balance was falling just as the weight of the petroleum sector increased 
(SENPLADES 2009, p.93).  In an attempt to reverse this trend and restructure the 
economy towards industries with greater value-added and more skilled employment, the 
government developed the “Endogenous and Sustainable National Strategy for Buen 
Vivir”,46 which foresaw a four-phase transition towards the long-term goal of a 
“knowledge economy” (SENPLADES 2009, pp.93–98).  The first phase, which reflects 
Correa’s focus since taking office, would tackle basic necessities not only through 
investment in social policy but also through focusing on sectors that generate and 
sustain employment such as SMEs and especially the social economy,47 considered “in 
this era of solidarity, reciprocity, and cooperation … the main tool for incorporating 
redistribution into the very process of wealth generation” (SENPLADES 2009, p.95).   
 SMEs are seen as key not because of their contribution to growth, which is 
eclipsed by that of major agro-exporters, but because of their contribution to 
                                                 
46 Buen Vivir is the Spanish translation of the indigenous Quichua concept of Sumak Kawsay, a holistic 
vision of social and environmental wellbeing analogous to Bolivia’s Vivir Bien.   
47 This is usually referred to as the “solidarity economy” in Ecuador. 
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employment and their tendency to use national rather than imported inputs, both factors 
complementing the government’s drive towards endogenous development.  At the 
smaller end of the scale, microenterprises are even more critical to human and social 
development, since the vast majority exist to provide subsistence to families.  The 
government has tried to channel resources to these sectors particularly by aiming to 
dedicate 45 per cent of procurement contracts to national industries, with a 
disproportionate share going to SMEs (Vázquez S. & Saltos Galarza 2010, pp.248–50).   
Yet, as in Venezuela the clearest priority in Ecuador is the social economy, 
which has been bolstered by the creation of a raft of new institutions that provide 
training and promotion – such as National Institute for Popular and Solidarity Economy 
(IEPS) and the Directorate of Inclusive Commerce – to promote the export capacity of 
the popular and solidarity economy (EPS).  At the same time, a new body of law defines 
and regulates the role and control of this sector (Ministerio de Coordinación de 
Desarrollo Social 2011), whereas the Superintendence of the Popular and Social 
Economy monitors the financial cooperatives and credit unions that fund much of this 
sector’s activity.  Between 2007 and 2012 the IEPS provided nearly $600 million of 
cheap credit to the social economy, whereas booming participation in cooperative 
financial institutions saw this sector constituting 15 per cent of domestic financing by 
2013 (ANDES 2013; Revista Lideres 2013a).  Apart from providing capital to increase 
productive capacity, this is also a means of tackling stubbornly high levels of rural 
poverty, particularly amongst indigenous groups for whom private banking is often 
geographically and culturally distant (ANDES 2013; Revista Lideres 2013b).  This 
concern for the social economy will be shown to inform Ecuador’s interactions with 
Venezuela in development of both the SUCRE and a new Trade Agreement for 
Development (ACD) compatible with the TCP. 
 As for Chávez in Venezuela, for Correa human development had to be 
underpinned by social protection for marginalised groups that were also vital to 
electoral success.  Accordingly, progress in this area since inauguration in 2007 has 
been significant.  By 2010, social spending had risen to 9.5 per cent of GDP, compared 
to 4.8 per cent in 2006, whereas poverty fell by 9 percentage points (to 29 per cent) and 
income inequality by 7 points to 47 (Ray & Kozameh 2012, pp.13, 15).  Unlike in 
Venezuela, however, social policy in Ecuador was implemented by reforms to existing 
institutions rather than through new mechanisms like the missions.  The most significant 
has been the Human Development Bond, a conditional cash transfer (CCT) programme 
for the poorest 40 per cent, with particular attention to mothers, the elderly, and the 
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disabled.  Correa oversaw numerous increases in the value of the transfer and launched 
a drive to increase participation, doubling the government’s funding of the programme 
and taking it to a fifth of the voting-age population by 2011 (Acosta 2009a, p.68; Ray & 
Kozameh 2012, p.16).  Since the condition of this CCT is school attendance, it also 
reinforced Correa’s second major social-policy drive, towards universalisation of 
primary education, achievement of a 75 per cent graduation rate at secondary level, and 
elimination of illiteracy (Luna Tamayo & Astorga 2011, p.303).  Poverty and education 
were also targeted together by the passage from parents to the state of responsibility for 
provision of school books, meals, and uniforms (often sourced from the social 
economy), as well as by banning the common practice of charging unofficial fees 
(Ministerio de Educación 2009).  At the same time, the government extended grants and 
cheap mortgages to the poorest through its Housing Bond programme, which not only 
doubled (compared to 2007) the level of housing credit available in Ecuador, but also 
served as an expansionary stimulus to this dollarised economy during the global 
financial crisis.  Social policy has been complemented by changes in the labour market, 
where between 2007 and 2012 unemployment fell from 7.5 to 4.9 per cent and 
underemployment from 52.6 to 43.5 per cent.  Subscription rates for the traditional 
social-security system rose also from 30 to 40 per cent of the labour force, though this 
was complemented by an innovative living-wage scheme applied proportionally to 
companies’ profits (Ray & Kozameh 2012, p.14).  Overall, real incomes have increased 
significantly under Correa, with the family average rising for the first time in decades 
above the cost of the government’s “basic basket” of essential goods and services 
(Acosta 2009a, p.34).  There have been conflicts, particularly over quality-assurance 
evaluations in education, but since Correa has tended to work with and within existing 
institutions, internal opposition has been far weaker than in Venezuela. 
 Ecuador also shares Venezuela’s central foreign-policy aim of reasserting 
national autonomy, in part by promoting multipolarity and reinforcing regional 
integration (Asamblea Constituyente 2008, Article 416).  The flipside of this is the 
reduced risk of endogenous-development strategies being jeopardised by extra-regional 
events and interventions.  At its most prosaic this is evident in a willingness to defend 
domestic industry and selectively substitute some imports by methods – increased 
subsidies, tariffs, and safeguards – that might have been considered unthinkable 
protectionism twenty years ago (SENPLADES 2009, p.109).  More eye-catching 
indications of this reassertion include closure of the large US military base at Manta 
soon after Correa’s accession (Falconí 2010, pp.86–91), establishment of an 
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international panel which cleared a third of Ecuadorian foreign debt by questioning its 
legality (Weisbrot & Sandoval 2009, p.17), and protracted battles with multinational oil 
companies in various domestic and international forums over contracts and 
environmental damage (Acosta 2009b).48  This change has been so radical that when the 
international institutions have favoured external actors, the institutions themselves have 
been renounced, as with the World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (after it found in favour of Chevron) and various BITs whose 
resort to extra-regional arbitration was incompatible with the new constitution 
(Asamblea Constituyente 2008, Article 422).49 
Particularly important here is Ecuador’s rejection of bilateral north-south trade 
deals seen as injurious to efforts to deepen LAC integration.  While Colombia and Peru 
signed FTAs with the US, thereby ending any hope of completing the Andean 
Community’s customs union, such a move would have contradicted of Ecuadorian 
development plans, which demanded that agreements be signed with subregional 
groupings or not at all (SENPLADES 2007, p.317, Strategy 5.5.2).  Fander Falconí, 
who has headed either SENPLADES or the Foreign Affairs Ministry during virtually all 
of Correa’s presidency, explained that FTAs “consolidate structures of unequal 
exchange, establish an unfair international division of labour, exclude very significant 
productive sectors, prey on nature, and also destroy integration processes” (Editorial 
2009).  Ecuador’s proposal of a broader agreement with elements of political dialogue 
and cooperation to reduce asymmetries was ultimately rejected, but it did inform the 
TCP-compliant Trade Agreement for Development (ACD) model that Ecuador and 
Venezuela would later attempt to employ in replacing expiring CAN trade rules with an 
ALBA-compatible agreement (see chapter four).  Indeed, Ecuador under Correa – like 
Venezuela under Chávez – became an avid promoter of new intra-regional institutions 
that would give LAC greater control over its own destiny.  It was an Ecuadorian 
presidential commission which fleshed out Chávez’s proposal for a regional virtual 
currency later adopted within ALBA (the SUCRE; chapter five), and the same team was 
also heavily involved in conceptualising and publicising the Bank of the South 
initiative.  Most importantly, however, they took these two initiatives and supplemented 
them with a proposed Common Reserves Fund of the South to propose an overarching 
New Regional Financial Architecture (NRFA).  Essentially, the NRFA mimicked the 
functions of major multilateral institutions – the IMF, World Bank, and Keynes’ 
                                                 
48 Occidental (Oxy) and Chevron (relating to activities of its subsidiary Texaco). 
49 By 2013 Ecuador had withdrawn or was slated to withdraw from 15 BITs. 
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unimplemented “Bancor” currency – only bringing these functions under LAC control 
(Páez Pérez 2010; Rosales et al. 2011).50  This substantiates the shared concern for LAC 
autonomy commonly held to motivate ALBA, whereas later chapters on the TCP and 
SUCRE also highlight the role of this synergy in the design of these initiatives. 
 Despite these significant changes in direction, however, many aspects of 
Ecuador’s pre-Correa political economy persist.  Unlike in Venezuela, resort to 
nationalisation has been limited; existing regional and international trade commitments 
have been maintained; and inherited institutions have been reformed and revamped 
rather than replaced.  While this might draw the ire of maximalist elements within 
Correa’s movement – not to mention in academia (Petras 2010, for example) – it has 
averted many of the problems dogging implementation of Chávez’s Twenty-First 
Century Socialism in Venezuela.51  Essentially, although Correa’s reforms have targeted 
the marginalised sectors that are the crux of both his endogenous development model 
and his electoral support, they have done so without openly attacking the interests of 
existing elites.  Although business leaders in Ecuador’s traditional big seven export 
industries would have liked to see FTAs with the US and the EU,52 neither of which was 
forthcoming, their existence is not seriously threatened by prioritisation of SMEs and 
the social economy.  And where their interests have been directly threatened, as when 
the US withdrew its Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA) 
preference regime, Correa’s government has provided support, in this case by 
dampening losses arising from tariff changes (Hoy 2011).53  Ecuador remains a member 
of the WTO and CAN, the frameworks within which most of its trade is regulated, and 
despite adhesion to ALBA and activism on UNASUR it also retains an active interest in 
Mercosur, an option more palatable to economic elites. 
 Yet, as in Venezuela there is internal opposition from those linked to economic 
elites or of a different ideological stripe.  Here the Planning Secretariat (SENPLADES) 
and more radical elements of the Foreign Affairs Ministry make up one faction, 
labouring to reorient industrial and trade policy towards the interests of the poor.   The 
second faction consists of the Coordinating Ministry of Production, Employment, and 
Competitiveness (MCPEC), linked to agricultural elites, and the more traditional wing 
                                                 
50 The proposal also suggests a LAC body resembling the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes, but this aspect is less central. 
51 This is not to assume that there existed a middle ground acceptable to the Venezuelan opposition; on 
the contrary, Chávez’s early years could be seen as an attempt precisely to find this middle ground, but 
this moderation met only with anti-democratic interventions like the 2002 coup and the 2002-03 oil strike. 
52 Oil, bananas, shrimp, flowers, coffee, cacao, fish, constituting around 85 per cent of exports. 
53 ATPDEA compensation was phased out once ATPDEA was renewed.  It was revived in 2013, 
however, when Ecuador withdrew from ATPDEA following US threats vis-à-vis Edward Snowden. 
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of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, considered “a conservative stronghold” and 
historically unafraid to obstruct policies issuing from the executive (Acosta 2009a, 
p.95).  As noted above, tensions between the two have been allayed by provision of 
benefits to both, but ultimate control over trade policy has been invested in the Minister 
of Production, as it is this position that controls the body with the final say over trade 
policy, the Foreign Trade Committee (COMEX).  This is indicative of the relative 
caution of Ecuador’s “Citizen’s Revolution”, where changes in participation have been 
relatively limited (Tockman 2010, pp.13–15).  Where the Chávez government relied on 
a mix of input and output legitimacy, in Ecuador the focus has been output legitimacy 
bolstered by control legitimacy: as one activist put it, “if someone sells you bubblegum 
on the streets, [Correa] wants to make sure that taxes are paid and that you get a receipt” 
(in Denvir 2008).  Thus, while Correa’s reforms have not been so radical or directly 
transformative as those in Venezuela, they have been executed relatively successfully, 
with tensions diffused by provision of benefits to various sectors of society.  This 
successful implementation has meant that Correa’s reforms are electorally secure in the 
short term (given approval ratings of 80 per cent) and institutionally secure in the 
medium term given their basis in established branches of the state.  The same concern 
for implementation and broad output legitimacy plays into Ecuador’s role in the TCP 
and SUCRE, but so too do tensions between the more radical and conservative elements 
within his administration. 
By simply grouping Ecuador with Bolivia and Venezuela as a relatively radical 
New-Left state, the ALBA literature overlooks any possible role for these nuances of 
Ecuadorian political economy.  Yet, as in the case of Venezuela, the details of this more 
comprehensive picture prove to be crucial to understanding ALBA. 
 
The Anglophone ALBA: Punctuated Pragmatism  
As noted in chapter two’s review of the ALBA literature, there has been precious little 
analysis of any influence from or impact upon ALBA’s three Anglophone Caribbean 
members, Dominica, St Vincent and the Grenadines, and Antigua and Barbuda.  Where 
they have been considered, this has tended to be from the perspective of Venezuela 
(Jácome 2011) or the US (Kozloff 2008).  And even the sole significant exception, the 
scrupulous work of Norman Girvan (2008; 2010; 2011a), relies to a great extent on a 
combination of ALBA pronouncements and official local accounts of Caribbean 
member-states’ involvement which are sourced at a distance.  The most common trope 
here is that Anglophone Caribbean membership represents the mutual interests, first, of 
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a Venezuelan government eager to expand its geopolitical influence (Arriagada Herrera 
2005, p.12) and, second, of small island states in desperate need of funds with which to 
finance their own development strategies (Sanders 2007).  Yet, even accounts that take 
this tack admit that there is “no clear ‘quid pro quo’ for Venezuela” (Sanders 2007, 
p.473), suggesting that this understanding is not entirely watertight.  Our analysis 
reveals that although the political economy of Anglophone members bears little 
resemblance to that of their larger Latin neighbours – given their smallness this could 
hardly be otherwise – there are shared tendencies towards “people-centred 
development” that are expressed when these states can quite literally afford to express 
them.  Thus, while it is true that Anglophone ALBA states’ foreign policy is driven 
primarily by a need to secure resources with which to stabilise their own economies, 
there is also an ideological aspect to their membership of ALBA.  As chapter six will 
demonstrate, ALBA’s Petrocaribe initiative in particular underwrites expression of this 
shared ideological commitment to human development, whilst also favouring the 
autonomy of the Caribbean region as a whole. 
 
Internal Crises and External Constraints 
To a far greater degree than in Venezuela or Ecuador, the nature of development in 
Dominica, St Vincent and the Grenadines, and Antigua and Barbuda is defined more by 
structural constraints than by the political choices of incumbent governments.  As is 
now widely accepted in academic and in policy circles (Briguglio 1995; Commonwealth 
Secretariat & World Bank 2000), their status as small island developing states (SIDS) 
implies a peculiar vulnerability to external conditions and crises, as well as a broad set 
of limitations on internal development relating to smallness (not least of internal 
markets, capital bases, and firms). 
In the early 2000s this acute external exposure resulted in outright fiscal crises in 
Dominica and Antigua, whereas St Vincent only narrowly avoided the same fate.  For 
Dominica and St Vincent this owed to the phasing out of a preferential regime for 
banana exports to the EU following a successful challenge at the WTO by US and Latin 
American competitors.  The fiscal crisis in Antigua, meanwhile, was triggered by the 
veritable War on Tourism that followed the 9/11 attacks and by a US ban on online 
gambling which destroyed Antigua’s burgeoning offshore-gaming industry (IMF 2006, 
pp.5, 20).  As a result of these crises, both Dominica and Antigua have had to seek 
assistance from the IMF, and their development planning has ever since been subject to 
appreciable constraints such as GDP-relative limits on public debt, the public wage bill, 
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and the primary balance (see Payne 2008 on Dominica, for example).  Although St 
Vincent did not seek IMF assistance, its reliance on foreign direct investment to inject 
capital into the local economy and on financial markets to fund deficits has meant that it 
too has had to commit to a market-friendly orthodoxy of fiscal discipline and primary 
surpluses.  As a result of these contextual factors, the first priority of development 
planning – Dominica’s Growth and Social Protection Strategy documents 
(Commonwealth of Dominica 2006; 2012), Antigua’s National Economic and Social 
Transformation Programme (Lovell 2011, pp.38–44), and St Vincent’s periodic 
Medium Term Economic Strategy Papers (Central Planning Division 2007; 2010) – is 
necessarily fiscal sustainability.  This has minimised the financial resources and policy 
space available to Roosevelt Skerrit (Dominica), Baldwin Spencer (Antigua), and Ralph 
Gonsalves (St Vincent), precluding any turn towards endogenous-development of the 
like seen in Venezuela or Ecuador. 
On the whole, the constraints acting upon Anglophone ALBA members have 
rendered coherent models a luxury beyond their means.  This has ushered in a new 
pragmatism that recognises the limits on available development strategies while seeking 
to capitalise on opportunities to counteract them.  As Vincentian Prime Minster Ralph 
Gonsalves reveals, in this context of vulnerability much economic policymaking is 
reactive: 
 
The state can’t retreat; it has been a force for good in this country.  But 
sometimes it may take a less prominent position in the economy.  In other cases 
the state will take a greater role … we will take a tactical stance depending on 
the situation. 
(I.68) 
 
Accordingly, we find Gonsalves’ government privatising state companies like St 
Vincent’s National Commercial Bank as well as Food City supermarkets that were once 
used to moderate food prices just as Venezuela’s state-run Mercal shops do.  Yet, at the 
same time Gonsalves defends deliberate deficit spending and use of the Public Sector 
Investment Programme as counter-cyclical measures in the wake of the financial crisis, 
whilst the state has also actively – if unsuccessfully – promoted alternatives to the 
declining banana industry, such as arrowroot, offshore banking, and tourism (Central 
Planning Division 2002; 2007; 2010).  Likewise in Dominica Skerrit has not questioned 
his predecessor’s privatisations of the state banana company, ending of price controls, 
or regressive tax increases.  But there too it is the state that actively seeks to offset 
losses in the banana industry through crop diversification, promotion of fisheries, and 
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by carving out a niche as “The Nature Isle”, an alternative eco-tourism destination set 
against the usual Caribbean offer of white-sand beaches (Commonwealth of Dominica 
2012, pp.38–54).  Antigua – ravaged anew in 2009 by the collapse of the Allen Stanford 
empire – has slated port authorities, electricity, telecoms, and even the profitable State 
Insurance Company for privatisation (UPP 2009, p.1; Government of Antigua & 
Barbuda 2009, p.4).  At the same time the state has looked to boost tourism and 
information technology, as well as prioritising revitalisation of the country’s long-
neglected agricultural sector (UPP 2009, pp.19–22).  In the cases of Dominica and St 
Vincent particularly, dire necessity has also led to urgent invention of more radical 
long-term solutions.  In Dominica, this means exploitation of its volcanic terrain not 
only to attract holiday hikers, but also to generate and export geothermal energy to 
neighbouring French départements d'outre-mer Guadeloupe and Martinique 
(Government Information Service 2013b).  In St Vincent, this means betting the run-
down farm on the costly construction of a jet-capable airport at Argyle so as to compete 
with major Caribbean tourist destinations such as Barbados and Antigua (Gonsalves 
2011). 
Overall, there is no coherent development model within or across the three 
states, with each looking to find its own response to external conditions that describe the 
limits of developmental policy space.  Part of the strength of Petrocaribe will be shown 
to be its flexibility in this respect, as it allows governments to define and defend their 
own development strategies with only the lightest of conditionality. 
 
Protecting People-Centred Development 
Yet, what marks out these ALBA governments is how they choose to use their limited 
policy space, and here there is a clear overlap across the three and with their Latin 
American bedfellows in ALBA.  It is worth noting that the parties of Skerrit (Dominica 
Labour Party), Gonsalves (Unity Labour Party), and Spencer (United Progressive Party) 
all represent the left-wing option in their respective political arenas,54 and this is 
reflected in a pro-poor focus reminiscent of the central social element of reforms in 
Venezuela and Ecuador.  Thus, in Dominica, the government has instituted numerous 
programmes targeting marginal groups.  The “Yes, We Care” initiative provides a 
subsidy to carers for the elderly and disabled (Douglas 2009); the Housing Revolution 
programme constructs subsidised housing for the poorest (particularly the indigenous 
Kalinago) as well as providing repairs to the island’s many substandard dwellings 
                                                 
54 This is least clear in Antigua, where the opposition Antigua Labour Party’s platform is ill-defined. 
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(Government Information Service 2013c); the government’s AID Bank provides low-
interest loans for low-income homebuyers (AID Bank 2011); and a regularisation 
programme provides squatters with rights to the lands that they have long inhabited 
(Dominica News Online 2012).  In St Vincent, social housing has been aggressively 
promoted through Gonsalves’ Housing Revolution, which has provided 650 homes to 
low- or no-income citizens and their families (ULP 2010a, p.38); the state-owned 
National Commercial Bank has offered 100% mortgages to first-time buyers working in 
the public sector (ULP 2010c, p.28);55 and the Education Revolution programme has 
built schools, provided a new national public library, and most importantly 
universalised secondary education from a baseline of 39 per cent in 2001 (ULP 2010a, 
p.38).  In Antigua, the new People’s Benefit and Senior Citizen’s Utility Subsidy 
programmes have provided monthly cash transfers to the disabled and to the poor, the 
elderly, and the disabled (Government of Antigua & Barbuda 2012a; 2012b); the 
minimum state pension has been raised by over 50 per cent, with an annual grant to help 
pay for home improvements (UPP 2009, p.3); the minimum wage has been increased 
(UPP 2009, p.24); the stagnant National Public Library project has been resuscitated; 
school uniforms and school meals are now offered free of charge (UPP 2009, p.2); and a 
sizeable affordable-housing scheme for civil servants has begun at North Sound 
(Ministry of Agriculture 2011).  This common social focus chimes not only with the 
human-development aspect of Venezuelan and Ecuadorian development strategies, but 
also with the cementing of political success through provision of benefits to those worst 
affected by earlier crises.  Though by no means central to all of these programmes, 
chapter six will reveal that Petrocaribe is implicated in a surprising number of them, 
with its one condition of “social purpose” favouring social spending in particular. 
 
Aid-Seeking Foreign Policy as a Boon to Development 
There is also an overlap with Venezuela and Ecuador in terms of moves to diversify 
foreign relations, meaning in the Eastern Caribbean case away from traditional partners 
like the US, Canada, and the UK.  Indeed, as in Venezuela’s case particularly, the 
foreign policy of Anglophone ALBA states has been used to reinforce social policy.  
Dominica’s Yes We Care programme was backed by a Libyan grant and by ALBA’s 
Petrocaribe initiative (see chapter six, p.178); low-income mortgages were made 
possible by a credit line from the Venezuelan development bank BANDES (AID Bank 
2011); and a vast array of infrastructural projects have been funded by a Chinese 
                                                 
55 It has since been privatised as Bank of St Vincent and the Grenadines. 
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government grateful to Dominica for its sudden change of opinion on Taiwanese 
sovereignty.  In Antigua both the Senior Citizens Subsidy and the People’s Benefit 
Programme are funded directly by Petrocaribe; affordable-housing schemes were 
facilitated by cheap credit from state financial institutions in Venezuela; and as in 
Dominica fishing infrastructure has been revitalised through aid from Japan (Caribbean 
360 2011; Government Information Service 2013a).  In St Vincent laptops provided free 
to schoolchildren via the Education Revolution are donated by Portugal and assembled 
in Venezuela (ULP 2010b, p.19);56 Cuban equipment and expertise were behind a new 
state-of-the-art medical centre at Georgetown (ULP 2010a, p.26); and, most importantly 
of all, the Argyle airport project has been supported by Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago, 
CARICOM, Venezuela, Cuba, ALBA, Petrocaribe, Iran, Libya, and Austria, with the 
Vincentian government estimating that in the early stages every dollar from state coffers 
has been matched by nearly six dollars from international partners (Gonsalves 2011, 
p.33).  This aid-seeking behaviour is in all three cases a conscious development strategy 
that brings in capital and creates employment without lightening the meagre state purse 
or asking the taxpayer to refill it (Skerrit 2011, pp.14–15).  As one senior official of St 
Vincent’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs explains:  
 
As  with  all  other  small  island developing  states,  the  pursuance  of  our 
national interest is susceptible to various external factors. … These challenges 
compel us to act strategically in an environment of constant change. … This 
means the expansion of diplomatic relations beyond the pool of traditional 
allies to include new prospects in the interest of our national development needs 
and priorities. 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011, p.2) 
 
As chapter six will show, from the recipients’ side this factor more than any other 
underpins the logic of Petrocaribe, yet it is also compatible with the concern for LAC 
autonomy manifest in the development strategies of Latin American members like 
Ecuador and Venezuela. 
 
Remembering Autonomy and Anti-Imperialism 
Indeed, the leaders of Anglophone ALBA states also share with their larger Latin 
neighbours an explicit desire to reassert their own autonomy in order to insulate national 
development strategies from external influence and intervention: 
 
                                                 
56 This is an extension of the Venezuelan Canaima programme. 
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Latin America and the Caribbean have suffered greatly as a result of coercive 
and imperialistic models of colonialism and later the Washington Consensus. 
The fundamental underpinning of such models is the reduction of the role of the 
state in domestic policy-making in tandem with increased control by foreign 
capital – whether such capital originates with a foreign government, an 
international financial institution or with multinational corporations. 
(Spencer 2009) 
 
In Baldwin Spencer’s Antigua this has not been hollow rhetoric.  In a remarkable 
David-and-Goliath case of WTO arbitration, Antigua and Barbuda successfully argued 
in 2004 that the US was unfairly restricting free trade in gaming services (gambling) 
and thereby damaging Antigua’s burgeoning offshore-gaming industry (Cooper 2008).57  
The claim was ultimately so successful that Antigua was even given permission to 
engage in “legal piracy”, selling products of US creative industries without paying for 
copyright as a means of recouping associated losses (BBC News 2013).  Though St 
Vincent has not experienced this kind of direct conflict in recent years, “Comrade” 
Ralph Gonsalves has long decried US imperialism and the injustices of the existing 
international system, leading him to advocate at home for a more autonomous 
“postcolonial economy” (I-Witness News 2013; Gonsalves 2007).  And although 
Dominica’s Roosevelt Skerrit took office as a discreet centrist, by 2008 he was using 
speeches before the UN General Assembly to berate the US for “[putting] the 
mechanisms of the WTO to work to their benefit” and to promote regional and south-
south cooperation (Skerrit 2008).  All three leaders have been vocal supporters both of 
Anglophone Caribbean integration via CARICOM and of a turn towards Latin America, 
not only though ALBA but also through the Community of Latin American and 
Caribbean States (CELAC), from which the US and Canada are excluded.  This is a far 
cry from the 1980s, when the influence of the US in the Caribbean was so complete that 
“in almost every arena, it was able to lay down the parameters of what could be done 
and even what could be thought” (Payne 1998, p.210). 
 
 On the whole, although the Anglophone ALBA members do not pursue an 
endogenous-development model analogous to those of Ecuador and Venezuela, where 
they are able to escape the constraints of their status as SIDS, they do evince a similar 
pro-poor social focus.  Furthermore, this is intimately tied to a newly diverse foreign 
policy that criticises the character of the existing world order and promotes the 
autonomy of Caribbean states and of the LAC region.  Thus, while there is a basic 
                                                 
57 n.b. this process was started by the previous ALP government but then vigorously adopted by 
Spencer’s UPP. 
 92 
 
pragmatism to the political economy of Anglophone ALBA member-states, it is 
punctuated by ideologically left-of-centre initiatives whenever structural constraints are 
relaxed.  As chapter six will show, ALBA’s Petrocaribe initiative encourages precisely 
this relaxing of structural constraints, whilst also nudging signatories towards social 
spending. 
 
Conclusion: A Fuller Picture of ALBA’s National Political Economies 
This chapter serves to highlight inconsistencies between the conscious development 
strategies of ALBA member-states which are reflected in the ALBA literature and the 
reality of hybrid political economies in which novel development models have only 
been partially implemented alongside continuities from previous eras and 
administrations.  As the ALBA literature suggests, across the five members studied 
there is a convergence towards reasserting the autonomy of the LAC region, the 
importance of social policy as a means of promoting human development, and a 
realisation that this pro-poor focus brings new legitimacy for these left-of-centre 
governments.  While not a luxury available to Anglophone members too vulnerable to 
external events, between Venezuela and Ecuador more specifically there is a clear 
commonality in terms of the means of restructuring economies to the benefit and 
empowerment of the poor through reinforcement of the social economy.  These two also 
share the same foreign-policy drive to reassert their own autonomy and that of the LAC 
region by challenging the dominance of existing international institutions and by 
creating and promoting local substitutes.  This is the version of ALBA reflected in the 
existing literature, whose shared developmental aims inspire and shape the design of the 
TCP, SUCRE, and Petrocaribe, as revealed in sections on their intended effects in 
chapters four to six. 
 But this chapter also demonstrates that there is more to the political economies 
of ALBA member-states than this focus on their development models suggests.  
Attempts at implementing endogenous development in Venezuela and Ecuador have 
met with varying degrees of success, and the two have tried to circumvent tensions by 
very different means.  In the face of a crucial recall referendum, Chávez abandoned 
attempts to reform existing institutions and built new parallel structures to provide 
immediate benefits to his core constituents.  Despite initial success in overcoming the 
failings of traditional institutions, with time even these parallel institutions became 
encumbered with many of the same problems.  Thus, even reforms designed to promote 
endogenous development were afflicted by inefficiency, state incapacity, and corruption 
 93 
 
both public and provide.  Correa has focused on improving existing institutions while 
making certain concessions to existing elites.  By this means Correa has delivered 
significant benefits to the constituency which carried him to power.  Yet he has also 
created a schizophrenic split in industrial and trade policy between branches of state 
linked to primary-export elites and others linked to the social movements that brought 
him to power.  Anglophone Caribbean members, meanwhile, are so constrained by their 
precarious finances that they must actively seek new sources of external assistance to 
facilitate their “people-centred” initiatives. 
 The key point here is that ALBA’s national political economies are internally 
diverse and individually distinct despite sharing certain priorities.  And nowhere do we 
find fully implemented the endogenous-development model cited in the ALBA 
literature.  As Trinkunas’ statement at the beginning of this chapter intimated, self-
proclaimed drives for “Twenty-First Century Socialism” and a “Citizens’ Revolution” 
can only tell us so much.  In reality, New-Left development strategies are achieved 
unevenly, with unresolved contradictions and inherited characteristics of political 
economies often thwarting their fuller expression.  As the following chapters on specific 
initiatives will demonstrate, the implemented ALBA is as much a reflection and 
reinforcement of these tensions in national political economies as it as of the New-Left 
reforms that it was designed to support. 
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Chapter Four: The People’s Trade Agreement (TCP) 
 
It is of vital importance to study whether or not the [TCP’s] benefits for the 
peoples [of ALBA states] equal those of Bolivian exporters of textiles and 
genetically modified soya, of the Cuban civil service, of Nicaraguan, Argentine, 
or Brazilian cattle ranchers, or businessmen who are “friends of ALBA”. 
(Benzi 2010, p.18) 
 
The first of the three core ALBA initiatives to be analysed is the People’s Trade 
Agreement (TCP), which represents ALBA’s clearest and most comprehensive attempt 
to define an approach to trade within its “Economic Zone of Shared Development”.  As 
will be explored in greater depth below, it aims to facilitate cooperative, state-guided, 
intra-regional productive integration that safeguards social welfare and human 
development.   These ideas weigh heavily in accounts of ALBA that see the TCP as an 
autonomy-reinforcing regionalisation of endogenous development, anchored in 
newfound legitimacy amongst previously marginalised groups (chapter two, p.46).  Yet, 
as Benzi’s call for a more thorough investigation of its interactions and impact suggests, 
any reassessment must be sensitive also to the possibility of unintended effects and 
dynamics involving all manner of actors within participating states. 
As outlined in the introduction (pp.22-23), this reassessment proceeds via a four-
stage process which compares the idealised “on paper” initiative with its observable, 
implemented reality.  This begins with a thorough examination of the origins and 
functioning of the TCP according to its design.  Though this first stage is essentially 
descriptive, since much of the confusion in the literature arises from vague 
understandings of what ALBA initiatives actually do, it is essential that it be carried out 
in real depth.  Here we focus, first, on the TCP, which is essentially a framework of 
principles designed to guide negotiation of intra-ALBA trade agreements, be they bi- or 
multilateral.58  Then we look at Venezuela and Ecuador’s attempt to apply the TCP via a 
novel trade-agreement format (Trade Agreement for Development, ACD) after the 
breakdown of FTAA talks and Venezuela’s exit from the Andean Community (CAN) 
cleared the path for a remodelling of bilateral trade rules.  This shows how Ecuador’s 
ACD concept codified TCP principles that invert neoliberal orthodoxies in order to 
reassert the state’s role in guiding development and defending social protections.  This 
unusually scrupulous examination enables stage two’s exploration of the initiative’s 
intended effects in terms of the concepts of endogenous development, autonomy, and 
                                                 
58 The TCP was originally to inform negotiations towards a multilateral deal involving all of ALBA. 
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legitimacy which are central to the ALBA literature.  Consistent with the dominant 
ideas in this literature, the TCP looks to reinforce endogenous development by 
reinforcing a LAC “economic zone of shared development” involving a shift towards 
higher value-added goods that can be produced via intra-ALBA value chains.  Likewise, 
recalling the shared drive for multipolarity of Ecuador and Venezuela, it aims to use 
special and differential treatment (S&D) to reduce asymmetries between parties, 
fostering creation of a LAC pole within this more balanced world order.  A particular 
focus on EPS organisations and SMEs favours poorer sectors of society, reinforcing 
endogenous development and providing new output legitimacy to the left-of-centre 
governments involved.  This first half of the chapter thereby deals with the states-led 
design of this element of ALBA as a regional project. 
 The second half, however, reveals in stage three the TCP’s real-world 
implementation, comparing it to stage one’s proposed functioning and implementation.  
The basic finding is that although implementation of the TCP has been attempted both 
multi- and bilaterally, it has failed in both forms.  Despite numerous rounds of 
negotiations between Venezuela and Ecuador towards a TCP-compliant ACD, the final 
deal served only to renew existing rules for a further five years, meaning that the TCP 
remains entirely unimplemented, thereby precluding its many intended effects.  Stage 
four focuses on the impediments to the TCP-ACD process,59 begging the question of 
how and why this novel agreement failed to materialise despite agreement over its 
potential worth as a boon to endogenous development.  Contrary to the ALBA 
literature, which has focused on innovative New-Left development strategies, the 
factors influential in this failure prove to be continuities, ranging from structural factors 
and inherited institutional commitments to characteristics of domestic bureaucracies and 
elites.  Thus, the study of the TCP’s “unimplementation” provides new insights into the 
forces acting upon and ultimately thwarting one of ALBA’s core economic initiatives. 
 
Avoiding Crossed Wires: Which TCP is the TCP? 
Since one of the failings of the existing ALBA literature is its imprecision, it is 
important to be clear about which elements of ALBA are being studied and why.  In the 
case of the TCP, there are two potential sources of confusion. 
First, the term TCP began to be used in 2006 with Bolivia’s adhesion to ALBA, 
but its meaning changed when fundamental principles for a multilateral TCP agreement 
                                                 
59 The term “TCP-ACD process” will be used to refer to negotiations towards a TCP-compliant bilateral 
ACD between Venezuela and Ecuador. 
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were agreed upon at an ALBA summit in 2009.  The 2006 TCP was simply an 
extension to Bolivia of ALBA’s 2004 founding agreement between Cuba and 
Venezuela, combining broad declarations of principle with specific “actions” in various 
policy domains (most famously the “doctors for oil” exchange).  The 2009 TCP, 
meanwhile, was a framework of principles designed to inform a comprehensive 
multilateral agreement.  Here we are interested in the 2009 TCP and attempts to 
implement it multi- and bilaterally.   
 Second, because the 2009 TCP lists principles, it is possible to consider any 
state-led trade compatible with these principles as evidence of the TCP in action.  Such 
trade does indeed take place, as when Venezuela bought up Bolivian textiles whose 
export to the US fell through after unilateral preferences were withdrawn (Tabares 
2010).  But such trade is irregular, uninstitutionalised, and changes little about the basic 
issue of what happens when the goods, services, or investments of one member-state 
cross a border into another.  Conversely, the multilateral TCP proposed in 2009 and the 
bilateral ACD sought by Venezuela and Ecuador represented comprehensive deals that 
would have represented progress towards the “economic zone of shared development” 
sought by ALBA states and heralded in the existing literature.   
 
Origin and Proposed Function of the TCP 
The 2009 People’s Trade Agreement (TCP)60 
An opportunity to present a novel intra-ALBA trade agreement first hove into with the 
irretrievable breakdown of talks towards the distinctly neoliberal, LAC-wide FTAA in 
2005.  ALBA’s original agreement between Cuba and Venezuela (2004) had been a 
response to the FTAA itself, and while it had captured the imagination of many, it did 
not significantly alter existing regulation of the everyday business of regulating flows of 
goods, services, and capital across borders.  Then, in 2006, Venezuela’s decision to 
withdraw from CAN gave fellow members Bolivia and Ecuador notice of a potential 
opportunity to reshape their relations when the five-year withdrawal period ended in 
2011.  Since this would also free Venezuelan trade from CAN’s obligation of special 
treatment for Bolivia and Ecuador, both had a particular interest in establishing a viable 
alternative before 2011, especially once Ecuador had also joined ALBA (mid-2009).  
Bolivia’s Vice-Ministry of Foreign Trade was set the task of coming up with a set of 
                                                 
60 n.b. This description can only be as clear as the TCP and ACD themselves are about their own purpose 
and functioning.  Since – as is explored below – neither has been implemented, there is no fully 
implemented existing example to analyse, only the TCP framework and the model ACD. 
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guiding principles that would inform a multilateral TCP, resulting in the Fundamental 
Principles of the People’s Trade Agreement ratified by ALBA members in late 2009 
(I.49). 
 
The TCP: Inverting Neoliberal Trade Regimes 
The function of the TCP, like any trade agreement, is principally to regulate taxation of 
goods and services across borders, though like many modern agreements it also touches 
on trade-related areas such as investment, intellectual property, and public procurement.  
Its novelty lies in its reversal of many of the orthodoxies of free-trade agreements.   
Where US-backed bi- or multilateral FTAs have been negotiated in national-
interest terms in order to gain market access for domestic firms with competitive 
advantage, the TCP proposes that commercial rules be set cooperatively and in line with 
the interests of the poorest sectors in society (ALBA-TCP 2009b, Principle 1).  Rather 
than modifying domestic law in order to ensure lower costs for firms, the TCP disavows 
conditionality and stipulates respect for internal laws and policies (Principles 2, 16).  
Rather than seeing liberalisation as inherently positive, the TCP “[permits] countries to 
raise tariffs to protect nascent industries or when considered necessary for the internal 
development and welfare of the population” (Principle 11).  Rather than promoting 
reciprocal treatment regardless of asymmetries, the TCP echoes the first concern of 
ALBA’s original policy document (Comisión Presidencial Asesora en las 
Negociaciones del ALCA 2003, p.2) by stipulating tariff regimes (Principle 11) and 
wider rules (Principle 5) that explicitly favour less-developed parties.  Rather than 
seeking to open up the state to private investment, the TCP supports nationalisation 
(Principle 6), particularly of basic services (12), with domestic rather than international 
arbitration in cases of conflict (Principle 16).  Rather than giving foreign firms equal 
footing in public procurement and intellectual property, the TCP sees these as 
developmental tools which should favour respectively local industry and humanity 
(Principles 14, 18).  And rather than conducting negotiations behind closed doors, the 
TCP promises to open them up to participation from wider society (Principle 21). 
 
Codifying the TCP: Ecuador’s Trade Agreement for Development (ACD) 
Though this framework covered many of the issues central to everyday trade, it did not 
amount to an actionable agreement.  It is all very well to establish in principle that trade 
rules should benefit poorer states and their populations, but how would this be codified, 
institutionalised, and practiced?   
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With its preferential access jeopardised by Venezuela’s denunciation of CAN, 
and facing private-sector dissatisfaction at home following the collapse of FTA 
negotiations with the US and the EU (I.45), Ecuador proposed to fill in the gaps through 
a new TCP-compliant format called the Trade Agreement for Development (ACD).  
Although its existence has been all but ignored in accounts of ALBA (save for de la 
Barra 2010, p.18), this format aimed to marry up TCP principles and real-world trade 
practices, allowing Ecuador to reach TCP-compliant trade deals with other ALBA 
countries, most notably its major intra-ALBA partner Venezuela.  Since the Venezuela-
Ecuador trade relationship represents the core of ALBA trade (44 per cent),61 
conclusion of this deal would have been a major step towards the establishment of a 
multilateral ALBA trade agreement, even if only through gradual proliferation of TCP-
compliant bilateral deals based on the ACD model.  The concept began to be developed 
in 2009 (I.49) alongside preparations for negotiations with Venezuela (Hoy 2010), and 
this process informed the model text approved and presented in September 2011.62 
 An ACD has three major sections – Political Dialogue, Trade for Development, 
and Cooperation for Development – but the meat resides in its middle section on Trade 
for Development.  This is detailed and binding in precisely the ways required to render 
the TCP’s principles practicable, covering the usual ground of trade agreements, such as 
tariffs, rules of origin, sanitary measures, sanctions, and safeguards.   Indeed, it even 
tackles “WTO Plus” areas like services, intellectual property, public procurement, and 
competition.  But it attempts to make regulations in these areas compatible not only 
with the stipulations of Ecuador’s constitution and national development plans, but also 
with the TCP and the wider WTO rules by which all ALBA members are also bound.   
Thus, within the model ACD we find a many articles that correspond to specific 
TCP principles.63  Most significantly, in line with the TCP the ACD is shot through with 
considerations of S&D (ALBA-TCP 2009b, Principles 5 and 11), whereas the notion of 
reciprocity is all but absent.  As far back as the draft stage, S&D was first among equals 
within the ACD’s crosscutting themes (SENPLADES 2011a, p.8).  In the final model, 
every major chapter of the ACD makes repeated and early reference to the need to 
favour the less-developed economy, be it in terms of asymmetrical provision of market 
access (República del Ecuador 2011, Article 8), less onerous rules of origin (Article 
                                                 
61 Calculated for 2010 using UN Comtrade data, based on averages of trade levels reported by each state 
in each trade relationship. 
62 The centrality of ACDs to ALBA is clear in SENPLADES’ internal strategy document on the nature, 
purpose, and potential of its membership, which evaluates in detail the suitability and readiness of ALBA 
partners for ACD agreements (SENPLADES 2011b). 
63 In this section, all “principles” refer to the 2009 TCP, whereas all “articles” refer to the ACD. 
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16.1), easier access to trade-defence instruments (Article 64), or even an obligation on 
the part of the larger partner to help the smaller in meeting sanitary requirements 
(Article 56.3).  This also spills over into the ACD’s fleshing out of what the TCP calls 
solidarity trade (Principle 1), which it defines as “exchange of goods and services that 
promotes development of the Parties, particularly the less-developed party, in order to 
reduce the asymmetries between them” (Article 7.1, note 10).  Where such trade 
malfunctions to the cost of the minor partner, the ACD includes an Economic 
Development Safeguard which can protect and promote productive industries that “raise 
the populace’s general quality of life” (Article 67) in a manner consistent with the TCP 
(Principle 11).  As the TCP requires (Principle 2), the ACD recognises the sovereign 
right of states to maintain environmental, social, and labour laws (Article 94) and even 
explicitly prohibits their abuse as a means of incentivising investment (Article 102).  
The TCP’s rejection of national treatment in public procurement (Principle 14) in 
favour of state-guided contracting that supports local industry is also adopted in the 
ACD (Article 78).  Afforded special consideration in the ACD (Preamble, Articles 
92.2.e and 105), as well as in its governance and monitoring (Article 128.1), are the 
same small and associative actors (SMEs and EPS organisations) that are foregrounded 
in the TCP (Principle 9).  Again in line with the TCP (Principle 12), provision of basic 
public services is restricted to states (Article 79.1), whereas nationalisation (Principle 6) 
is likewise condoned, as long as it respects local law (Article 89.3).  When conflicts and 
controversies do arise, the TCP’s requirement that jurisdiction remain in the national 
arena (Principle 16) is respected, with the only other channel being dialogue via 
institutions inherent to the agreement (Articles 2.i, 57, and 131-32).  There is even a nod 
in the direction of the TCP’s aim of opening up trade negotiations to consultations from 
the wider public (Principle 21), albeit restricted in the ACD to the chapter on 
Sustainable Trade and Development (Article 92.2).   
Overall, there is an extensive overlap between the TCP and the ACD, with the 
latter codifying many of the principles of the former and converting them into a legal 
instrument that would require ratification in signatory states.  However, unlike the TCP 
it also provides practicable regulations for the everyday taxation of trade which are 
intended to remain compatible with WTO rules.  But WTO rules are inherently 
liberalising and default to elimination of barriers to trade wherever possible, whereas 
the TCP reaffirms the state’s right to engage in protection for developmental ends.  This 
tension means that the proof of the ACD’s compliance to TCP principles would best be 
measured in a concluded agreement, as its effects would depend on the extent to which 
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negotiators followed the ACD recipe, particularly with regards the S&D at its heart 
(Estévez 2012, p.30). 
 
Intended Effects of a Fully Functional TCP 
We now turn to the intended effects of the TCP, considering how a hypothetical 
implementation of this regional initiative would relate to development strategies at the 
national level. 
As in ALBA more widely, itself originally an “Alternative” to the FTAA rather 
than an Alliance, the intended effects of the TCP are largely a response to Latin 
America’s experience of neoliberal globalisation in the form of north-south PTAs 
(Bolpress 2006).  In a 2009 monograph on Ecuadorian political economy written during 
his presidency, former academic economist Rafael Correa concluded that: 
 
...extreme trade liberalisation between economies with large productivity and 
competitiveness differentials implies grave risks for the less-developed 
countries, given the probable destruction of its productive base, and with it the 
loss of jobs without the ability to create new ones, all of which constitutes a 
genuine social catastrophe. 
(Correa 2009, p.133) 
 
More specifically, he saw such deals as encouraging the decline of manufacturing 
industries and the strengthening of primary agricultural exports in which poor LAC 
countries have “comparative advantage” but in a context of declining terms of trade.  At 
home this meant rising concentration of income with the attendant social ills, while 
abroad it meant increased external dependence (Correa 2009, pp.133–34).  Although the 
TCP and ACD’s means are many and varied, their aims explicitly respond to these 
perceived failings and the export-oriented model that gave rise to them.  In the words of 
ALBA’s former Executive Secretary, ALBA was developed “in order to have absolute 
and sovereign control over our natural resources, our economic and fiscal policies, to 
achieve at last the development that was denied us by neoliberalism and the Washington 
Consensus” (I.28).  But would this be the effect of the TCP be if it were implemented?  
And how would it link into the development models of the states involved? 
 
Reasserted Autonomy 
Essentially, the TCP responds to the shared aims of Venezuelan and Ecuadorian foreign 
policy (chapter three, pp.68, 82), and to a lesser degree the Anglophone ALBA 
members (p.90): namely, promotion of a multipolar world and prioritisation of regional 
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integration.   The significance of these twin aims is that autonomy is sought only vis-à-
vis certain trade partners.  Essentially, the latter goal of forging a LAC pole in the 
international order through regional integration validates LAC interdependence, while a 
push for multipolarity validates actions that reduce the relative power of other poles, 
most notably the United States.  This makes LAC trade preferable to extra-LAC trade, 
predominantly with the US and the EU.  Furthermore, the TCP’s conscious reversal of 
various tenets of the neoliberal FTA model also aims to block those channels through 
which control over development has been ceded in the past, making its attempted 
reassertion of autonomy far more forceful than would be a simple diversification of 
trade relations under the old FTA model.  
 Most importantly, pervasive provisions for S&D and the once unthinkable 
raising of tariffs are designed to minimise displacement of local firms by foreign ones, 
or at least to have states coordinate this process cooperatively such that infant industries 
are not nipped in the bud by foreign competitors.  Aside from simply protecting local 
firms, the political coordination required by such moves should also smooth progress 
towards ALBA’s ideal of complementarity: an intraregional relationship where value is 
added by each partner, internal demand satisfied, and surpluses exported extra-
regionally.  Inasmuch as the TCP achieves this ideal, member-states’ exposure to 
current-account deficits, external debt, and external shocks should be reduced.  Further, 
were trade within the preferential TCP to displace trade with other “poles”, the 
economic strength and leverage of these poles would be reduced (however slightly).  
This would reduce power differentials between ALBA states and the major powers that 
have historically intervened in LAC.  Thus, countries that suffer from a hyper-
concentration of exports to the US (Shadlen 2008) – such as ALBA members 
Venezuela, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and St Vincent – hope to take the sting out of 
politically motivated external actions that can wreak economic, social, and political 
havoc at home.   Indeed, while the TCP-compliant ACD was being developed, the US 
was threatening to revoke its unilateral ATPDEA preference regime from FTA 
opponents Bolivia and Ecuador but not FTA-friendly Colombia and Peru, a move which 
only served to underline the continued relevance of the TCP’s solidaristic rationale. 
The TCP, like any alternative model, also holds the threat of the good example, 
in that achievement of mutually beneficial, cooperatively coordinated trade could 
provoke copycat initiatives elsewhere, particularly given Ecuador’s attempts to make 
the ACD its template for all future trade agreements.  To quote one the ACD’s 
architects, “the history of trade negotiations [in LAC] is that the others arrive with the 
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text and they tell us ‘put a comma here and a full stop over there so that it fits in with 
your economy’” (I.45); the consciously strategic act of presenting a locally produced, 
non-standard text to northern partners, as Ecuador audaciously did with the European 
Commission (ICTSD 2011), underlines the centrality of autonomy to trade policy 
within ALBA.  In a similar vein, principles of non-national treatment and rejection of 
investment incentivisation through dismantling of social protections (amongst others) 
are designed to recover elements of autonomy lost in the rush to liberalise of the 1980s 
and 1990s.  Having seen first-hand the social and political cost of privatisation in the 
neoliberal period – as with Bolivia’s water wars or the disastrous Union Fenosa 
takeover of electricity in Nicaragua – the TCP reasserts ALBA states’ right to maintain 
or re-establish control over “strategic” services and resources.  Recognising that wider 
legal frameworks served to lock-in earlier reforms partly by giving the final word to 
international arbitrators like the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (of the World Bank) – whose only three former members are Ecuador, Bolivia, 
and Venezuela – the TCP proposes to return jurisdiction to the national or intraregional 
level.  More generally, by regulating and protecting trade flows implicated in state-led 
development, the TCP would submit more of its trade to management and manipulation 
via relationships not characterised by the extreme power imbalances or diverging 
interests of longstanding relations with the US and the EU.  The importance of this dual 
relationship between autonomy and endogenous development is not lost on ALBA’s 
Executive Secretary: 
 
Inasmuch as our suppliers are in Latin America and our clients are in Latin 
America, we can engage as equals with the US and Europe, in the sense that we 
also begin to master technologies, telecoms, promote our own infrastructure, 
trade, and our industries via [ALBA] mechanisms.  
(I.28) 
 
Endogenous Development 
This also neatly expresses the type of internal changes sought by the TCP, which we 
might call complementary industrialisation.  For Venezuela and Ecuador particularly 
this ALBA initiative would allow reinforce diversification away from dominant 
extractive industries (chapter three, pp.70, 80).  As one negotiator of the TCP-ACD 
process noted: 
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[FTAs with traditional partners] would certainly mean exporting more bananas, 
flowers, shrimp, but not more cars.  We’re not going to sell them cookers, 
domestic appliances, plasma TVs, though we do produce them.  More bananas, 
certainly, but bananas don’t bring internal economic benefits.  There’s more 
demand for labour, but it’s low-skilled and only in banana-growing regions.  
There’s no linkage with the rest of the economy.  What local inputs do bananas 
use?  Nothing!  Agrochemicals?  Imported!  It’s the same with flowers, shrimp, 
the lot of them!  We’re not interested in selling more bananas to the EU or the 
US.  We want to change our productive matrix to produce more white goods, 
automobiles, and so on. 
(I.45) 
 
Internal analyses confirm that the TCP does indeed have the potential to promote 
exports with higher valued-added, with ALBA representing the second most receptive 
regional-bloc market (after CAN) for manufactured goods not derived from natural 
resources (SENPLADES 2011b, p.27).  For both countries the ideal situation would see 
a broadening of their range of exports through joint, complementary production that 
avoids negative impacts on domestic political economy (I.51). 
 
…within [Venezuela’s] plans for coming years, they want to revive their auto-
parts industry.  They also assemble vehicles.  We’re saying to each other that if 
we have an agreement within the ALBA framework, let’s create projects 
together and accumulate [value] in the automobile industry, Ecuador and 
Venezuela … We have a low level of national value at 12 per cent; Venezuela’s 
saying “if you want to enter into this deal with us, let’s develop these sectors so 
that it’s viable.” 
(I.53) 
 
The TCP and ACD seek to promote this kind of state-guided development in 
various ways.  The permissibility of selective protection means that tariffs can be 
coordinated to promote complementary trade in the components of value chains.  The 
political stability of such arrangements is protected by economic-development 
safeguards that are triggered by any damage to popular wellbeing.  Meanwhile, 
retention of the right to utilise public procurement to developmental ends means that 
reliable demand for the final products of such chains can be provided by the state, as 
with Venezuela’s Ministry for Industry purchasing Ecuadorian buses to renew the fleet 
of the domestic public-transport system (Agencia Pública de Noticias del Ecuador y 
Suramérica 2011).  As discussed in chapter two (pp.41-43), this aspect of cooperative 
regional endogenous development – alongside ideas of barter trade – frequently 
underpins understandings of ALBA’s commercial side within the literature. 
 The TCP and ACD also explicitly favour SMEs and EPS enterprises, which 
represent a central element of the productive transformations sought in Venezuela and 
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Ecuador (chapter three, pp.70, 80).  Moreover, it tallies with the wider people-centred 
development focus observed also in the Anglophone ALBA states (chapter two, p.88).  
Promotion of SMEs and the associative sector – over heavy industry under import-
substitution industrialisation (ISI) or primary exporters in an export-oriented model – 
reflects a desire to foster organisational forms that create more and better employment, 
preferably with an empowering participatory aspect.  The aim is to boost human 
development by providing poorer participants in small or associative enterprises not 
only with material benefits, but also with transformative experience of self-
determination (chapter two, p.47). 
Indeed, the TCP aims to reinforce this kind of empowering cooperation by 
regionalising it: 
 
In the case of quinoa [Bolivia] is exporting but they have technological 
problems.  With the Bolivians we can find out how to take on new markets.  
They’re favourable to the idea as well.  Otherwise, small Bolivian producers are 
affecting small Ecuadorian producers; there’s a serious effect on the market.  
My interest is not for people to stop buying from the Bolivians, but rather to 
grow the market in order to share it; with the logic of the free market, we get 
the elimination of similar types of producers in both countries.  Instead we want 
to reinforce that kind of [EPS] structure in each country; that’s our position. 
(I.52) 
 
Acting on the requirement that special provision be made for SMEs and EPS producers 
in the TCP, the ACD regionalises institutional backing for these producers at the 
domestic level – e.g. Ecuador’s Directorate of Inclusive Commerce or Venezuela’s 
SUNACOOP – by allocating them dedicated space in the governance arrangements 
inherent to the agreement.  This is the same EPS-supporting regionalisation of strategies 
for endogenous development that we find in the existing literature: 
 
The fact that … Venezuelan cooperatives manufacture school footwear for 
Bolivian children illustrates [ALBA’s] achievements at the local level, given 
that sources of employment are opened up through organisation of the so-called 
Endogenous Development Nuclei and footwear is provided at low cost to 
Bolivian schools. 
(Chinas 2011, p.165) 
 
This is precisely the type of relationship sought by the TCP, since it begins to 
approximate the ideal of an “economic zone of shared development”: the low-cost 
produce of an empowering, self-managed organisation in one state meeting the basic 
needs of the poor in another state to the mutual benefit of both.  This would boost 
internal demand through increases in spending power related to employment, while also 
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facilitating human development by minimising instability in the lives of those with the 
least capacity to absorb economic shocks.  This same dual concern motivates the ACD’s 
explicit barring of race-to-the-bottom style incentivisation of foreign investment 
through manipulation of labour and environmental laws.  TCP and ACD guidelines on 
food sovereignty likewise fit the same model: enabling (often indigenous) Ecuadorian 
peasant farmers to export agricultural surpluses to Venezuelan consumers hit by 
spiralling food prices would be preferable to an extra-regional trade relationship 
dependent on brute market forces and potentially allowing political leverage (as with 
US ATPDEA preferences).   
 
New Sources of Legitimacy 
Regionalised endogenous development also implies new sources of output legitimacy at 
the national level.  This is true to the extent that the TCP-ACD process delivers 
solutions to the longstanding problems of to the newly politicised constituencies 
supporting incumbent governments.  The clearest example is its role in production 
chains whose final goods become cheaper inputs for social programmes, as with 
provision of subsidised food in Venezuela’s barrios via state-run Mercal and 
Bicentenario shops.  Ecuador’s status as a net exporter of agricultural produce would 
complement and palliate Venezuela’s status as a net importer prone to politically 
damaging shortages.  The EPS and SME focus, meanwhile would extend benefits 
“upstream” to small exporters who are afforded new access to markets in which to sell 
their excess production and source cheaper inputs.  In Bolivia and Ecuador particularly, 
the EPS element could provide benefits particularly to poor smallholders (as in the 
quinoa example) or family-led cottage industries (such as textiles).  Both also have a 
particularly high concentration of indigenous workers, thus legitimising these 
governments in the eyes of newly mobilised groups that have created severe political 
instability in the past.64  The TCP-ACD process could also provide gains in terms of 
input legitimacy, again to these groups in particular.  Where past trade agreements were 
negotiated in consultation primarily with the representatives of big business, the TCP-
ACD process stipulated at least a measure of participation from EPS actors:  
  
                                                 
64 e.g. the Cochabamba water war in Bolivia or removal of various recent Ecuadorian presidents. 
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We have delegations from the Chamber of Micro-entrepreneurs, the Platform 
for Fair Trade, Chambers of Small-Scale Industry.  EPS organisations, 
microenterprises, and SMEs participate in every sector all across the country, so 
how do we show our concern for them?  They are included for the first time.  
Before they didn’t even get involved; that’s the difference.  Now they’re taken 
into account; they’re informed participants; they know that they have to take 
certain decisions.  Before they didn’t even know that there were negotiations 
going on! 
(I.52) 
 
New institutions at the national level and within the regional ACD’s institutional 
framework also mean new control legitimacy for these groups.  If their inclusion bears 
no fruit, they now have institutions through which to channel their claims. 
 It should be remembered, however, that despite its apparent novelty, the TCP 
and ACD do not contest the WTO rules by which all ALBA members are bound.  By 
repeated reference to GATT’s Part IV on trade and development between unequal 
parties, the ACD’s designers did seek to maximise the space for S&D in a WTO-
compliant deal, but this was the extent of its challenge (I.55).  It was designed not to 
jeopardise existing regional or multilateral commitments.  Neither do preferences 
accorded by the TCP or its prioritisation of EPS actors necessarily imply losses for 
economic elites.  On the contrary, the TCP-ACD process is designed to cater to the 
interests both of traditional elites and of these previously marginalised groups.  A 
functioning TCP-compliant agreement, negotiated with partners’ sensitive sectors in 
mind, aims to provide stable preferential market access for economic actors of all 
shapes and sizes. 
 
 On the whole, an implemented TCP-compliant agreement between ALBA 
members – in this case the ACD – would substantiate the view, common in the 
literature, that ALBA’s economic initiatives serve to bolster the autonomy of its 
member-states by regionalising people-centred, endogenous-development initiatives 
that also reinforce the legitimacy of incumbent governments.  But to what extent has the 
TCP been implemented?  And are these benefits truly materialising?   
 
Implementation, Impact, and Linkage to National Political Economies 
Turning to the real-world application of the TCP and ACD, our simple conclusion is 
that no multi- or even bilateral deal has been agreed within ALBA, meaning that of the 
28 trade relationships within ALBA, not one is covered by a TCP-compliant agreement. 
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Accordingly, none of the numerous intended benefits discussed above have been 
forthcoming.  This is not for lack of trying, however, and consistent with this work’s 
approach (chapter one, p.20), the analysis below reveals how the rarely broached 
analysis of “unimplementation” – i.e. the failure to implement proposed initiatives – can 
provide valuable insights into the many complications and contradictions that confound 
the TCP in ways unexamined in the literature. 
 
Failure of the Multilateral TCP 
The 2009 TCP framework was originally designed to lead directly into negotiations 
towards a multilateral TCP (ALBA Secretaría Executiva 2010a, p.121, Measure 3).  
Accordingly, one month after the TCP principles were established ALBA’s economic 
council convened a Working Group on Commercial Complementarity, which was to set 
the schedule for negotiations beginning January 2010 (ALBA Secretaría Executiva 
2010c).  Beyond this meeting, however, virtually nothing was heard from the new 
working group, and implementation advanced no further, though the aspiration 
remained.  As will be explained below, behind the scenes officials could not achieve full 
coverage of ALBA member-states or a common approach to trade negotiations – let 
alone a mutually convenient tariff regime (I.49). 
 
Bilateral TCP-Compliant Trade Deals: Who and Why? 
Although the multilateral option had been derailed, the possibility of bilateral TCP-
compliant deals remained, but this raised the question of necessity and potential benefit.  
In absolute terms, only six of the 28 ALBA trade relationships in 2010 were worth more 
than $15 million annually; for the remaining 22, deciding to expend limited resources 
on lengthy trade negotiations might fall foul of a simple cost-benefit analysis.  Of the 
larger six trade relationships (see Figure 6, below) four involve Venezuela (in 94 per 
cent of intra-ALBA trade) and three Ecuador (48 per cent), with the relationship 
between the two easily the largest in ALBA (comprising 44 per cent of ALBA trade).  
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bilateral trade along lines compatible not only with domestic constitutions, laws, and 
development plans, but also with ALBA’s TCP principles at the regional level (MRECI 
2010).  Negotiations to this end were held between Ecuador’s MRECI – specifically its 
Subsecretariat of Economic and Commercial Affairs – and Venezuela’s Ministry of 
Trade, with the latter providing the basic text around which the final agreement would 
be formed (I.45).  The resulting agreement declared itself a stepping stone towards 
ALBA’s proposed “Zone of Economic Development” based on the 2009 TCP principles 
(República del Ecuador y la RBV 2010, Preamble), but its brief and curious mix of 
vague intentions, administrative formalities, and cavalier changes provided only a 
partial account of how this would occur.  Thus, on the one hand – and in the style of 
many ALBA documents – nebulous commitments are made “to develop necessary 
actions”, “to promote”, “to prepare”, “to foment”, “to evaluate”, and “to incentivise” a 
variety of mechanisms and programmes (all Article 2), with the details left for “specific 
agreements and conventions for which this Agreement will constitute a reference 
framework” (Article 8).  Yet, upon its entry into force the agreement was to eliminate 
all tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in goods, without even the kind of safeguards 
for protection of local industry or popular wellbeing found in the model ACD. 
 As with all international agreements relating to trade, the CFA then had to be 
submitted to Ecuador’s Foreign Trade Committee (COMEX) for final approval.  This 
body, a dependency of the Ministry of Production, is staffed by ministers or high-level 
officials from other ministries affected by trade policy, but as noted in chapter three 
(p.85) its only permanent members are the current president and vice-president of 
COMEX, the current minister responsible for foreign trade, and the current minister 
responsible for agriculture (Correa Delgado 2011, Article 6).  At the time of the CFA’s 
submission for approval, the presidency of COMEX was held by the Production 
Minister Nathalie Cely herself, whereas foreign trade fell within the remit of Ricardo 
Patiño’s Foreign Affairs Ministry (MRECI), whose team had negotiated the CFA.  
These two figures stood at the head of the two factions within Correa’s government – 
respectively linked to export elites (Cely) and Correa’s Alianza PAIS movement 
(Patiño) – as outlined in chapter three (p.84).  In a mordantly worded Resolution 15, 
COMEX judged that the CFA had failed to cover various essential technical areas and 
would in any case put Ecuadorian producers at a sudden and serious disadvantage vis-à-
vis Venezuelan competitors, with non-tariff barriers meaning full access to the 
Ecuadorian market was being exchanged for no “real access” to the Venezuelan market.  
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MRECI was ordered not only to provide a minutely detailed report on what had been 
agreed, but also to reopen negotiations immediately (COMEX 2011).   
 Given the perceived failure of MRECI to achieve an acceptable deal, 
responsibility for the new negotiations was given to officials from the presidency’s New 
Financial Architecture (NAF) team, also responsible for design of the SUCRE (see 
chapter five) and heavily involved in development of the model ACD.  With the expiry 
of CAN preferences rapidly approaching, this team rushed out a brief document that 
could be tacked on as a “protocol to” the CFA; in reality it explicitly reversed many of 
the original agreement’s clauses.  Most importantly, complete bilateral tariff 
liberalisation was replaced by maintenance of “tariff preferences in force upon signing 
of this protocol”, namely the same CAN preferences just days away from expiry when 
the Protocol was signed on 11 April, 2011.  Areas of potential conflict – tariffs, rules of 
origin, protection of national industry, and productive complementarity – were relegated 
to a series of annexes to be negotiated at a later date.  These were developed over the 
following three months, with the final agreement being published in late July (Gaceta 
Oficial 2011, pp.6–18).  In the end, however, the annexes did little to change the nature 
of the bilateral trade relationship.  Pity the poor official charged with writing – 
presumably with a wry smile – the following clause on tariffs: 
 
With the aim of strengthening mutual cooperation and economic development 
through the principles enshrined in the Agreement for the Application of the 
Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America and the People’s Trade 
Agreement (ALBA-TCP), the Parties agree to maintain, for the entire tariff 
schedule, the tariff preferences in force upon signing of this protocol… 
 (Governments of Venezuela and Ecuador 2011, Article VIII) 
 
That is, by maintaining precisely those rules already in force, set by a very different 
agreement, the Protocol aimed to provoke a change in trade compatible with a new and 
very distinct set of principles.  After the same fashion, although the Protocol had 
promised changes in rules of origin to allow strategic sectors to be prioritised in line 
with the national development objective of creating regional value chains (à la TCP), 
the level of foreign origin allowed in Ecuadorian products ultimately remained at 60 per 
cent, while for Venezuela it was set at 50 per cent (Governments of Venezuela and 
Ecuador 2011 Annex IV, Article 3.4), exactly as in CAN.  Annex VI, on Productive 
Complementarity contains much of the language of the TCP, but in concrete terms it 
obliges the two parties only to “seek out” and “conduct studies” on complementarity 
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(once again); a template for a future, in-depth Complementarity Work Plan is provided 
(Annex VI, Article 7), but no such plan has ever seen the light of day.   
Overall, the Framework Agreement did little more than kick the CAN a little 
further down the road, squandering a uniquely favourable opportunity to achieve a TCP-
compliant deal.  This does not mean that the Framework Agreement will necessarily 
have negative consequences, and indeed existing CAN rules do at least mandate S&D 
for poorer members (as advocated in the TCP).  Yet, besides adding the new instability 
of quinquennial renewal, the CFA’s failure to alter existing trade arrangements denies 
Venezuela and Ecuador – and indeed Bolivia – the benefits sought by the TCP and 
ACD’s designers.67  Beyond these particular types of intraregional trade, a TCP-
compliant preferential agreement was supposed to promote intraregional trade in 
general; since the impact of other economic initiatives within ALBA, most notably the 
SUCRE virtual currency (chapter five), depends on growth in trade, this simple 
continuation of existing arrangements represents a double failure. 
In the final analysis, the TCP’s failed implementation means that intra-ALBA 
trade is almost entirely as it was prior to the existence of ALBA.68  As Felíx Arellano 
avers: 
 
From the beginning of ALBA the free-trade dynamic has continued to operate 
… because the trade relationship between Venezuela and Cuba is regulated by 
agreements signed within the ALADI framework, as with the case of 
[Venezuela and] Nicaragua; and with regards Bolivia and Ecuador, trade 
relations are regulated by the free-trade programme of the Andean 
[Community] rules. 
(Arellano 2009, p.19) 
 
That is, despite the markedly different principles and rhetoric of the TCP, aside from 
intermittent solidarity trade between states, trade in the ALBA era has continued almost 
exactly as in the pre-ALBA era.  
 
TCP-ACD Failure: Delegitimising ALBA Trade Initiatives 
Since the fact of this failed implementation was not lost on the various stakeholders in 
the process, the net impact of the TCP-ACD process was in fact negative: it left ALBA, 
the ACD, and the TCP tainted by the stains of difficulty, incoherence, and ultimate 
                                                 
67 Bolivia followed Ecuador in reaching an almost identical agreement with Venezuela. 
68 “Almost” because ALBA’s founding agreement between Cuba and Venezuela (2004) did involve some 
significant changes, though in fact even these were not implemented until five years later. 
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failure.  On the governmental side, one high-level participant in TCP negotiations who 
had originally been a strong supporter of the idea was forced to conclude that: 
 
ALBA is a fairy tale.  The TCP doesn’t exist; there’s nothing behind it … This 
isn’t about the TCP anymore, nor the ACD, but rather free trade. 
(I.49) 
 
Another state official, charged with ensuring the compatibility of his country’s various 
trade commitments, reported that the Venezuela-Ecuador ACD deal had been 
“romantic” and “well-intentioned” but ended up “the same: no more, no less; there are 
no advances” (I.51).  On the more critical private-sector side, to quote the head of one 
chamber of industry, the TCP-ACD process represented “a clear example of what not to 
do in this area” which could wind up being nothing more than “a document full of 
useless rhetoric” (Asociación de Industriales Textiles del Ecuador 2011, p.1). 
This kind of internal delegitimisation is an effect far removed from the benefits 
that the TCP was supposed to provide.  Instead, it serves to harden negative postures 
towards ALBA just as it weakens positive ones.  Since ALBA is also an offer open to 
all LAC states, perceived incoherence also militates against the shared goal of full LAC 
regional integration, delaying once again the development of this newly autonomous 
pole within a multipolar order.  Outside LAC, too, there exists the threat of the bad 
example, whereby a good idea is invalidated in the eyes of its potential adopters owing 
only to poor implementation: given Venezuela and Ecuador’s experiences in applying 
the TCP, it is hardly surprising that there has been no sudden glut of copycat 
alternative-trade agreements.  While new modes and mechanisms of trade could be 
conceptually influential, for them to achieve any real acceptance in real-world politics 
they would need at least to demonstrate movement towards the achievement of their 
goals. 
As this section has shown, this has not occurred in the case of the TCP, yet its 
grinding failure can provide new insight into the constraints on ALBA’s intended 
effects of reasserted autonomy, regionalised endogenous development, and new sources 
of legitimacy. 
 
Factors Impeding Progress and Mitigating Impact of the TCP 
Unacknowledged Continuities and the Multilateral TCP 
The most fundamental issue mitigating the urgency and potential impact of the TCP is 
the pre-existing level of intra-ALBA trade per se, which has hovered around the three 
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per cent level throughout ALBA’s lifetime (Figure 7, below).69  This compares 
unfavourably to levels of 62 per cent in the EU, 40 per cent in NAFTA, and 25 per cent 
in ASEAN.70  While trade levels are not fixed, they are modulated by the structural 
characteristics of national economies, and three per cent represents a particularly low 
base upon which to build.  If only such limited trade occurs within ALBA, even with 
generous and genuine ideological support it can only represent but one of the various 
elements competing for political and bureaucratic attention within a member-state’s 
trade policy.  Thus, though endogenous development may be the government’s priority, 
this prioritisation does not necessarily permeate the entire state.   
 
 
Figure 7: Intra-ALBA trade as % of trade with world, 2005-2012 (n.b. due to lack of data this excludes 
Anglophone members and creates 2007 figures from averages for 2006 and 2008. Source: International 
Trade Centre [via trademap.org, which utilises UN COMTRADE data]). 
Looking at the TCP from the perspective of individual member-states reveals a 
similar story.  The existing structure of trade meant that a TCP agreement would not 
have been equally valuable to all parties, though analysis of the relative importance of 
ALBA trade to its member-states produces some surprising results (Figure 8, below). 
 
                                                 
69 These figures are distorted by the absence of services, the skyrocketing price of mainly extra-regional 
fossil-fuel exports, and the off-the-books nature of many oil agreements involving PDVSA.  Yet, even 
with these many caveats, we can still confidently affirm that intra-ALBA trade is weak. 
70 All 2008, from UN Regional Indicators Knowledge System (cris.unu.edu/riks).  Though imperfect, this 
remains the standard measure (see	De	Lombaerde	&	Van	Langenhove	2006	for	alternatives). 
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Figure 8: ALBA member-states’ trade with ALBA as % of their total trade, 2010 (source: UN 
COMTRADE [comtrade.un.org]). 
Most remarkable is the fact that despite representing the core of ALBA trade (being 
involved in 94.6 per cent of the total), Venezuela’s trade with ALBA weighs lightly (1.7 
per cent) in its own overall trade; only Antigua and Barbuda is less involved (1.5 per 
cent).  For various other members – particularly Nicaragua (17 per cent), Dominica (9 
per cent), and Bolivia (7 per cent) – the pull of a full multilateral deal is somewhat 
stronger. 
Furthermore, the TCP looks to exploit complementarities between member 
economies for the mutual benefit of both partners, but the existence of 
complementarities sufficient to tempt states into complex negotiations cannot be taken 
for granted, even where they are on the same ideological page.  It is notable that the four 
least diverse economies in LAC according to Harvard University’s Economic 
Complexity Index (Hausmann et al. 2011, pp.63–66) are all ALBA members – 
Venezuela (21st of 21), Bolivia (20th), Nicaragua (19th), and Ecuador (18th) – whereas 
Cuba sits only slightly higher (14th).71  With such narrow export bases, there is less 
potential for the products of one member to enter into the value chains of others, thereby 
lessening the incentive to achieve a deal that would facilitate this process.  Venezuelan 
and Ecuadorian exports are dominated by oil; both Bolivia and Venezuela have 
abundant natural gas; Bolivia and Ecuador compete in textiles and many agricultural 
products (most recently quinoa); Dominica, Saint Vincent, and Ecuador all compete in 
banana exports, not least in the Ecuador-driven WTO dispute over the Caribbean’s 
preferential banana regime for European markets. 
                                                 
71 Even former ALBA member Honduras was fifth from bottom.  The Anglophone states of the OECS are 
not included, presumably due to a lack of data. 
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While the aim of the TCP may be precisely to boost trade and to develop new 
complementarities, the availability of pre-existing areas of mutual benefit from which to 
build would encourage at least an initial commitment to a multilateral TCP.  
Conversely, if there is little existing or potential trade, this raises the question of 
whether material and human resources required for trade negotiations might not be 
better employed elsewhere.  Trade between ALBA’s Latin American and Anglophone 
members, for example, has fallen into this category (I.28, I.29).  Not only are levels of 
existing trade extremely low, the cost of interactions between Latin America and the 
Anglophone Caribbean – be that between officials, traders, or tourists – is also 
inevitably raised by linguistic and legal differences that diverge according to colonial 
legacy (civil law and Spanish versus common law and English).  Thus, when 
discussions were held between ALBA states on the intellectual-property aspect of the 
multilateral TCP, officials from Antigua and Barbuda soon concluded that “the legal 
system was so different that the ALBA approach would not work in our system” and 
promptly ended their participation (I.86). 
Overall, the TCP is impeded by the various political-economic continuities 
inherited by ALBA’s incumbent governments, from pre-existing trade structures and 
resource endowments to differences in the cultural legacies of British and Spanish 
colonialism. 
 
The Multilateral TCP: Lost in the Olla Podrida of LAC Regional Institutions?72 
A second key block on participation, however, was the existence of competing sub-
regional obligations.  As in institutional “spaghetti bowls” the world over (Bhagwati 
1995), the dense intermingling of ingredients in the olla podrida of LAC institutions 
can produce some explosive outcomes for ALBA trade.  
In the Caribbean, ALBA’s Anglophone members had prior and prioritised 
commitments, first, to the OECS, and, second, to CARICOM.  As Vincentian Prime 
Minister Ralph Gonsalves explained: 
 
                                                 
72 “Olla podrida” translates literally as “rotten pot” and is the origin of the term “potpourri” in English 
(via French).  It is a dish of assorted leftovers. 
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We made it explicitly clear that our membership of ALBA is complementary to 
and not subversive of existing arrangements: CARICOM, the OECS, the 
currency union, and the regional security system … those treaties are reduced to 
domestic law, so I can’t go and do something contrary to prior treaty 
arrangements, like the CARICOM treaty or the OECS treaty.  Cuba, Venezuela, 
Nicaragua, Bolivia, Ecuador, they understand that. 
(I.68) 
 
Norman Girvan, who originally reported favourably to CARICOM’s Council for 
Foreign and Community Relations on the compatibility of ALBA and CARICOM, 
points out that for the same reason a fully binding preferential trade agreement would 
have been a deal breaker for the Anglophone members (2011b, p.16).  That is, 
participation in a multilateral TCP would have required an audacious split from the 
Caribbean’s existing sub-regional organisations.  In Latin America, meanwhile, the 
unilateralism of Cuba’s elimination tariffs for Venezuelan imports in ALBA’s founding 
agreement (2004), for instance, was unilateral only because Venezuela did not want to 
fall foul of non-party most-favoured nation clauses under CAN (ALBA 2004, Article 
11; Comunidad Andina 1969, Article 155).  Not only that, it was Venezuela’s 
withdrawal from CAN which first provoked attempts at a multilateral TCP, as well as 
subsequent Venezuela-Ecuador and Venezuela-Bolivia deals.  By the time these 
attempts began, however, Venezuela was well on the way to becoming a full member of 
Mercosur (from 2006), while Nicaragua’s commercial wagon had been hitched to the 
US economy via the CAFTA-DR FTA.  Though emerging pan-South American and 
pan-LAC organisations UNASUR and CELAC remained shallow and indistinct, they 
added to the well-documented oversupply of regional institutions (Malamud 2009) 
between which overstretched LAC states had to divide their limited time and resources.  
With the exceptions of Cuba and Venezuela, ALBA has been but one of many 
simultaneously pursued forms of regional integration, and not necessarily the one 
prioritised.  Only a clear demonstration of its utility and viability could change this, yet 
abortive initiatives such as the TCP-ACD instead give an impression of inadequacy. 
 ALBA has tended to deal with legal and institutional clashes by employing a 
flexible “à la carte” format, whereby states can opt in or out of initiatives according to 
the demands of national political economy (Girvan 2011b).  While Norman Girvan 
considers this a strength, the converse can also be argued.  If ALBA is incapable of 
achieving a primacy that would require serious concessions from its members, its 
institutions can easily become ad-hoc, non-binding, and impermanent, filling only the 
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gaps left in-between member-states’ other, more important commitments.73  It is not 
that this is an inherently faulty strategy, but rather that it is interpreted as such by many 
of the actors involved, leading to a half-hearted involvement that does not provide the 
stability or clarity favoured not only by the economic agents who do most of the actual 
trading but also by many of the officials responsible for implementing initiatives (see 
below, p.121).  While the non-binding à la carte approach appears to favour greater 
breadth of involvement, this is an involvement of little depth.  Thus, in the TCP’s case 
everyone was happy to agree to non-binding principles and the idea of a multilateral 
agreement, yet a more contractual, operable trade deal was unacceptable.  Ecuador and 
especially Bolivia have long advocated greater institutionalisation of ALBA initiatives 
through binding, contractual treaties requiring ratification (I.42).  Yet Venezuela has 
persisted in its preference for a “flexibility” that recalls the vague and often 
contradictory governance of its own political economy.  Being the major economic and 
political force within ALBA, it is best placed to fill the governance vacuums that occur, 
giving it less of an incentive to support real change. 
Thus, rather than reasserting member-states’ autonomy, the failed multilateral 
TCP shows that autonomy is constrained by other regional institutions, thereby limiting 
ALBA’s scope for innovation.  Venezuela’s preference for a “flexible” approach to 
institutionalisation prevents any clash from being resolved for or against ALBA, 
thereby contributing to the vague feeling of uncertainty that surrounds the initiative. 
 
The Multilateral TCP and International Institutional Constraints 
Beyond their obligations to other regional institutions, ALBA states must also choose 
either to operate within the limits of WTO rules to which all are signatories or instead to 
face the consequences of contravening or abandoning them.  This dilemma lay at the 
heart of their failure to achieve a multilateral TCP. 
 When the proposal was first floated, officials of latecomers Ecuador and Bolivia 
began working in earnest on ways to operationalise the TCP’s concepts of 
complementarity, cooperation, and solidarity (I.45, I.49).  There were real internal 
debates over whether or not to formulate an agreement along WTO lines, with more 
radical policymakers advocating development of a non-monetary vision of trade entirely 
outside the existing system (I.49).  However, they were also conscious of the fact that 
their abandonment of the WTO “would provoke nothing more than a giggle” (I.49), 
                                                 
73 Such choices are made all the time, as shown by the decision of Colombia and Peru to deal a death 
blow to CAN by signing FTAs with the US. 
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whereas contravention would bring serious economic sanctions from other WTO 
members: 
 
No state, for all its good intentions, is going to set up a scheme that breaks the 
[WTO] rules, because if it does, they’ll make you pay.  If you don’t accept the 
rules, any old country can say “I’m not importing from him!” or “I’ll hit him 
with this [sanction]!”  Since they’ve got more power, you end up staying. 
(I.51) 
 
When trade officials finally gathered to discuss the design of the multilateral TCP, 
Ecuadorian and Bolivian officials were shocked to find their Nicaraguan counterparts 
enamoured of conventional FTAs like their CAFTA-DR deal with the US (I.49), 
whereas the Cuban delegation presented various draft chapters that were a carbon copy 
of the WTO rules: as one Ecuadorian official put it, “even the Cubans work to a 
different [non-TCP] logic!” (I.45).  Essentially, as Isabel Estévez points out, ALBA 
states’ unanimous subscription to the WTO framework limits the possibility for genuine 
changes of direction in any new model agreement: 
 
When the country [Ecuador] negotiates trade agreements with other members of 
the WTO, they can but deepen the privileges already established in the 
regulatory framework of the WTO (for example, greater liberalisation of trade 
in goods, greater regulation of intellectual property). 
(Estévez 2012, p.15; emphasis in original) 
 
Were ALBA to engage in interregionalism or interactions with rising powers elsewhere, 
it would also face pressure to stick to recognised standards or to produce a convincingly 
clear, coherent, and contractual alternative.  The fact that it falls between these two 
stools can also act as a disincentive to the same south-south trade promoted by ALBA 
as a means of achieving multipolarity: 
 
India’s not interested in negotiating with Ecuador; they’re better off with an 
ALBA bloc.  They talk to us a lot about generic medicines – we’ve got a lot of 
interesting technology – but they’re talking about billion-dollar investments.  
What are the rules of the game?!  Where’s the credible structure of wider legal 
security for ALBA? 
(I.51) 
 
Thus, even though the literature tends to equip ALBA with the power to 
transform the nature of its members’ trade relations, in reality its members are 
constrained not only by regional institutions but also global institutions.  Inasmuch as 
member-states value their WTO-regulated trade – and fear its destabilisation – they are 
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pushed towards particular modes of trade that conflict with ALBA’s preference for 
regionalised endogenous development.  While they retain their sovereign right to leave 
the WTO at any point, in practice they are locked-in by the extent of their trade with 
other members.  While the ALBA literature focuses on the novelties of the New Left, in 
practice the legacies of the neoliberal period are difficult to overcome. 
 
Operationalisation of the TCP and State Capacity 
This generalised compliance with WTO rules relates not only to the commercial dangers 
of their transgression, however, but also to the lack of a well-defined and practicable 
alternative.  It was this that led to stagnation of the multilateral TCP (I.45) – how could 
officials agree on something they could not articulate or codify? – and this ambiguity 
itself increased the perceived risks of provoking commercial retribution from other 
countries: 
 
First you have to properly assimilate [the TCP] conceptually and examine your 
commitments at the multilateral [global] level so that you can weigh up your 
response, your support.  Otherwise, they’re going to contradict each other and 
collapse under their own weight; you’ll get pulverised! 
(I.51) 
 
Even after the multilateral TCP had stalled, the same issue plagued bilateral 
negotiations between Venezuela and Ecuador.  The initial failure of the CFA to advance 
beyond the “good intentions” of the early ALBA agreements was in part a result of this.  
In the first instance, the original text developed by Venezuela, in which Ecuador only 
“changed the commas and full stops” (I.45), took on the character of early ALBA 
agreements, also emanating from Venezuela.  Caught between a desire to move away 
from WTO rules and concerns about doing so, the basic CFA failed not only to tackle 
the nuts and bolts of trade but also to produce a concrete plan for cooperative and 
complementary utilisation of trade regulations to the benefit of both parties.  Instead, its 
sweeping elimination of all tariffs saw Ecuador scrambling to reopen negotiations at the 
last minute for fear of damage to its producers (I.45).  As one of the negotiators 
admitted, the difficulties were partly technical, amounting to uncertainty about how to 
produce a TCP-type agreement: 
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For me the main thing is that we haven’t constructed models of economic and 
productive complementarity.  We don’t know how to enhance our capacity 
jointly, in terms of resources, industrial development … If you want to do an 
FTA, everything’s ready; you know what the disciplines and conditions are, 
there’s a whole structure: “we get to this point and then we conclude 
[negotiations]!”  Here no, because you don’t have that.  This agreement 
depends on criteria that we’re constructing… 
(I.53) 
 
 Even when the CFA was rejected by COMEX and reconfigured via the Protocol 
and its various annexes, many of the same problems remained, with further uncertainty 
over how to make allowances for novel concepts such as EPS, fair trade, and solidarity 
within a broadly conventional agreement (I.51).  Although the final model ACD 
agreement went some way to achieving this (Estévez 2012, p.36), it barely made a dent 
on the combined CFA, Protocol, and annexes that ultimately rendered the Venezuela-
Ecuador deal a simple renewal of existing CAN rules.  This compromise meant that 
despite all the sound and fury, the TCP-ACD process had managed to produce neither a 
conceptually consistent alternative mode of trade nor even bilateral agreements within 
WTO rules to promote coordinated substitution of extra-ALBA imports (from 
Colombia, say) for intra-ALBA ones (I.49). 
 This inability to produce a workable agreement is reminiscent of weaknesses in 
state capacity at the domestic level, where officials have also proved incapable of 
implementing concepts whose meaning remains obscure (chapter three, pp.73-78).  Far 
from being transformed by New Left reforms, officials accustomed to a very different 
script are more often perplexed.  Neither Venezuelan officials in their draft text of the 
CFA, nor their Ecuadorian counterparts in their subsequent revisions managed to pin 
down the TCP in a form that could draw the support of other actors involved.  In the 
literature the very ideas underpinning an ALBA initiative are assumed to have a 
transformative capacity that they fail to demonstrate in practice (chapter two, p.47).  In 
reality, initial scepticism about the TCP’s vagueness and impracticability was 
vindicated by its tortuous progress and abortive institutionalisation.   
 
The TCP and Bureaucratic Inertia 
The absence of a clear, coherent, and practicable plan for implementation of the TCP 
also reduces its attractiveness to the very officials charged with putting it into practice.  
Where they are unconvinced, they have the power to leave proposals sinking into the 
bureaucratic mire: 
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The [TCP] declaration is romantic.  They say that something has to be done, in 
terms of markets, in procurement, that it’s a peaceful project…  But it gets 
bogged down in the middle ranks until God knows when because they can get 
into all the projects that come from the centre, presidency downwards; they 
know the terrain and they have their ways.  They can be a massive weight in 
boycotting anything, regardless of how good it is.  How do you change that? 
(I.51) 
 
The default setting where there is a risk of failure is (somewhat understandably) “go 
with what you know”, which in this case means sticking with the familiar free-trade 
models. 
 Further, a complex and underspecified TCP is competing with the relatively 
simple and familiar prescriptions of these existing models.  The export-orientated free-
trade model may have many faults, but over-complexity is not one of them.  For better 
or worse the technicians charged with its implementation have a road map that shows 
them how to proceed.  Even officials well-disposed to the idea of a TCP-compliant deal 
confess that “like it or not, the WTO has got things pretty well structured!” (I.45).  
Since trade officials have been working to these precepts for so long, there is even a 
culture of liberalisation that rejects the kind of changes needed – now with 
constitutional backing – to promote inward-looking development:  
 
At the highest levels of the country’s management of trade, the word 
protectionism is still a dirty word.  There isn’t even a coherent alternative in 
terms of tariff protection; the tendency is still to go for a tariff of zero.  That 
makes endogenous development impossible! 
(I.49) 
 
Further, this culture is reinforced through international interactions, where any deviation 
from the norm can be met by the scorn of external actors who are also peers: 
 
One negotiator came to tell me that it would be embarrassing for Ecuador to 
distance itself from the normal negotiating conventions.  A matter of personal 
embarrassment?!  We’re talking about the interests of the country here!  This 
guy has to suggest something different to his friends the negotiators on the 
other side – because they are friends.  At that level there’s incredible resistance 
from the traditional negotiating team in the Foreign Ministry because they’re 
ashamed to put forward an ACD.  We even have this to overcome! 
(I.45) 
 
 While some of these “unreconstructed” officials have been displaced by allies of 
the self-styled “revolutions” that brought ALBA presidents to power, others inevitably 
remain, often in senior positions due to long service.  As a result, the assumption of 
transformative impact in the ALBA literature is grossly misleading.  As at the domestic 
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level, the regional level has neither clear governance through which such problems can 
feed back, nor any institution (beyond individual presidents) with the power to do 
anything about it.  Ultimately, it registers only vaguely with the ALBA Secretariat as a 
mystifying “demotivation” with no obvious solution (I.10). 
 
The TCP-ACD Process and Internal Division 
Beyond impracticability and inertia there also lies the question of interest groups and 
their representation within the state itself.  The divisions that this creates have tended to 
be obscured by an assumption in the literature that incumbent governments’ stated aims 
are representative of genuine changes.  However, the TCP-ACD process, particularly on 
the Ecuadorian side, shows that national-level divisions can be important to the 
performance of regional initiatives. 
 
i.) Factionalism and competing interests 
In Ecuador the two factions struggling for influence over trade policy diverged in terms 
of their respective constituencies and their stances vis-à-vis conventional FTAs.  As 
noted in chapter three (p.84), the head of the left-wing faction was Foreign Minister 
Ricardo Patiño, advocating for a TCP along ACD lines; to his ideological right was 
Production  Minister Nathalie Cely, who favoured more traditional FTAs.  Final 
responsibility for trade policy rested with the cross-ministry Foreign Trade Committee 
(COMEX) headed by Cely, yet promotion of trade and integration fell within the remit 
of Patiño as head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Integration (MRECI), 
thereby setting the stage for conflict.  The fault lines of this split ran directly through 
MRECI, emerging with the resignation in 2010 of Correa’s previous Foreign Minister 
Fander Falconí and his vice-minister for trade Julio Oleas, both associated with Correa’s 
Alianza PAIS movement.  Their exit was due in part to their attempts to implement a 
more radical trade policy, which had stymied attempts to conclude deals both with the 
US and with the EU.  Though this was no bad thing in their eyes (Falconí & Oleas 
2011), it drew much criticism from the private sector, prompting Correa to change 
course.  Though he maintained as Foreign Minister another Alianza PAIS stalwart 
(Patiño), the Vice-Ministry for Foreign Trade and Economic Integration passed into the 
hands of Francisco Rivadeneira.  Both Cely and Rivadeneira were closely tied to the 
agro-export elites of the coast, and the two bodies they headed aligned themselves with 
the interests of this group within government, favouring conventional agreements with 
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traditional partners.  Patiño, meanwhile, remained committed to an alternative vision of 
trade and was supported in this by Coordinating Minister for Economic Policy Katiuska 
King, as well as the head of the Planning Secretariat, René Ramírez.74  The existence of 
this split was common knowledge (El Universo 2011), but it exploded most memorably 
in a facebook war when Patiño’s deputy Kintto Lucas dubbed a potential trade deal with 
the EU “neocolonialism” during Cely and Rivadeneira’s trip to Europe to discuss it; 
Cely’s own deputy Mauricio Peña hit out at Lucas, whereas Economic Policy Minister 
Katiuska King “liked” his original neocolonialism remark, and the whole sorry mess 
had to be reined in by Correa (El Comercio 2011). 
 
ii.) Cooperative negotiation of trade rules or CADIVI as a non-tariff barrier? 
It was under previous foreign minister Falconí that Ecuador joined ALBA and first 
studied the possibility of a multilateral TCP, but it was his successor Patiño that took 
responsibility for the Venezuela-Ecuador CFA.  It was Patiño’s team that negotiated the 
initial agreement, based on Venezuelan draft texts, which echoed much of the language 
of the TCP but failed to provide guidance on the more routine, practical aspects of trade.  
Their approach had been to begin with this rough agreement and then develop it “on the 
go” (I.53) in continuous consultation with Venezuelan counterparts perceived to be on 
the same ideological page.  But from the perspective of the Cely faction, this was 
unacceptable on technical grounds and because of the dangers posed from dropping 
tariff barriers for a partner whose own currency controls – CADIVI’s restrictions on 
foreign currency for imports not produced domestically – were considered an effective 
non-tariff barrier (COMEX 2011).  Thus, in a foretaste of larger problems with CADIVI 
and the SUCRE (chapter five), a key part of Venezuela’s endogenous-development 
strategy became a spanner in the works of a TCP-ACD process that aimed to enable a 
regionalised form of the very same strategy. 
 
iii.) Maintenance of the status quo 
 The protocol and annexes were added to the original CFA with the technical 
help of SENPLADES and the presidential New Financial Architecture commission – 
                                                 
74 Though this is only anecdotal, a fieldwork visit to the more conservative part of the Foreign Ministry 
was notable for the near-complete lack of knowledge or concern for ALBA amongst officials, who could 
only offer a publicity leaflet printed by the ALBA Secretariat.  Officials at SENPLADES, meanwhile, 
spoke at length and with enthusiasm, sharing the findings of their detailed “Sociopolitical and Economic 
Analysis of ALBA” from the Ecuadorian perspective. 
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both instrumental in the development of the ACD concept – and provisions were made 
for previously neglected practical issues.  But these ultimately drew more on existing 
CAN rules than on the new ACD.  This constituted a last-ditch attempt to marry up the 
priorities of two groups with essentially distinct concerns: the Cely faction focused on 
the desire of sizeable agro-export industries to gain preferential access to large markets 
through traditional FTAs, whereas the Patiño faction favoured a novel format that 
would open up access to EPS producers, SMEs, and nascent manufacturing industries 
with the potential to add value within intra-ALBA production chains.  Though the latter 
draws much of the academic attention for its novelty, in reality the former won out, and 
trade continued on much the same terms as prior to Correa’s presidency.  In the end 
neither faction was entirely happy with maintaining the status quo, but in practice this 
favoured the free-trade preference of the Cely faction.  Thus, tension between groups 
with different interests and trade priorities ultimately thwarted the TCP-ACD process’ 
regionalisation of endogenous development: 
  
We have ALBA-TCP and EPS for the poor, bypassing the vice-ministry [for 
trade], and then the vice-minister [for trade] in charge of big negotiations 
elsewhere … There is no consistent policy on international trade relations in 
which everyone is included.  You end up in the old tradition of zero-sum 
economic policy: “if I don’t get it, nobody gets it”.  You can’t have endogenous 
development like that. 
(I.49) 
 
iv.) The potential for corruption 
Harder to identify and even more difficult to overcome, internal opposition to state-led 
regional initiatives can indeed become zero-sum in those cases where there are direct 
links between state officials and economic actors whose interests are at stake, a situation 
not uncommon in LAC economies where access to state resources has played a key role 
in private accumulation.  Since ballot-box Bolivarian or Citizen “Revolutions” do not 
enjoy the luxury of post-insurgency purges, they must be carried out by senior 
bureaucrats of other eras who may maintain such links or by new officials with a similar 
openness to corrupt practices.75  Further, as levels of corruption in the Venezuelan, 
Cuban, and Nicaraguan states demonstrate, true-believing revolutionaries both political 
and military can quickly trade ideology for dollars once in power (on Venezuela, see 
chapter three, pp.77-78). 
                                                 
75 As noted in chapter one (p.22), such factors are inherently furtive, although this assertion does stem in 
part from “off the record” observations from various interviewees. 
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v.) Endogenous development: different interests means different models 
Overall, the presence and importance of this split at the heart of the Ecuador’s political 
economy gives the lie to accounts that would present the development strategies of 
ALBA member-states as complete or coherent.  On the contrary, alongside the 
endogenous development strategy articulated in the constitution and associated national 
plans there remains a significant commitment on the part of certain branches of the state 
and their constituencies to the export-oriented free-trade model to which the TCP was a 
critical response.  Moreover, it was Correa who “delivered the vice-ministry of trade” 
(I.49) and control over COMEX to the latter faction while maintaining the discourse of 
the ACD.  The power of this faction, and of the agro-export elites behind it, represents a 
further constraint on the autonomy of ALBA member-states in achieving an alternative 
trade agreement.  With the two factions appealing to different constituencies, the 
proposals of neither faction received generalised support, and ultimately the easiest 
option of “no change” won out. 
 
Conclusion: ALBA and the TCP 
Returning to Benzi’s call for a more thorough investigation of the TCP the outset of this 
chapter (Benzi 2010, p.18), we can only conclude that it is premature to broach the issue 
of how its benefits are distributed, for the TCP has not been implemented.  
Nevertheless, the reasons for this “unimplementation” do reveal precisely the kinds of 
tensions between and within states that are suggested by his question. 
 The failure of the TCP-ACD process seriously undermines the claims of many 
academic accounts of ALBA, as well as proclamations from ALBA figureheads about 
the imminent arrival of a credible zone of shared development.  These claims are often 
substantiated by recourse to the TCP, which member-states have tried and failed to 
implement both multi- and bilaterally.  In bilateral form, Ecuador intended to use its 
novel ACD concept bring the TCP principles to bear on its trade with Venezuela, 
constituting in itself 44 per cent of intra-ALBA trade.  The anticipated payoff was the 
sovereignty-reinforcing reversal of many of the reforms enacted in the neoliberal period, 
with S&D, selective protection, developmental targeting of public procurement, 
national retention of ultimate jurisdiction, and even nationalisation rendered valid tools 
of politically guided cooperative development.  The aim of creating regional value 
chains with higher value-added and involving a variety of previously marginalised 
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actors would key into shared drives for endogenous-development at the domestic level 
and produce tangible benefits in terms of employment, prices, stability of supply, and 
popular wellbeing.  Since the range of beneficiaries tends to overlap with those 
mobilised by the movements which brought incumbent governments to power, an 
implemented TCP would have meant gains particularly in terms of output legitimacy. 
 Yet, in practice none of these gains was achieved, because the TCP-ACD had no 
positive effect on intra-ALBA trade.  The multilateral option discussed in 2009 quickly 
fell apart, whereas the ACD was batted back and forth between Ecuador and Venezuela 
before existing CAN arrangements were simply renewed.  The multilateral TCP process 
was hindered first by the sub-regional commitments of ALBA states, particularly 
Anglophone members committed to the OECS and CARICOM, and then by a wider 
concern for WTO rules and the dangers of their contravention.  The bilateral process 
was also hindered by deficiencies in planning and state capacity, with officials unable to 
produce a workable format that would go beyond principles and generalities to 
applicability.  The final CFA between Ecuador and Venezuela incorporated little of the 
ACD’s or TCP’s character.  Ultimately, however, the bilateral ACD was only really 
desirable for one side of Ecuador’s trade-policy governance, and not even the side with 
the final say.  In effect, there was no unified trade strategy, but rather an internal 
conflict between those advocating for conventional FTAs with large partners and those 
attempting to develop infant industries and smaller actors via cooperatively coordinated 
preferential access to ALBA markets.  Essentially, these elements of national political 
economy were regionalised alongside the proposed solution embodied in the TCP, 
which was thereby doomed to failure. 
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Chapter Five: Unified Regional Compensation System (SUCRE)  
 
…the Sucre’s “birth” [promotes] a vision of regional economic development 
independent of the United States and the dollar.  Exactly what if anything the 
Sucre will turn out to be, however, remains unclear.  In the future will 
Venezuela claim to be sending Cuba 10,000 Sucres worth of oil in return for 
10,000 Sucres worth of medical services?  If the near-term purpose of the Sucre 
is to act as this type of “virtual currency” for trade purposes, it is plausible but 
economically meaningless. 
(US Embassy to Venezuela 2009) 
 
As with the TCP, beyond its basic function as a virtual currency facilitating local-
currency payments for intra-ALBA trade, the nature and significance of the SUCRE 
initiative is often misunderstood, even by those who stand to be affected.76  While the 
ALBA literature shares some of the same uncertainty as the US Embassy in Caracas, the 
SUCRE is there considered far from “economically meaningless”.  Rather, it is often 
taken as evidence of significant progress towards a zone of shared development that 
regionalises the endogenous-development strategies of its larger New Left member-
states, reasserting at the same their autonomy and providing new benefits to incumbent 
governments.   
Adopting the same four-stage structure as in the previous chapter, here we will 
discuss how the SUCRE acts, first, in the interest of states by saving on foreign 
exchange, insulating a portion of intra-ALBA trade, and favouring SUCRE-zone 
production over external production; and, second, in the interest of economic actors of 
all shapes and sizes by increasing cost-competitiveness via a reduction in transaction 
costs.  This is designed to reinforce endogenous development particularly through its 
promotion of regional production chains with higher value-added, new access to export 
markets for the same associative organisations favoured at the national level, and the 
implication of producers of one member-state in the legitimising welfare provision of 
another.  Unlike the TCP, it has been implemented in ALBA’s four largest economies, 
with trade via the mechanism rocketing during its short life, thanks particularly to the 
central Ecuador-Venezuela relationship.  Broad participation and a lack of conflict 
owing to secular benefits for all involved have meant that the SUCRE has been able to 
realise many of its intended effects.  Yet, there are caveats, and again they relate in great 
part to inherited structural factors and conflicting institutional commitments that pre-
                                                 
76 The SUCRE monetary council specifies that SUCRE (upper case) denotes the system as a whole, 
whereas sucre (lower case) means the unit itself.  The name recalls Ecuador’s pre-dollarisation currency, 
also the “sucre”.  Both the new system and the former Ecuadorian currency refer back to Antonio José de 
Sucre, hero of Latin American independence and close friend of Simón Bolívar. 
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date the endogenous-development model foregrounded in the ALBA literature.  As in 
the TCP case, tensions in national political economies are regionalised alongside the 
policies of states-led regionalism, with the latter emerging severely compromised.  
Thus, trade imbalances significantly reduce foreign-exchange benefits to Venezuela, 
whereas Ecuador’s diversification of production into areas of higher value-added is 
favoured at the expense of Venezuela’s, albeit with some cost and supply benefits to 
Venezuela’s import-dependent economy.  The most damaging of all such clashes relates 
to capital controls in Venezuela, whose developmental purpose has been twisted not 
only into a new non-tariff barrier to Ecuadorian exports, but also into a means of 
draining Venezuelan foreign exchange through currency arbitrage.  Thus, alongside real 
progress towards its intended functioning and impact, the SUCRE has also 
unintentionally promoted regional conflict and corruption across ALBA’s national 
political economies, inhibiting achievement of ALBA’s wider aims. 
 
Origin and Proposed Function of the SUCRE 
As with so many recent innovations in LAC, the push for a regional compensation 
mechanism came from Hugo Chávez.  During a bilateral meeting with Ecuador’s Rafael 
Correa in November 2008, some seven months before Ecuador’s entry into ALBA, the 
Venezuelan president sought assistance from Correa’s Presidential Technical 
Commission for the New Regional Financial Architecture with the simple request of “a 
payment system for Central America, the Caribbean, ALBA, and Ecuador that does not 
use the dollar” (I.45).  A basic outline of the system was prepared within a week and 
was immediately backed by Caracas; the fully functional system went live just thirteen 
months later, and the first transaction took place in February 2010 (I.45). 
The SUCRE system centres on a unit of account for international trade between 
ALBA members, comparable to the virtual European Currency Unit that preceded the 
physical Euro currency.  It is not a hard currency nor is there any sign that it will 
become one in the foreseeable future, though this was the ultimate goal for Chávez at 
least (ALBA Secretaría Executiva 2010e, p.1).  Its central purpose is to allow importers 
and exporters, public or private, to compensate each other in local currencies instead of 
having to purchase dollars.  The system is controlled by a Regional Monetary Council 
that sets the weight of each national currency in the SUCRE basket and encourages 
coordination of monetary, trade, and exchange-rate policy across member-states (Páez 
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Pérez 2010, p.24).77  Members contribute five per cent of their initial allocation of 
sucres to a Reserves and Commercial Convergence Fund (FRCC) that can finance 
production-for-export projects within deficit members so as to redress trade imbalances 
(ALBA Secretaría Executiva 2010e, p.4).  Since there are six months between the 
assignation of SUCREs and the payment of balances, this also amounts to a multilateral 
extension of credit to the value of the sucres exchanged. 
 By way of example, without the SUCRE a Venezuelan supermarket importing 
milk to a value of $100,000 from a Bolivian dairy cooperative would have to pay 
Venezuelan Bolivars to a local bank with a correspondent bank in the US, which would 
in turn deposit the dollar payment with the US-based correspondent bank of the 
exporter’s bank in Bolivia, who would finally pay the Bolivian exporter in Bolivian 
Bolivianos.  If a Bolivian carmaker then bought $200,000 of steel from Venezuela, the 
same process would occur in reverse.  There are costs associated with the currency 
exchange and the transactions between banks at both the Venezuelan and Bolivian ends 
of the deal, not to mention the seigniorage gained by the US Federal Reserve through 
circulation of its currency overseas.  These costs are relative to the value of the 
transaction, which would be $300,000 across the two exchanges above. 
The SUCRE offers four clear advantages to users great and small.  First, it 
eliminates the currency-exchange cost altogether.  Second, with the elimination of 
various steps in the process (and therefore middlemen), transaction costs are also greatly 
reduced.  Third, since SUCRE payments are automated and rely on no external 
institutions, they occur in real time; this reduces the labour cost of setting up and 
monitoring payments and reduces the potential for defaulted or delayed payments.  And 
fourth, where capital-outflow controls (Venezuela) or taxes (Ecuador) apply, these 
should be eliminated.  Since all four types of cost are ultimately reflected in the final 
price of the hypothetical milk or steel mentioned above, any reduction in these four 
costs increases the competitiveness of SUCRE-utilising producers vis-à-vis non-
SUCRE producers.  With use of the SUCRE restricted to ALBA members, this 
effectively promotes intra-ALBA trade.  Promoters of the SUCRE frequently refer to 
the case of Continental Tyres’ exports from Ecuador to Bolivia.  The company’s 
internal accounts show that the costs associated with a payment via the SUCRE are just 
nine per cent of what they would be via the usual means (Trujillo 2012, p.17).  This 
equates to some five per cent of the product’s price on the Bolivian market, a significant 
                                                 
77 The value of one sucre (XCD) is roughly $1.25 USD.  XCD figures are used in some sources but all are 
converted to USD here. 
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gain in competitiveness that potentially increases Continental’s market share at the 
expense of Peruvian, Chilean, or American suppliers, for example (I.45). 
But since, from the perspective of importers and exporters, the system requires 
only local currency, it also opens up the possibility of foreign trade to actors far smaller 
than Continental.  In dollar-denominated transactions there are financial, cultural, and 
even geographical barriers to take-up by small businesses: for a peasant farmer in 
eastern Ecuador, obtaining the necessary documentation (letters of credit and so on) 
means getting to a city and being required by a man in a suit and a white shirt to provide 
proof of sufficient resources to engage in foreign trade; this process is both costly and 
intimidating.  Alongside the larger banks already engaged in trade financing, the 
SUCRE system allows smaller credit unions and cooperative banks to act as operators, 
adding reduced geographical and cultural distances to the existing advantage of not 
having to purchase foreign exchange (I.52). 
The SUCRE system thus constitutes an efficacious and cost-effective trade 
mechanism that provides a secular – rather than ideological – gain to its users, be they 
private or public, large or small.  Unlike most ALBA institutions it is also a treaty 
agreement and therefore ratified by national parliaments, implying a legal durability and 
stability that counterbalances the costs and risks of adopting a new system. 
  
Intended Effects of a Fully Functional SUCRE 
As the explicit objectives of the SUCRE indicate, the potential benefits of its successful 
implementation are many, and in great part related to the overlapping themes of  
autonomy, endogenous development, and legitimacy that were identified in the 
literature of ALBA. 
 
Reasserted Autonomy 
The SUCRE initiative was designed to counter the “perverse effects” on developing 
economies of the existing international economic system; namely, the dollar 
dependence of the international economy and the concentration of decision-making 
power in the international financial institutions (IFIs) that govern world trade, finance, 
and development (Mata 2012, p.4).  Unsurprisingly, given that the proposal emerged 
alongside the financial crisis of 2008, the SUCRE’s designers saw the dollar as a 
transmission belt for volatility into developing countries.  Prominent IFIs like the IMF 
and World Bank, meanwhile, were associated with the paquetazos (structural 
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adjustment programs)78 of the 1980s, rendering them dirty words in much of LAC, for 
voters and for policymakers alike.  The SUCRE’s primary aim is to reduce exposure to 
this international system by “decoupling from use of the dollar in foreign trade” (ALBA 
Secretaría Executiva 2010e, p.4).  Since the SUCRE naturally favours regional trade 
partners, this coincides with Venezuela and Ecuador’s shared aim of promoting a 
multipolar world through a transition from dependence on the US market towards 
increased interdependence with regional neighbours (chapter three, pp.68, 82).  Though 
the value to the US of seigniorage from intra-ALBA transactions – nullified by the 
SUCRE – is but a drop in the ocean, this could prove more significant if the example of 
a successful SUCRE were to intensify the global trend towards regional compensation 
and monetary protection already emerging in the poor world;79 in time the growth and 
diffusion of such schemes could have a real impact on the economic hegemony of the 
US.  In line with the SUCRE’s second stated objective (ALBA Secretaría Executiva 
2010e, p.4), the combination of previously dollar-denominated imports now transacted 
in local currencies and extra-regional imports displaced by newly competitive intra-
ALBA suppliers should mean that less foreign exchange is spent on the import bill.  In 
the earlier example, say, the outstanding sucre balance to be settled in dollars would 
have been $100,000 instead of $300,000.  This would insulate member-states from 
certain sources of political unrest as healthier reserve levels would leave them better 
equipped to deal with fiscal and balance-of-payments pressures during economic 
downturns.  The effective multilateral extension of credit implied by the six-monthly 
settling of SUCRE balances also adds liquidity and thus further insulates trade flows 
from extra-regional crises.  Since the latter two factors amount to improved 
macroeconomic health in the eyes of international markets, their credit ratings and 
borrowing costs should also be positively affected, again freeing up resources for other 
developmental ends. 
 
Endogenous Development 
An effective SUCRE would promote endogenous development in a number of ways.  
First, implicit favouring of intra-regional trade would mean that more of the value 
created within ALBA would remain within ALBA, with a knock-on effect on 
employment.  This ties in with the people- rather than growth-centred focus on the 
                                                 
78 Formed from paquete (“package”) and the suffix –azo, which implies a strong blow. 
79 Most prominently ASEAN’s Chiang Mai Initiative (2000), Mercosur’s gradually intensifying currency-
swap arrangement (since 2008), and a BRICS-led foreign-exchange fund (Kelly & Prentice 2013). 
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social effects of economic policy that was observed across the five member-states 
studied in chapter three.  Further, one particular aspect of this people-centred approach 
was a new focus both on SMEs and the associative organisation of the “popular and 
solidarity economy” (EPS) rather than larger industrial and agro-export businesses that 
were prioritised in earlier eras of import-substitution and export-orientation.  This was 
based, first, on the idea that SMEs create more and better jobs and should therefore be 
supported by state intervention, whereas larger primary industries created fewer, worse 
jobs and already enjoyed the advantages of size without any additional help from the 
state.  Associative EPS enterprises, meanwhile, are seen to provide both tangible skills 
and intangible empowerment by virtue of their participatory nature (chapter three, 
pp.70, 80).  The SUCRE aims to offer both kinds of enterprise the chance to engage in 
foreign trade, which – if successful – would favour their viability by reinforcing their 
financial position.  The knock-on effect on individuals would be material changes in 
conditions through growth of their small or associative businesses, and in the latter case 
further empowerment through the awareness-raising inherent to communal self-
management (Cole 2008).  The regionalisation of these domestic changes comes 
through the prioritisation of productive complementarity (ALBA Secretaría Executiva 
2010e, p.4), which is to say the creation of intra-regional production chains that lock in 
the above benefits and render member-states mutually responsible for their partners’ 
development. 
Since ALBA’s is a vision of integrated development, whereby the economic, 
political, social, and cultural cannot be disentangled, this developmental 
interdependence is particularly acute.  EPS producers in one state might be producing 
the subsidised food made available through the social programmes of another, for 
instance.  Again, this should insulate the region from external crises, since more of the 
trade flows involved in their state-led development are contained within ALBA; they 
can thus be guided through relatively cooperative relations with smaller differences in 
power and interest than in north-south agreements.  Also regionalised is the focus on 
minimising inequalities, though here between states instead of between citizens.  The 
Reserves and Commercial Convergence Fund (FRCC) is designed to siphon off a small 
percentage of the sucres accruing to member-states with positive trade balances in order 
to finance growth of deficit-country exporters whose products could enter into the 
complementary productive chains mentioned above.  This should provide a new source 
of development financing that both comes from and goes to ALBA states in line with 
state-led planning rather than market-led allocation. 
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New Sources of Legitimacy 
Since the SUCRE plays into much the same vision of regional productive integration as 
does the TCP, the ways in which it could impact upon legitimacy are similar.  
Involvement in the provision of benefits to incumbent governments’ core constituencies 
means that the SUCRE can foster political as well as economic interdependence.  At the 
demand end, this might see the SUCRE’s cost advantages passed on to consumers via 
state-subsidised distribution networks like Mercal and Bicentenario (chapter three, 
p.71).  At the supply end, export markets should be opened up for EPS actors and SMEs 
by the possibility of using local currencies and cooperative agent banks.  In Bolivia and 
Ecuador especially, the EPS sector involves many indigenous workers, meaning that the 
SUCRE can provide disproportional benefit to this politically crucial group, which has 
been instrumental in unseating previous governments.80  Skilful use of symbolic 
resources – as with the utilisation of the “SUCRE” moniker shared with the pre-
dollarisation Ecuadorian currency of Ecuador – also regionalises the resurgent 
nationalism that has underpinned the new political movements of ALBA governments.81  
According to the Executive Secretary of the ALBA Secretariat, this is part of a 
conscious policy of promoting a sense of belonging, of “our SUCRE” (I.28). 
But unlike the TCP-ACD process, the mechanism as designed provides clear 
benefits across the board, regardless of ideological bent.  For one, its existence does not 
challenge international trade via normal channels, even between ALBA members; those 
who do not wish to take part are unaffected.  Second, since it naturally reduces costs, it 
increases the competitiveness of production within ALBA vis-à-vis extra-regional 
producers, thereby providing export markets or cheaper imports to the producers and 
vendors of member-states (insomuch as intraregional demand exists).  This is as 
attractive to a multinational company like Continental Tyres as it is to a cooperative 
dairy farmer in Ecuador, creating a broader, more stable base of political support for the 
mechanism.  Third, the provision of new development financing to encourage 
complementary trade would seem only to positively affect those targeted as potential 
exporters.  The desired insertion of smaller intra-regional businesses into 
complementary production chains would come at the expense of extra-regional 
                                                 
80 Particularly in Ecuador, where during the 1990s and 2000s the Confederation of Indigenous 
Nationalities of Ecuador repeatedly convoked politically devastating mass protests. 
81 Something akin to Neumann’s region-building (Neumann 1994). 
 135 
 
producers whose exports to ALBA countries would be substituted by local production 
rather than creating new competitors for local companies. 
 Overall, a SUCRE system functioning along these lines would substantiate the 
view that ALBA reinforces the autonomy of ALBA and its member-states and 
underpins national endogenous-development strategies, which also implies mutual 
reinforcement of legitimacy between member-states.  But as the TCP example has 
shown, the potential impacts of core ALBA initiatives can be entirely nullified by 
implementation failures. 
 
Implementation, Impact, and Linkage to Members’ Development Strategies 
Unlike the TCP, however, the SUCRE has been implemented by some ALBA member-
states, namely its four largest economies: Venezuela, Ecuador, Cuba, and Bolivia.  
Though its use has grown rapidly since 2010, this growth has been uneven, with its 
impacts distributed accordingly.  The system has also been abused in ways that 
undermine endogenous-development strategies.  Both the qualified successes and 
mitigated failures of its implementation reveal much about the progress of ALBA more 
broadly. 
 
Participation in the SUCRE 
The first moderator of impact is participation, for if a given ALBA member opts not to 
use the SUCRE, then its only possible effect on that political economy could be loss of 
intra-ALBA trade to the firms of newly competitive SUCRE-zone countries.  Put most 
dramatically, since neither Nicaragua – whose trade with ALBA is considerable (see 
chapter four, p.114) – nor the Anglophone member-states have participated, the SUCRE 
effectively has no presence, impact, or developmental linkage within half of ALBA’s 
member-states.  But put more realistically, the SUCRE covers 91 per cent of ALBA by 
population and 98 per cent by economic size.   
 As with the TCP, one potential hindrance to participation is that its potential 
impact is proportional to the size of trade relationships with ALBA, meaning that gains 
from SUCRE utilisation may not outweigh implementation costs.  Given what we have 
already seen about differences in the importance of ALBA trade (chapter four, p.114), 
the benefits of the SUCRE would be far more significant for Nicaragua (intra-ALBA 
trade = 17 per cent of total trade) than for Anglophone members (average = 5 per cent), 
for example.  It also means that the absolute cost of SUCRE implementation for 
overstretched micro-states weighs even heavier in the balance, which along with their 
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commitments within the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union partially explains their 
absence.  Overall, the SUCRE’s coverage is broad, since the participation of ALBA’s 
four largest economies means that 78 per cent of intra-ALBA trade could be channelled 
via the SUCRE.82 
 
Trade within the SUCRE Zone 
In those states where it has been implemented, the SUCRE has produced promising 
results in its short life.  After a few test transactions worth just $13 million in 2010, 
SUCRE trade shot up to $538 million in 2011, representing 8.2 per cent of total intra-
ALBA trade.83  This is impressive growth considering the unfamiliarity of the system 
for central banks, agent banks, and end-users alike.  SUCRE trade near doubled in 2012 
(see Figure 9, below), ending the year just shy of the billion-dollar mark ($988m). 
Although figures for total intra-ALBA trade in 2012 are not yet available, they will 
surely show that SUCRE-trade growth far outpaced growth in intra-ALBA trade, 
implying gains for SUCRE trade vis-à-vis dollar-denominated trade.  The same lack of 
data makes it impossible to judge whether or not the SUCRE mechanism has 
contributed to an increase in SUCRE-zone or intra-ALBA trade: no such increase 
materialised between 2010 and 2011, with the figure hovering at 3.1 per cent, but it 
would be unfair to expect such rapid results from a freshly minted mechanism.  Prima 
facie, the basic indicators suggest that it is flourishing and thereby making progress 
towards the intended effects on regional autonomy, development, and legitimacy 
described above. 
 
Figure 9: Value of SUCRE trade ($ millions), 2010-2012 (source: SUCRE 2012) 
                                                 
82 With Nicaragua’s imminent entry, this will rise to 98.9 per cent. 
83 ALBA-ALBA trade from Comtrade.  Intra-ALBA trade here includes the four members not utilising 
the SUCRE, but since their trade is only 2 per cent of the total, any difference would be negligible. 
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the ideological motivations, practical utilisation, and secular advantages of the SUCRE 
in an attempt to win broad support for the initiative, particularly from a private sector 
that has been suspicious of the idea from the outset (Hans 2009).  Figures show that the 
system has indeed won over many of its critics.  Early transactions were often limited to 
state enterprises, but the private share of SUCRE trade soon shot up and has grown 
steadily ever since (see Figure 11, below), going from 72 per cent in 2011 (SUCRE 
2011a, p.23) to 86 per cent six months later (Trujillo 2012, p.16).   
 
 
Figure 11: Private, public, and mixed shares (%) of total SUCRE trade, Jan-Jun 2012 (source: Trujillo 
2012, p.16). 
This is all the more important given the fractious relations between the private 
sector and the state in many ALBA countries, especially Venezuela.  Despite tense 
relations, we find not only multinationals like Unilever and Nestlé employing the 
SUCRE (SUCRE 2012), but even those like Empresas Polar that have repeatedly been 
threatened with nationalisation after accusations of fomenting unrest through cuts in 
production of staples (AVN 2012).  In terms of intended effects outlined above, it is too 
early to know the extent of any displacement of extra-SUCRE-zone trade by intra-
SUCRE-zone trade, but the rapid expansion of SUCRE trade suggests that progress is 
being made.  Less than three years into its life the SUCRE was channelling 74 per cent 
of all bilateral trade between Ecuador and Venezuela, suggesting that its advantages 
have been understood across the board (BCE 2013).84   
As accounts of ALBA often stress, this increases the kind of regional 
interdependence that favours regionally coordinated development planning and reduces 
ALBA’s vulnerability to external shocks.  Through its provision of benefits particularly 
                                                 
84 Unless all SUCRE trade is new, which is extremely unlikely.  The work cited relates to figures for 
SUCRE trade.  Figures for total trade used in this calculation also come from the BCE (bce.fin.ec). 
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to business elites that tend to be hostile to state intervention, the SUCRE also 
contributes to the output legitimacy of incumbent governments.  So successful in this 
respect has the SUCRE been that we even find it played up in Mazda advertisements 
about “supporting national progress, assembling for life ahead” that cash in on the 
economic nationalism implied by the SUCRE (Oficina Comercial Ecuador-Venezuela 
2011, p.15).85 
 
Linking SUCRE Exports to Endogenous Development 
But intra-ALBA integration of private trade is only one way of achieving the inward-
looking development sought by Venezuela and Ecuador alike.  From the government’s 
perspective, trade through public (or mixed) companies has the advantage of being 
directly manipulable by government.  If ALBA states wish to encourage endogenous 
development through creation of complementary production chains, state enterprises 
can be instructed to participate, whereas private companies can only be nudged or 
cajoled.  In order to ensure that this happens, both governments have committed to 
channelling all bilateral trade between public entities via the SUCRE (Presidencia del 
Ecuador 2011).  This is particularly significant given recent growth in direct state 
control of industry in Venezuela (see chapter three, p.71). 
There is some evidence that this strategy is quite literally bearing fruit.  In food 
production, for example, numerous state producers of agricultural inputs in Venezuela 
(Fertinitro, Pequiven, Copequim) now utilise the SUCRE to export the fertilisers 
required for Ecuadorian production of bananas and coffee (Mata 2012, p.12), which are 
in turn exported extra-regionally.  Creation of such intra-regional production chains for 
extra-regional exports is an explicit development strategy of both governments (I.51).  
In the opposite direction, Ecuador to Venezuela, and for internal consumption rather 
than export, state banks provide cheap credit and local-currency access to the SUCRE 
mechanism for Ecuadorian farmers so as to enable them to displace non-ALBA 
suppliers, as with Colombian onion producers selling to Venezuela (I.55).  Since state 
enterprises often act as buyers at the other end of such deals, the profit margins that 
would usually go to intermediaries can instead go towards socially advantageous “fair 
trade” prices (I.21).  In such cases, the SUCRE is successfully creating social and 
economic benefits at both ends of an intra-regional transaction, an ALBA mechanism 
thus contributing not only to the regionalisation of endogenous-development strategies, 
but also to the autonomy implicit in greater food sovereignty. 
                                                 
85 The term “economic regionalism” would confuse, but it is a “region feeling” that is invoked. 
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 This state-guided intraregional trade plays an especially important role in the 
case of SMEs and the EPS, both of which are priority sectors for the governments 
involved (chapter three, pp.70, 80) and for the SUCRE’s Regional Monetary Council 
itself (SUCRE 2011a, p.8).  Thus, in Ecuador the SUCRE becomes a tool with which 
new institutions like the Office of Inclusive Trade and traditional institutions like the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, Aquaculture and Fisheries (MAGAP) can promote 
the participation of small or associative organisations in international trade.  Milk 
production serves as a pertinent example: small and medium-sized Ecuadorian dairy 
farmers are encouraged to join associative groups like the Eastern and Mountain 
Livestock Association (AGSO), which – with MAGAP support – provide infrastructure 
to pool production, training to increase yields, and fair prices to reduce volatility.  The 
associative organisation then enters the international market via the SUCRE and can 
interact directly with Venezuelan importers, public or private.  Correa’s Ecuador has 
done a particularly good job of opening up institutional paths to sucre-denominated 
exports for small and associative traders.  Geographical and cultural barriers are 
combated first by the MAGAP-run National Storage Unit (UNA), which provides 
unmediated and local access to agricultural production chains; guidance on finding 
buyers is given by the export agency ProEcuador and by the Office of Inclusive Trade; 
and access to the SUCRE mechanism is furnished by a wide range of agent banks, 
including not only private banks with nationwide coverage but also smaller cooperative 
banks and credit unions (BCE 2012).  This work of creating an export culture amongst 
smaller economic actors speaks to a desire to empower (both materially and technically) 
those sectors of the economy whose gains flow directly to the poorest areas of society.  
Progress has been cautious since the Ecuadorian state recognises that misadventures in 
international commerce could be fatal for small organisations unable to absorb 
unexpected losses, yet there have been successes particularly in basic products such as 
milk, rice, potatoes, onions, and palm oil (I.52).  Even the SUCRE’s own regional 
monetary council (CMR) has looked to support the incorporation of SMEs and 
producers’ associations by creating a register of those aiming to adopt the SUCRE 
(SUCRE 2011a, p.38).  But the SUCRE mechanism’s fundamental role in this process 
is to improve the competitiveness of Ecuadorian milk from EPS producers and to allow 
smaller actors to trade internationally using only local currency.   
Qualitatively speaking, inasmuch as the SUCRE facilitates EPS and SME 
involvement in international trade, it regionalises aspects of the endogenous-
development models of ALBA members, here Ecuador and Venezuela (chapter three, 
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pp.66-73, 79-82).  Apart from direct economic and social benefits, the aim of achieving 
regional autonomy is served by the creation of trade links that reinforce food 
sovereignty and are somewhat isolated from shocks in the global political economy.  
There are also less tangible gains in experience and mutual confidence between actors, 
banks, and state institutions brought into contact for the first time by the SUCRE (I.55).  
This intraregional interdependence also sees the regional level contributing to output 
legitimacy, since benefits often accrue to the formerly marginalised groups who brought 
ALBA governments to power, as with the poor and indigenous in Ecuador who are 
overrepresented in SMEs and EPS organisations.  Prima facie, the size of bilateral 
SUCRE transactions – averaging $432,000 per transaction to June 2012 (based on 
Trujillo 2012) – and the minimal use of cooperative agent banks (BCE 2013, p.2) 
suggest that few smaller or associative companies are becoming directly involved.  But 
this is complicated by the fact that larger associative organisations like AGSO and UNA 
commercialise in single transactions the production of many smaller producers.  For 
example, the milk trade with Venezuela described above was worth $20 million in 2011 
but was sourced from a network of 12000 small dairy farmers (Embajada del Ecuador 
en Venezuela 2010, p.3), whereas the SUCRE’s own reporting suggests that growth in 
participation of smaller actors is significant to the sharp overall increase in SUCRE 
trade (SUCRE 2013). 
 
Linking SUCRE Imports to Endogenous Development 
These benefits also extend to the importing member with much the same consequences.  
Indeed, given the relationship between state-led trade and social programmes within 
ALBA, if anything they are stronger.  If Ecuadorian products reach Venezuelan 
consumers at better prices via the SUCRE, be it through public or private trade, intra-
ALBA interdependence is again strengthened.  But where state enterprises engage in 
trade to provide politically sensitive products sourced from groups whose wellbeing is 
also politically sensitive, this interdependence is all the greater. 
This is precisely what happens with milk when it passes from Ecuadorian EPS 
producers into the Venezuelan market via a sucre-denominated transaction.  Milk is the 
star of Venezuelan food-scarcity crises, being absent from 29 per cent of shops in early 
2011 (Oficina Comercial Ecuador-Venezuela 2011, p.13), making its stable supply a 
political issue.  At that point it enters into the state’s food-distribution network through 
the importer, in this case the Agricultural Services and Supply Corporation (CASA).  
CASA is one of a number of state companies that import and then distribute products 
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via a nationwide network of subsidised food stores based principally in deprived areas.  
The best known of these is Misión Mercal, one of the original social programmes that 
cemented Chávez’s reputation as a champion of the poor prior to the 2005 recall 
election (chapter three, p.71).  Their success has been such that there are now a number 
of offshoots such as Supermercales, Bicentenary Stores (nationalised from French 
multinational Casino), and the roaming subsidised-food markets that appear periodically 
in Plazas Bolívar all around the country.86  Moreover, the wider state food-supply 
network dominated by CASA and the Venezuelan Food Producer and Distributor 
(PDVAL) also supplies other social services such as schools and prisons, not to mention 
the huge and hugely important healthcare mission Barrio Adentro (López 2010).  Thus, 
the benefits to the small farmer in Ecuador translate into benefits for a poor Venezuelan 
consumer whose demand for affordable milk is being met by a Mercal store in a 
Caracas barrio.  Again, food sovereignty is regionalised and with it external 
dependence reduced.  At the same time the material needs of supporters of incumbent 
governments are being met and politically damaging shortages mitigated. 
There numerous areas in which it could be expanded across different members:  
Ecuador could import medical products from Cuba to treat beneficiaries of the 
regionalised Misión Jose Gregorio Hernandez disability-targeting programme (I.45), or 
the competitiveness of the Ecuadorian car industry could be bolstered by SUCRE-
sourced inputs from the Venezuelan state steel company SIDOR (I.55).  Ecuadorian 
household appliances already reach Venezuelan consumers via private importers but the 
Ecuadorian government also means to insert national producers into the social 
programme Mi Casa Bien Equipada (My Well-Equipped House), which provides 
discounted white goods to poor families (ProEcuador 2013, pp.8–9).  This simultaneous 
legitimisation and promotion of human development through welfare provision is a 
perfect expression of the SUCRE’s (and therefore ALBA’s) role in underpinning the 
political-economic changes associated with ALBA governments at the domestic level. 
 
Extra-ALBA Impact and LAC Autonomy 
The SUCRE also has an extra-regional impact that ties in with Venezuela and Ecuador’s 
shared goal of creating a multi-polar world.  Officials from both countries have 
energetically promoted the SUCRE system within their respective countries in the hope 
of persuading the greatest possible number and variety of actors to participate (SUCRE 
                                                 
86 Every Venezuelan town has a Plaza Bolivar, a central square equivalent to a Mexican zócalo or a 
Spanish Plaza Mayor only with the addition of an obligatory statue of the Great Liberator. 
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2011a, pp.49–52).  But its Ecuadorian designers in particular have taken the SUCRE 
further afield, explaining its logic and functionality in multilateral forums throughout 
LAC and the wider world.  Within LAC specifically, the SUCRE is an integral part of 
the New Regional Financial Architecture proposal (NRFA), which is pushed vigorously 
by both Venezuela and Ecuador.  As noted in chapter three (p.83), the idea is to create 
regional institutions that replicate the functions of the IMF, the World Bank, and the 
dollar in the global economy, only under local control.  In place of the IMF, a network 
of central banks would create a “Southern Fund” to pool reserves; in place of the World 
Bank, new regional banks like the Bank of the South and the ALBA Bank would use 
regional resources to fund development projects according to regionally agreed 
objectives and conditions; and in place of the dollar, a regional currency (the SUCRE) 
would facilitate, intensify, and balance regional trade.  By touting the SUCRE’s 
advantages, backed-up by credible evidence of significant progress, they strengthen the 
case for the wider NRFA, whose Bank of the South element is also establishing itself in 
fits and starts. 
Aside from the NRFA, the SUCRE’s promoters hope to inspire other countries 
and regions to develop similar mechanisms.  Inasmuch as they succeed, the SUCRE is 
playing a role in decreasing the weight of the dollar in the world economy.  This 
reduces the influence of the US as the dominant power in the prevailing unipolar 
arrangement, which equates to progress towards multipolarity.  The SUCRE was 
already part of a wider move towards intraregional currency agreements, including the 
Chiang Mai initiative of ASEAN+3 and the Local-Currency Payments System (SML) 
operating between Brazil and Argentina, but it outstrips both in complexity and utility.  
Such has the SUCRE’s success been that even ALBA’s ideological nemeses Colombia 
and Peru have expressed their desire to adopt the system (Últimas Noticias 2012).  
Elsewhere, the SML is set to be extended to all of Mercosur, and Brazil has also 
proposed a currency-swap deal with the other BRICS countries (Kelly & Prentice 
2013).  While we cannot attribute these trends to the SUCRE alone, its positive example 
can only favour their intensification.  Though less direct than other impacts, this 
effectively increases the autonomy of both ALBA and wider LAC regions whose 
histories have been shaped – if not warped – by various great powers and the 
international institutional framework designed in their image. 
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Imbalances in Trade, Imbalances in Foreign-Exchange Savings  
Yet, even closer scrutiny of particular bilateral SUCRE relationships reveals that the 
SUCRE’s is not exactly an unqualified success.  Essentially, this is because the above 
depiction of Venezuela as a SUCRE importer and Ecuador as a SUCRE exporter is 
demonstrably accurate (as shown in Figure 12, below).  This fundamental imbalance, 
which is far from the ideal of balanced trade envisioned by the SUCRE’s design, means 
that anticipated benefits to states are unevenly distributed.  Bolivia’s minimal 
participation is the only example approaching balance, whereas Cuba’s small 
participation involves only exports.    
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Figure 12: Balances of SUCRE trade by participating state ($), 2011 (source: SUCRE 2011a, p.21). 
The important point is that just as “a healthy balance of trade amongst SUCRE 
members … increases the capacity for each state to save foreign currency at the end of 
each semester” (Rosales et al. 2011, p.18), an unhealthy balance reduces this capacity.  
Ecuador’s massive sucre surplus becomes Venezuela’s massive sucre deficit, which in 
turn has to be paid back in dollars.87  Despite rocketing oil prices throughout the ALBA 
                                                 
87 As noted in chapter one (p.20), issues of data availability prevent precise calculation of bilateral 
balances, but 2011’s figures are so clearly dominated by Venezuela-Ecuador trade that Venezuela’s 
deficit can only be as a result of Ecuador’s surplus.  Cuban and Bolivian imports in 2011 were also so 
small that they could barely trouble this conclusion, which is also supported by the slightness of 
Ecuador's SUCRE trade with Cuba and Bolivia in 2012 (see Trujillo 2012, p.15). 
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era, Venezuela has suffered from major cash-flow problems (chapter three, p.78), and 
this sucre deficit means that around 70 per cent of its SUCRE trade ends up being 
compensated in dollars at the end of each semester.  This means that any benefit from 
foreign-exchange savings is 70 per cent weaker for Venezuela than if we assume 
balanced trade.  Thus, although Venezuela has suffered serious cash-flow problems, the 
SUCRE does far less to relieve them than was envisioned in its design.  Ultimately, the 
threat to Venezuelan reserves from SUCRE deficits became so serious that Venezuelan 
planners and central-bank officials were moved to warn that further growth in the deficit 
“would represent a significant shock to the international reserves of the Republic” (Vera 
Azaf 2013).  Consequently, just as the SUCRE can reinforce the output legitimacy of its 
incumbent governments, where it does not perform the function for which it was 
designed, it can also do just the opposite.  The realisation that Venezuela is gaining less 
than other member-states – whose surplus sucres are ultimately exchanged for 
Venezuela’s dollars – also feeds into domestic political concerns over “giving away the 
oil” to other countries (chapter three, p.78).   
The flipside, of course, is that Ecuador’s SUCRE surplus means that it expends 
less of the foreign exchange upon which its dollarised economy relies, removing some 
of the usual pressure to protect traditional exports that have provided the hard currency 
in circulation.   Any future move to de-dollarise the economy – a strategy favoured by 
Rafael Correa in his previous life as an academic economist (Correa 2004) – would 
massively increase Ecuadorian autonomy by restoring national control over the money 
supply, and the SUCRE helps to create the conditions for this, albeit in small measure.   
Thus, although the overall reduction in foreign-exchange expenditure makes this 
a positive-sum situation, shares in that positive sum are relative: for Ecuador to gain 
more, Venezuela must gain less.  While this asymmetry is compatible with ALBA’s 
wider S&D principle, it does not correspond to the SUCRE’s intended functioning, and 
it can delegitimise one government while legitimising another. 
 
Imbalances in Trade, Imbalances in Value-Added 
The divergence in Venezuelan and Ecuadorian utilisation of the SUCRE is also 
reflected in the types of products traded and their potential developmental impact.  As 
was seen in chapter three (pp.70, 80), both governments aim to diversify their 
economies away from primary commodities and towards products with higher value-
added.  As Figure 13 shows (below), the SUCRE mechanism channels a relatively high 
proportion of high value-added products (35 per cent), including vehicles (16 per cent), 
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regional food sovereignty also a matter of economic self-interest (SENPLADES 2011b, 
pp.42–44).89  Thus, the SUCRE bolsters two pillars of Ecuador’s endogenous-
development strategy: strengthening of EPS actors and promotion of exports with 
higher value-added.  While this does mean cost and local-supply advantages for some 
key items that often suffer shortages in Venezuela – milk and cooking oil being the 
shortage products par excellence (Tejero Puntes 2011) – Venezuela’s looming sucre 
deficit means that the direction of supply tends to favour Ecuadorian producers in terms 
of the endogenous-development strategies shared by both countries (as represented in 
Figure 14, below).  As with the foreign-exchange transfer provoked by such unbalanced 
trade, this departs from the design of the SUCRE in ways that could damage its 
legitimacy in the domestic sphere of ALBA’s predominant force, Venezuela. 
 
 
 
Figure 14: Typical direction of state-led SUCRE trade flows between Venezuela and Ecuador. 
 
The Insignificance of the SUCRE Reserves and Commercial Convergence Fund 
One counterweight to these damaging trade imbalances is the Reserves and Commercial 
Convergence Fund (FRCC), which was designed to fund productive investment for 
export-promoting projects in deficit countries (see p.130).  The funding criteria specify 
that only projects with the potential to increase specifically intra-SUCRE trade are 
eligible, and here again there is explicit consideration of the same “communitarian, 
cooperative, [and] mixed” forms of organisation emphasised at the domestic level 
(SUCRE 2011b, p.5).  But although it was mooted that the fund would accumulate as a 
percentage of the surplus sucres of exporting countries (Rosales et al. 2011, p.19), the 
                                                 
89 This is not to say that it is self-interest, but rather that it also works as self-interest, which has the 
potential to neutralise opposition from groups less convinced about the need for LAC solidarity. 
Ecuadorian EPS/SME 
Ecuadorian State Institution 
SUCRE 
Venezuelan State Institution 
Venezuelan Consumer 
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ratified SUCRE treaty specifies only “proportions, financial instruments, and terms 
agreed between [member-states]” (SUCRE 2009, Article X).  In practice, this has meant 
agreement merely to contribute 5 per cent of initial SUCRE allocations, meaning just 
$9.5 million (Presidencia del SUCRE CMR 2013, p.17).  Only $3.2 million of this had 
been forthcoming by the end of 2012, and even this had not been invested in productive 
projects (SUCRE 2013, pp.27–28).  This means that trade imbalances have simply been 
allowed to stand, thereby circumscribing the intended benefits of the SUCRE that were 
described in stage two.   
  
Overall, unlike the TCP, the SUCRE has been implemented across most of ALBA (as 
measured by population or economic size).  Its rapid uptake by a wider variety of actors 
has seen it channel 74 per cent of Venezuela-Ecuador trade, reinforcing the endogenous 
development and autonomy sought by both countries.  This regionalised provision of 
benefits to the constituencies of incumbent governments, but also underscored a wider 
output legitimacy stemming from the SUCRE’s secular benefit to economic actors of all 
shapes and sizes.  But this is not the full story, for upon closer inspection SUCRE trade 
has been distinctly skewed, leaving impacts on given signatories uneven and sometimes 
severely reduced. 
 
Factors Impeding Progress and Reducing Impact 
Despite the relative success of the SUCRE over its short lifetime, progress has been 
anything but smooth, and many of its goals remain unmet.  That is, the SUCRE as it 
stands is far from its worst possible outcome, but also some distance from its best.   
 
ALBA’s Economic Initiatives: Integrated in Success, Integrated in Failure 
As already noted, the SUCRE’s benefits can only ever be proportional to levels of 
SUCRE trade, which is a subset of total trade.  A variety of ALBA initiatives exist 
precisely to boost trade, and the impact of the SUCRE is therefore intimately tied to 
their efficacy.  Targeted development finance from the ALBA Bank should create 
entrants into SUCRE-zone production chains; Grandnational state joint ventures should 
increase trade in their prioritised sectors; and the overarching TCP agreement should 
lead to a generalised rise in trade between signatories.  Yet, as chapter four showed 
(p.114), intra-ALBA trade has remained minimal throughout its lifetime, and the most 
important of the three ALBA initiatives listed, the TCP, has not been implemented.  The 
ALBA Bank’s own persistent incoherence (chapter one, p.15) has left it unable to fulfil 
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its role in other ALBA initiatives (including the FRCC, above), and there is little 
evidence that grandnational companies have taken off between Venezuela and Ecuador, 
or indeed elsewhere (chapter one, p.15).  Thus, the case of the SUCRE shows how 
complementary links between ALBA initiatives can be both integrative and 
disintegrative: an individual initiative’s failures and successes can impact both 
positively and negatively upon the progress of other initiatives, thereby affecting the 
progress of the overarching ALBA project. 
 
SUCRE Participation: Conflicting Commitments and Caribbean Caution 
Returning to the basic question of participation, though for Anglophone members the 
meagreness of their ALBA trade relationships is central, other significant factors also 
come into play.  First, there is the question of competing commitments, be they 
political, legal, or economic.  For the Anglophone Caribbean members ALBA is a 
distant third in their prioritisation of regional arrangements, behind both their currency 
union with OECS neighbours and also the wider Caribbean Community (CARICOM).  
When an ALBA initiative calling itself a regional currency appears, they cannot 
participate without first considering its impact on the Eastern Caribbean dollar because 
the Treaty of Basseterre (OECS 2010, Article 4.2) obliges them to pursue joint policies 
on currency issues with fellow OECS members.  Beyond immediate neighbours in the 
Lesser Antilles, the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME) initiative, which 
also filters through to domestic law, is prioritised.  Politically speaking, meanwhile, any 
sharp “Latin turn” would have to be debated with CARICOM’s Council for Foreign and 
Community Relations, potentially causing discord in Anglophone ALBA members’ 
Caribbean relations. 
ALBA often counterbalances such concerns by according formally equal “one 
member one vote” status in ALBA’s governance even to its microstates, as befits its 
credo of cooperative yet sovereign regional development (e.g. Banco del ALBA 2008, 
Article 12.1).  Yet, in practice ALBA’s governance is far from this ideal, as in the case 
of the SUCRE.  Regardless of whether or not they would have considered joining the 
SUCRE initiative in the long run, according to participants in SUCRE negotiations 
“none of the options that were discussed were even known about by the Caribbean 
delegations” (I.49) despite this discourse of equal power and cooperation.  When the 
SUCRE treaty was signed at the seventh ALBA summit in October 2009, the 
Anglophone members were footnoted out, but they still appear not to have been fully 
prepared for the announcement.  At home opposition leaders and the media cried foul, 
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claiming incumbents were selling Eastern Caribbean sovereignty down the river, again 
showing how an ALBA initiative can at once provide legitimacy gains in one member-
state while jeopardising legitimacy in another. 
 
SUCRE Participation: Cuban National Interest over Cooperative Development 
Turning to trade between states that are SUCRE signatories, while its meteoric rise has 
been impressive, it could have been both quantitatively and qualitatively better (in terms 
of its own goals).  As seen above, SUCRE trade relationships are lopsided, distributing 
the SUCRE’s stated benefits unequally across member-states.  This is partly a problem 
of economic complementarity, but it is also a question of policy.  As with the TCP, 
states’ policies vis-à-vis the SUCRE often show little evidence of cooperation and 
solidarity, whereas competition and national interest remain to the fore.  Thus, we find 
that the Ecuador-Cuba relationship is minimal, and more significantly involves no 
Cuban exports to Ecuador.  This is not because Ecuador has not looked to utilise the 
SUCRE to foster the kind of developmentally advantageous production chains or trade-
to-welfare links discussed above, but rather because Cuba has refused to export to 
Ecuador via the SUCRE.  When the Ecuadorian state attempted to use the SUCRE to 
buy generic medicines, thus implicating Cuba’s hi-tech industries in Ecuadorian welfare 
provision, Cuba rejected the transaction because it did not want to be paid in sucres 
instead of dollars (I.45).  Both Ecuadorian and Venezuelan officials stressed this 
“whatever means necessary” pragmatism (I.38) as the defining feature of the Cuban 
approach: “they trade when and only when it suits them; if it’s cheaper from China, they 
go for whoever’s offering a good price, regardless” (I.11).  In the case of the SUCRE, 
this reticence prevents Ecuador-Cuba trade from contributing to delivery of the 
SUCRE’s intended benefits across ALBA.  Although Cuba’s uniquely difficult 
conditions make this strategy somewhat understandable, it highlights again how the 
peculiar developmental needs and constraints of national political economies can 
militate against the progress of core ALBA initiatives. 
 
The SUCRE as a New Non-Tariff Barrier 
At first glance the rapid rise in SUCRE trade between Ecuador and Venezuela would 
seem to suggest a healthy bilateral relationship, but in fact the Venezuela-Ecuador core 
of SUCRE has suffered from a great many problems, some of which ultimately mitigate 
the SUCRE’s impact. 
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First, since SUCRE benefits are proportional to SUCRE trade, failure to 
implement the TCP means no new impetus to intra-ALBA trade from a more 
comprehensive and complementary agreement.  However, besides this failure to add 
new measures to promote trade, Venezuela originally demanded that the SUCRE 
involve new restrictions, in the form of a list of specified range of goods that could be 
traded in sucres (Gaceta Oficial de la RBV 2010).  Rather than include products of 
interest, Venezuela populated the list with goods of little bilateral commercial value, 
dooming the Venezuela-Ecuador SUCRE relationship to insignificance (I.45): what 
value a trade-compensation mechanism for products that are not traded?  For the 
system’s designers in Ecuador, on the other hand, this amounted to abusing a payment 
system to implement industrial policy through effective introduction of new non-tariff 
barriers.  They therefore preferred to eliminate lists entirely so as to maximise the 
benefits which the SUCRE was designed to provide (I.45). 
 It is not enough to say simply that “Ecuador” and “Venezuela” wanted different 
things, however, as they are not unitary actors, and internal divisions were important, as 
in the case of the TCP.   With the SUCRE as elsewhere in ALBA, slow and grinding 
progress tends to become slow and grinding at lower levels of the state bureaucracy in 
meetings between technocrats and civil servants.  The interests and power of different 
groups hamper progress in different ways on both sides of the relationship.  Since the 
SUCRE offers secular advantages to private and public entities alike – and since their 
focus is extra-regional anyway – the commercial elite in Ecuador has been ambivalent 
rather than hostile to the SUCRE.  The largest exporters would have preferred that the 
government focus its attentions on resurrecting FTAs with the US and the EU, but the 
SUCRE is largely irrelevant to their business; to quote one opposition-aligned former 
Finance Minister, “we do business with those that buy: flowers to the US, broccoli to 
the US, not to Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba” (I.54).  Since SUCRE payments to 
Ecuadorian exporters come from the country’s central bank, the system also 
circumvents problems in Venezuelan foreign-exchange allocation for imports, offering a 
further across-the-board advantage.  As such, the government comes under little 
pressure, internal or external, to adopt a particular strategy.  Accordingly, Correa’s 
developmentalist, Citizens’ Revolution wing (chapter three, p.84) prevails and is able to 
pursue an approach that coheres with the government’s wider development planning. 
In Venezuela, however, various factors combined to support restriction of the 
SUCRE to particular products.  The most obvious exclusion by far was of oil and its 
derivatives, which make up a large part of bilateral trade due to Ecuador’s lack of 
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refinery capacity.  The inclusion of this product group alone would have redressed the 
imbalance in Venezuela and Ecuador’s SUCRE trade, as well as massively increasing 
overall levels of SUCRE trade.  However, given its import dependence and the cash-
flow problems (chapter three, p.78), Venezuela is loath to give up the foreign exchange 
gained from oil exports even to its SUCRE partners.  Complementarity and cooperation 
have their limits.   There is also competition between the two countries in numerous 
sectors, as with vehicles, for example.  If it becomes easier and cheaper to import 
Ecuadorian vehicles to Venezuela due to the SUCRE’s inherent benefits, they could 
undercut domestic producers (I.45).  Indeed, Ecuadorian automotive exports to 
Venezuela have boomed just as Venezuela’s own production has declined, with the 
SUCRE playing a significant part in this (EcuadorInmediato 2012; Araujo 2013).  This 
is a concern not only for those within the bureaucracy that entertain links with the 
Venezuelan car industry, but also for a government aiming to consolidate and grow its 
non-oil economy.  Furthermore, Venezuela’s press reports this as “contributing to a 
flourishing of the automotive industries of other countries, especially Argentina and 
Ecuador”  at grave cost to local producers (Hurtado 2013), showing again how a boon 
to endogenous development for one ALBA government can damage and delegitimise 
another. 
The issue of permissible-product lists for SUCRE trade first emerged and 
hardened at trade subsecretary level and so had to be elevated to ministerial level, where 
it again proved intractable (I.45).  With no other recourse remaining, Ecuadorian 
officials finally took their complaints directly to president Correa, who in turn raised 
them with his Venezuelan counterpart.  Quickly realising that a payment system with 
nothing to pay for would represent the ultimate white elephant, Chávez instructed his 
ministers to modify their stance, and the lists were ultimately eliminated (I.45).  But this 
conflict reveals how gains for one member-state can harm another, making ALBA’s 
ideal of cooperative and complementary regionalised endogenous development very 
difficult to achieve.   
 
The SUCRE and Capital Controls for Endogenous Development 
Yet, the conflict over product lists is minor compared to the one truly vexed issue at the 
heart of the SUCRE: capital controls.  Being a dollarised economy, Ecuador naturally 
has no limits on access to foreign exchange, but the Correa government has introduced a 
Capital Outflow Tax (ISD, 2007; originally 2 per cent, later 5 per cent) in order to 
promote import substitution.  Venezuela’s Chávez, on the other hand, introduced strict 
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controls in 2003 in order to put a brake on capital flight, with foreign exchange 
available thereafter only by application to the Foreign Exchange Administration 
Commission (CADIVI; chapter three, p.67).90  Since the SUCRE compensates in local 
currency, one might expect trade via this mechanism to be exempt from both Ecuador’s 
tax and Venezuela’s assignation system.  Further, with the SUCRE’s benefits accruing 
proportionally to its utilisation, any barrier to trade bears on the SUCRE’s success; if 
governments support the SUCRE, a coherent trade policy would have them dismantle 
such barriers.  Yet only Ecuador has kept its side of the bargain, leading to conflict 
between Ecuadorian and Venezuelan officials.  These conflicts again reveal how 
national political economies clash when forced into regional interaction by ALBA 
initiatives, with Venezuela’s involvement proving particularly problematic. 
 Ecuador’s elimination of its own capital-outflow tax was consistent with its 
wider approach to development.  Seeing the SUCRE as a means of strengthening 
ALBA’s interdependence and stability, Ecuador looked to incentivise its use beyond its 
inherent benefits.  Eliminating the ISD means reduced fiscal receipts for a portion of 
international trade, and as the case of Venezuela’s sucre deficit shows, imbalances can 
even result in an eventual capital outflow.  On these grounds, Ecuador could opt to 
retain the ISD.  Yet, exemption for SUCRE transactions also means a competitive 
advantage of five per cent vis-à-vis extra-regional firms for exporters in other SUCRE 
countries.  This is a huge difference in terms of cost competitiveness and constitutes a 
significant incentive for firms to seek new markets or suppliers via the SUCRE, 
favouring SUCRE-zone trade.  If Ecuador can achieve balanced SUCRE trade, as it 
aims to (I.45), or if continues to enjoy a SUCRE surplus, no extra dollars will be spent 
on buying back sucres.  As such, Ecuador chose to exempt SUCRE trade from the ISD 
(El Universo 2009). 
 On the Venezuelan side, the process of obtaining foreign-exchange for imports 
is heavily regulated by CADIVI.   As noted in chapter three (p.67), this institution was 
created not only to prevent runs on the currency which had provoked damaging 
instability in the past, but also to allow the government to direct allocation of foreign 
exchange away from imports that would smother local production and towards priority 
sectors and law-abiding businesses.  The first step is for relevant ministries to provide 
either a Certificate of Non-Production or a Certificate of Insufficient Production, 
thereby proving the need for the particular good to be imported.  Importers then apply to 
CADIVI for foreign currency to import that good, at which point the applicant’s record 
                                                 
90 Some other state institutions retained the right to assign dollars, including PDVSA and Bancoex. 
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is checked in terms of adherence to current statute (labour standards, payment of taxes, 
and so on).  If successful, they are then issued with two further permits, the Currency-
Acquisition Authorisation and the Currency-Liquidation Authorisation.  Even though 
the SUCRE employs local currency, Venezuela has required that SUCRE transactions 
also obtain approval via this process. 
Being generous, CADIVI is notoriously slow, unpredictable, and bureaucratic.  
It has been implicated in the accumulation of large debts to Ecuadorian exporters due to 
its bureaucratic delays and erratic disbursement, and the associated risks to Ecuadorian 
exporters’ cash flow have therefore led them to view Venezuelan markets as 
problematic (Hoy 2009).  Once SUCRE transactions began, Ecuadorian officials were 
surprised to find that even Venezuela’s own state enterprises could have their CADIVI 
foreign-exchange applications refused (I.45, I.55).91  At best, this reveals the alarming 
inefficiency of one domestic institution halting another’s progress despite both 
supposedly working to the same development plan.  The SUCRE is attractive for its 
speed as well as its lower cost as payments are in real time, but at the Venezuelan end 
the CADIVI requirement invokes a process so laborious as to make the subsequent 
SUCRE stage an afterthought.  As one pro-government Venezuelan businessman noted 
after a workshop on the SUCRE, the system’s advantages may not outweigh this major 
failing, particularly given the costs associated with adopting a new system: 
 
They talk about “the fast way” but what are the requirements?  The same as 
going via CADIVI, so there are no fewer requirements.  What the system might 
be is more agile, quicker, but if the difference is a week, what’s the point in 
creating two systems?  
(I.14) 
 
Mindful of the need to increase trade in order to achieve the SUCRE’s desired effects, 
Ecuador originally wished to eliminate CADIVI’s role altogether, reasoning that since 
the SUCRE is rooted in local currencies, there is no need to invoke CADIVI (I.45).92  
Yet, from the Venezuelan perspective CADIVI allows for administration of trade policy 
to support endogenous development by prioritising assignation to sectors meeting basic 
needs, enforcing socially minded legislation, and bolstering socioeconomic stability.  
Thus, the existence and performance of CADIVI, designed to protect and reinforce 
                                                 
91 Two specific examples were reported to me, relating to Pequiven (Venezuelan Petrochemicals) and 
CASA (Agricultural Services and Supply Corporation). 
92 Though their role is not covered here, it is worth noting that Bolivian officials also wanted CADIVI 
eliminated entirely from the SUCRE. 
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Venezuela’s endogenous-development strategy, militates against SUCRE-zone trade, 
making it a major obstacle to this ALBA initiative’s progress. 
 
The SUCRE and Capital Controls for Currency Arbitrage 
However, as was discussed in chapter three (p.77-78), CADIVI also plays a darker role 
in Venezuelan political economy, where it has become a conduit for rampant currency 
arbitrage.  This problem of Venezuelan political economy is regionalised through 
CADIVI’s continued use in SUCRE transactions, undermining achievement of the 
initiative’s intended effects. 
 Essentially, CADIVI’s multi-stage, discretionary process for obtaining 
government-rate dollars provides fertile ground for corruption.  Demand for dollars far 
outstrips supply, thereby favouring emergence of a currency black market.  With black-
market dollars selling for at least twice the government rate, this has created both the 
means and the incentive for engaging in currency arbitrage.93  Since sucre deficits have 
to be liquidated in dollars biannually, if Venezuela were to forgo CADIVI approval, it 
would have no control over the extent of this already substantial deficit (70 per cent, see 
p.144).  Yet, this is something of a Catch-22 situation, since maintaining CADIVI gives 
those with the capital to participate a new, faster channel through which to engage in 
corporate currency arbitrage, which also drains state resources.94  When Ecuadorian 
officials compared sucre-denominated transactions to records (taxation, physical 
quantity) of Venezuela-Ecuador sucre-denominated trade crossing its borders, they 
concluded that “at least a third” of official SUCRE trade was fictitious (I.45).95  Rather 
than actually importing goods, Venezuelan importers were setting up false transactions 
in order to gain access to foreign-exchange which they could then sell on the black 
market at twice the price (I.45).  This was later confirmed by the discovery of fictitious 
companies in Ecuador established purely to export non-existent products to Venezuelan 
importers via the SUCRE.96  At the Venezuelan end sucres are bought in Bolivars at the 
cheap government rate, and these sucres are then received by the fictitious Ecuadorian 
company in dollars.  These dollars can then be recycled into new fake transactions via 
the parallel currency market in Venezuela. 
                                                 
93 The black market rate was roughly twice the official rate during fieldwork.  It is now far higher. 
94 As opposed to individual “card scraping” (as detailed in chapter three, p.57). 
95 This appears to be confirmed by later public declarations on the issue from the Ecuadorian central bank 
(Quiroz & Torres 2013).  Although their figure of 19 per cent is somewhat more cautious, it comes from a 
public declaration and relates only to specific proven instances. 
96 Ecuadorian involvement does not require that fake companies be used, and real companies may be 
more convincing, though the risk is higher.  Real transactions may also simply be overstated so that a 
portion of the exporter’s payment can be used for arbitrage with less outright malfeasance. 
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 In Venezuela currency arbitrage is near-ubiquitous amongst those with enough 
money to participate, so this in itself is not especially surprising.  More surprising is the 
extent to which it infects even the upper echelons of Venezuelan politics, as Ecuadorian 
officials discovered when they took up the issue of CADIVI with their Venezuelan 
counterparts, expecting that at least some steps in the process could be eliminated.  
Veteran Venezuelan diplomat Kaldone G. Nweihed divides Chavismo into the Taliban, 
the patriots, and the Bolibourgeoisie, which is to say fanatical leftists, moderates 
working in the national interest, and self-serving thieves in Bolivarian clothing 
(interviewed in Mata Carnevali 2008, p.4).97  Though such links are inherently difficult 
to identify, for Bolibourgeois officials with links to private interests engaged in 
SUCRE-based currency arbitrage there is a clear incentive to maintain CADIVI’s role.  
And this incentive is huge: if a third of Venezuela-Ecuador SUCRE trade is false as 
Ecuadorian officials calculated, that would mean roughly $70 million was transferred in 
this way in 2011 (based on SUCRE 2011a), which would be doubled (at least) upon 
resale via the parallel currency market.98  Yet, Ecuadorian officials found that there was 
even direct state involvement.  Despite a commitment to use the SUCRE for all bilateral 
trade between public entities, some Venezuelan state enterprises rejected payment in 
sucres and instead sought payment in dollars to foreign accounts so that they, too, could 
enter into the wildly profitable currency arbitrage system (I.45).  By both means the 
SUCRE was severely undermined, for if a third of Ecuador-Venezuela exports are fake, 
and the Ecuador-Venezuela relationship represents 89 per cent of total SUCRE trade 
(see p.137), then 27 per cent of all SUCRE trade is fake.  If we apply that to 2012’s total 
SUCRE trade, it would amount to $288 million (SUCRE 2013, p.22), and this is based 
on the low boundary of Ecuadorian estimates.  Irrespective of the precise extent, it is 
certain that the SUCRE’s intended effects on endogenous development were severely 
weakened, whereas the initiative also unintentionally strengthened noxious elements of 
national political economy by regionalising them. 
Even when Ecuadorian officials elevated this issue to ministerial level, they met 
with intransigence, and it was only at the presidential level that agreement could be 
reached and a top-down directive issued (I.45).  Yet, even this was only a small 
compromise, eliminating in March 2011 the production-certificate requirement for 
SUCRE transactions between public entities.  The only other relevant change came in 
                                                 
97 To be clear, he also detects analogous currents in the opposition, but this is not relevant here. 
98 Precise data on bilateral relationships became unavailable in 2012 (chapter one, p.20), but a doubling of 
total SUCRE trade in 2012 means that the sums involved have only grown. 
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the face of food shortages, with a whole raft of imports being exempted from CADIVI 
approval, which freed up some SUCRE trade as a side-effect.  Another suggestion from 
Ecuadorian officials was to eliminate only the two authorisations relating to receipt and 
liquidation of foreign currencies, thus retaining the planning tool of production 
certification while removing the documents needed to obtain hard currency (I.45).  This 
was rejected by their Venezuelan counterparts.  In line with the SME-promotion 
element of both countries’ development models, Ecuador also suggested eliminating the 
CADIVI process at least for small businesses so as to encourage their involvement 
(I.53).  This, too, was rejected by Venezuelan officials.  Thus, use of the SUCRE to 
encourage productive integration and mutually reinforce endogenous development was 
inhibited by improprieties on the Venezuelan side, ultimately implicating the SUCRE in 
regionalisation of the worst kind of unproductive rent-seeking. 
 
Conclusion: ALBA and the SUCRE 
Having considered the implementation and impact of the SUCRE, we can now see that 
the US Embassy’s initial scepticism about this “economically meaningless” virtual-
currency initiative was misplaced (US Embassy to Venezuela 2009).  Despite rightly 
noting its intention to promote regional economic development independent of the US 
dollar, this misjudgement owed to a fundamental misunderstanding of its functioning.  
Conversely, the ALBA literature has tended to err on the side of impact, seeing the 
SUCRE as a key part of ALBA’s significant progress towards developing a cooperative 
and complementary inward-looking model of regionalism shielded from extra-regional 
forces by increased intraregional interdependence and anchored politically in the 
provision of benefits to newly mobilised constituencies at the domestic level.  Though 
this understanding may reflect the potential effects of a fully functional SUCRE, it does 
not reflect the reality of the SUCRE as implemented. 
 Crucially, the SUCRE has been implemented in the four economies that make 
up 98 per cent of ALBA’s total GDP, and trade via the mechanism has grown rapidly 
throughout its short life.  State-led trade in particular has helped to create the kinds of 
developmental interdependence envisioned by the SUCRE’s designers, while also 
boosting the SUCRE zone’s autonomy vis-à-vis the rest of the world.  This reflects and 
reinforces aspects of the development strategies of Venezuela and Ecuador, with 
nationalised industries in Venezuela and EPS institutions in Ecuador creating mutually 
beneficial trade relationships that feed into each other’s development strategies.  Yet, 
the system’s skilful design by Ecuadorian technocrats means that its benefits are not 
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restricted to any particular constituency, with a secular increase in competitiveness for 
producers of all shapes and sizes, from small Ecuadorian dairy farmers to Continental 
Tyres and Venezuelan giant Polar. 
 Yet, closer examination reveals that despite broadly successful implementation, 
the SUCRE has not functioned according to its own design, with partial participation 
and huge trade imbalances significantly skewing its impacts.  First, since the SUCRE’s 
significance is proportional to the trade that it channels, failure of the TCP to achieve an 
agreement that would boost intra-ALBA trade has had the indirect disintegrative effect 
of weakening the impact of the SUCRE.  Anglophone Caribbean members-states, 
meanwhile, were ruled out by prior regional commitments, revealing again how pre-
existing institutional commitments can restrict engagement with ALBA.  Ecuador-
Venezuela SUCRE trade, which represents nearly 90 per cent of the mechanism’s total 
trade, is dominated by Ecuadorian exports, implying very different effects for each 
partner.  In line with its endogenous-development model, net exporter Ecuador saves 
foreign exchange, diversifies into higher-value added exports, and reduces dollar 
dependence, but only by inflicting relative losses on net importer Venezuela.  Even if 
the latter’s social provision and food-scarcity issues are somewhat ameliorated, this can 
also have a delegitimising effect given the political saleability of the “giving away the 
oil” discourse at home.  Thus, while this ALBA initiative reflects endogenous-
development ideas common to both parties, it reinforces them mainly for just one, with 
any political effect also distributed unevenly.  The one part of the SUCRE specifically 
designed to tackle these damaging imbalances, its Reserves and Commercial 
Convergence Fund, is also the one part not implemented.  Meanwhile, Venezuelan 
currency controls that were established to protect its own endogenous-development 
drive are maintained for SUCRE trade, a move seen in Ecuador as an unfair non-tariff 
barrier to its exporters; though certain development ideas are common to both, when 
regionalised they result in conflict, ultimately reducing the SUCRE’s overall impact.   
In the Venezuelan case, abuse of the SUCRE for currency arbitrage also means that a 
large portion of its SUCRE imports are false, effectively draining the resources of a 
Venezuelan state already hit by cash-flow problems.  Though this longstanding problem 
of Venezuelan political economy may have little to do with its government’s New Left 
development strategies, it is nonetheless regionalised via an initiative inspired by them.   
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Chapter Six: Petrocaribe 
 
Is this the same article where they mention the quantity sold since 2005-2008? 
At a rate of 100usd - total sales would have been at 59bn usd and considering 
50pc payment facilitation (or 'saving') that is 59/2 meaning 29.5bn total.  
Eww... My head spins round. 
(Colibasanu 2008, private email, via Wikileaks) 
 
This bewildered analyst of private-intelligence giant StratFor, whose email cache was 
released via Wikileaks, is not alone in her struggle to get to grips with the extent and 
significance of Petrocaribe.  As her exasperation suggests, the combination of opaque 
official data and vague academic accounts often confuses as much as it clarifies.  By 
focusing on Petrocaribe’s real functioning, implementation, and impact, this chapter 
aims in part to reverse this trend, providing the kind of comprehensive portrayal that 
must underpin any in-depth analysis.  As in earlier TCP and SUCRE chapters, this 
begins with a thorough examination of the origins and functioning of Petrocaribe 
according to its design, emphasising the long history of Venezuelan involvement in the 
Caribbean and detailing Petrocaribe’s three core functions as a financial buffer against 
oil-price rises, a barter-trade mechanism, and a (social) development fund.  This then 
feeds into consideration of Petrocaribe’s intended effects in terms of the key concepts of 
autonomy, endogenous development, and legitimacy around which the ALBA literature 
revolves.  In line with dominant arguments in this literature, Petrocaribe aims to favour 
autonomy by counteracting the effects of global economic vicissitudes and by reducing 
signatories’ temptation to fall back on IFIs or extra-regional donors for support.  It aims 
to promote endogenous development by stabilising economies, protecting public 
spending, funding social projects, and maintaining employment by providing new 
export channels.  An inherent preference for social spending is designed to reinforce this 
aspect of local development strategies, thereby legitimising left-of-centre platforms in 
particular. 
However, stage three’s mapping of implementation and impact – where special 
attention is paid to focus countries Dominica, St Vincent and the Grenadines, and 
Antigua and Barbuda – and stage four’s analysis of impediments to implementation 
combine to produce a more mixed picture.  The fundamental oil-price buffering effect 
has become crucial to Caribbean political economy, while Petrocaribe’s development 
funding has also made a massive impact.  This represents real and significant evidence 
of ALBA’s solidarity logic in action.  But barter trade has not materialised in any of the 
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focus countries, and is elsewhere only indisputably important to Nicaragua.  And 
despite Petrocaribe’s overall impact, the most successful elements of Petrocaribe are 
also the least integrative in terms of interdependence; they are essentially transfers.  Far 
from promoting an “economic zone of shared development”, Petrocaribe’s governance 
is concentrated in the parallel state built around PDVSA in response to insurmountable 
tensions in Venezuelan political economy.  Whilst just as in Venezuela this permits a 
flexibility that can produce impressive results, it also raises the same serious questions 
about sustainability given the political and economic vulnerability of these parallel 
governance structures.  This is not least because real gains in output legitimacy for 
Petrocaribe’s importing governments come with delegitimising effects in Venezuela, 
where “giving away the oil!” serves as a rallying cry to an increasingly successful 
opposition.  
 
Avoiding Crossed Wires: Membership of Petrocaribe 
Unlike the TCP and SUCRE, which are restricted to de jure ALBA members, the 
Petrocaribe initiative represents a permanently open “offer” to the wider Caribbean 
region (see chapter one, p.12).  Where the TCP and SUCRE are characterised 
particularly by non-participation of the Anglophone ALBA members, in Petrocaribe it 
is Ecuador and Bolivia, two of ALBA’s largest and most active Latin American 
members, that have no involvement.  While Cuba is nominally involved, its oil imports 
from Venezuela are in reality governed by the bilateral Integral Cooperation Convention 
(República de Cuba y República Bolivariana de Venezuela 2000), which predates 
Petrocaribe by several years.  Venezuela’s role, meanwhile, is qualitatively and 
quantitatively incomparable to that of any other member since the entire initiative 
revolves around its provision of oil on favourable terms to the other seventeen 
members.99  Of these, Nicaragua, Dominica, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Antigua 
and Barbuda, and Cuba are full ALBA members, leaving twelve that are not.100  The 
geographical criterion of “Caribbeanness” means signatories must have a coastline on 
the Caribbean, with Pacific-bound El Salvador excluded, for example, whilst Guatemala 
qualifies thanks to a sliver of Caribbean coast wedged between Belize and Honduras. 
 
                                                 
99 These members, which import oil via Petrocaribe and convert part of the bill into soft-loans, will be 
variously referred to as “recipient”, “importing”, or “debtor” countries in this chapter. 
100 Bahamas, Belize, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Saint 
Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Suriname. 
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Origin and Proposed Functioning of Petrocaribe 
Venezuela’s Return to the Caribbean 
As with other ALBA initiatives, Petrocaribe’s novelty is overplayed in the literature 
partly because of a misunderstanding of its origins, with Venezuela’s deep and 
longstanding involvement in the Caribbean frequently ignored (Morales Manzur et al. 
2010, p.144).  Yet, as far back as the 1970s Trinidadian PM Eric Williams was 
denouncing Venezuelan attempts to “re-colonise the region” through “petrodollar 
politics” (quoted in Bryan 2011, p.25).  Shortly after, eleven Caribbean and Central 
American countries signed up to the San Jose Agreement (1980), which saw Venezuela 
and Mexico supplying poorer countries not only with partially financed oil bills at low 
interest, but also with funds for development projects.  The San Jose Agreement was 
part of what the Venezuelan government of the time described as: 
 
…a policy of international financial cooperation with the developing countries, 
particularly with those of Latin America, in order to accelerate their economic 
development, to rescue their natural resources, to stimulate their economic 
integration and to promote a more equitable new international economic order. 
(quoted in Guy 1979, p.508) 
 
If this sounds remarkably familiar it is because this approximates to the central goals of 
Venezuelan foreign policy and of ALBA today.  Any turn towards the Caribbean under 
Chávez was really a return, therefore, after a lull in relations during the 1980s and 
1990s. 
This use of Venezuelan oil to enable wider LAC development was always part 
of Chávez’s platform (Chávez Frías 1994), and soon after coming to power, the San 
Jose Agreement was expanded to various other countries by the Caracas Energy 
Cooperation Agreement (2000) and to Cuba via the wide-ranging bilateral Integral 
Cooperation Convention that prefigured ALBA (2000, Annex II).  As with the San Jose 
Agreement, a portion of the bill was financed according to the oil price, but already 
generous conditions were relaxed even further, with payment spread over fifteen years 
at a rate of two per cent (República de Cuba y República Bolivariana de Venezuela 
2000, Annex II).  Both agreements, though particularly the more comprehensive one 
with Cuba, admitted the novel possibility of payment by barter.  These three central 
elements of soft credit, development aid, and barter trade were finally offered – and 
largely accepted – throughout the Caribbean via Petrocaribe’s founding agreement.101 
                                                 
101 Only energy exporter Trinidad and Tobago and self-sufficient Barbados turned down the offer, 
whereas thirteen other states did sign up (with another four following suit by 2012). 
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Petrocaribe as Oil-Price Buffer and Soft Loan 
Contrary to common depictions of Petrocaribe as a means “selling oil below market 
price” (Ferrari & Toussaint 2010) or providing access to “reduced-price Venezuelan 
oil” (DeFeo 2010), the cornerstone of Petrocaribe is its soft-loan function, which serves 
instead to stabilise and curb effective oil prices for its signatories.102  The price billed 
inevitably approximates that of the OPEC basket, which members like Venezuela are 
obliged to target; not only does Venezuela not provide cut-price oil through Petrocaribe, 
it cannot.103  Rather, Petrocaribe’s main function is to act as a buffer against oil-price 
shocks by converting part of the upfront cost of oil imports into a loan relative to price 
increases.  The closer oil prices come to levels that could provoke balance-of-payments 
crises in Petrocaribe states, the more generous the initiative becomes in absolute terms 
(see Figure 15, below).  This keeps the cost of this crucial but volatile commodity 
within a more affordable range.  Even the “upfront” payment is in fact payable three 
months after delivery, allowing recipient governments time to arrange their finances 
when even this lower cost proves problematically high. 
 
 
Figure 15: Relationship between oil price and effective upfront cost of Petrocaribe oil imports (source: 
data from Petrocaribe 2008). 
                                                 
102 Consumers in Caribbean countries frequently express discontent that cheaper fuel prices have not 
materialised, maybe due to misreporting or political opportunism from local oppositions that can claim 
“Petrocaribe has done nothing for us” even though it is by design that direct benefits go to states. 
103 The “OPEC basket” is the weighted average price of the different grades and blends of oil produced by 
members of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries.  Members commit to targeting specific 
prices by moderating extraction, with each member having specific production targets.  Thus, OPEC 
production quotas define the price of Venezuelan oil, even in Petrocaribe. 
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 While the actual price cannot be reduced, associated expenses can be minimised 
and exceptionably favourable loan conditions can erode the real-terms value of the debt.  
In terms of reduced expenses, shipping is carried out by PSVSA and charged at cost, 
whilst mandatory exclusion of private actors eliminates margins normally accruing to 
intermediaries.  Dominica’s Minister of Housing, Lands, and Telecommunications 
estimates the value of this difference at $0.89 per gallon (Government of Dominica 
2008), and since the retail price remains the same for end users, this saving accrues to 
the recipient state.  In Dominica’s case, this would mean a yearly saving of $5.5 million, 
which represents a huge sum in a country of 73,000 people with a GDP of $484 
million.104 
This saving is complemented by financing conditions so favourable that they 
effectively shrink the debt.105  A hypothetical $10 million Petrocaribe bill with the 
barrel priced above $100, as it has been in recent years, would come with 60 per cent 
financing at 1 per cent annually for 25 years and two years grace, meaning that: 
 
 The upfront portion of $4 million (40 per cent) would be worth 0.75 per cent 
less upon payment some three months later thanks to inflation (saving $30,000). 
 The financed portion of the remaining $6 million (60 per cent) would lose 
roughly $355,000 of its value during the two-year grace period, then a further 
$2.1 million over the remaining 23 years at 1 per cent interest. 
 The final inflation-adjusted value of the original $10 million bill would be 
approximately $7,520,000, with nearly 25 per cent of the principal having 
disappeared as a surreptitious grant. 
 The same $10 million on private terms would grow to nearly $22 million.106 
 
These conditions make Petrocaribe an unparalleled source of international finance.  Not 
only are inherent savings transferred to recipient states, conditions are also so soft as to 
allow even for reinvestment at a higher interest rate, thereby redoubling any gains.  
 
                                                 
104 A similar value relative to GDP in the UK would be $27 billion.  The $5.5 million figure is based on 
supply of 400 barrels per day in 2012 (PDVSA 2013, p.128), there being 42 gallons to a barrel.  
105 Presuming dollar inflation of 3 per cent.  It has hovered around this level since the 1990s. 
106 Local budgets reveal that private banks like Nova Scotia or the Royal Bank of Canada offer terms of 
around 12 per cent interest over 15 years. 
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Petrocaribe as a Fair-Trade Barter System 
Further financial benefit is offered by Petrocaribe’s second key facility: counter- or 
barter trade.  The workings of this facility receive little attention in the original 
agreement, other than to note that “preferential prices” will be paid and that “sugar, 
bananas, or other products and services … affected by the trade policies of rich 
countries” may be accepted as payment of the financed portion of the bill (Petrocaribe 
2005, IV.4).  This facility is guided by ideas of Fair Trade as a state-led process directly 
linking producers and consumers and ensuring prices that “allow producers access to a 
dignified life, generating an additional gain for social ends [of] education, housing, 
health, socialisation of surpluses” (PDVSA 2008, p.5).  The eligibility, suitability, and 
value of products offered by Petrocaribe debtor-states is negotiated directly with the 
scheme’s one creditor, Venezuela. 
 
Petrocaribe as a Development Fund 
The financed portion of the oil bill should be set aside domestically for future 
repayments, but in the meantime Petrocaribe specifies that these funds may be used to 
finance projects with a social purpose.  This fund can be supplemented by profits from 
reinvestment of Petrocaribe soft-loan savings and from the state’s own margin as a 
reseller of Petrocaribe oil that comes with few transaction costs.107  Despite a mooted 
move to centralisation of these funds in the ALBA Bank (Searchlight 2009b), they 
continue to be held in the importing country and can be used at the local government’s 
discretion.  Petrocaribe’s guidelines specify, however, that social projects should 
promote economic, social, and cultural rights; generate the conditions allowing exercise 
of such rights; promote participative forms of community management of projects; or 
provide educational and organisational experiences that lead to significant 
improvements in life conditions (PDV Caribe 2011a, p.4).   
Petrocaribe, however, also boasts a second, additional source of development 
funding called the ALBA Caribe Fund.  The initial $50 million capital investment in 
this fund came directly from Venezuela, albeit with the expectation of contributions 
from other Petrocaribe signatories in future (Article II, Petrocaribe 2005).  Although the 
origin of these funds is never made explicit, they appear to come from the Venezuelan 
Bank of Economic and Social Development (BANDES), one of the funds under 
presidential control (chapter three, p.69) whose own income comes from PDVSA and 
large foreign loans such as those held with the Chinese government (Petrocaribe 2007).  
                                                 
107 These functions are carried out by joint-venture companies, whose role is explained below. 
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ALBA Caribe funds are grants rather than soft loans, and in order to access them 
importing countries have to apply in writing either directly to the Venezuelan 
presidency or via the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.108 
 A third development fund also exists for the specific purpose of financing 
projects that reinforce food sovereignty.  This was established as Petroalimentos 
(“Petrofoods”) during the fifth Petrocaribe summit in 2008 before being renamed 
ALBA Alimentos (“ALBA Food”) less than a month later (ALBA Secretaría Executiva 
2010d, p.5).  This fund should accumulate from a $0.50 contribution from PDVSA for 
every barrel of oil exported outside of Venezuela’s international cooperation agreements 
at a price exceeding $100, although the fund is open to capital from other unspecified 
sources (ALBA Secretaría Executiva 2010d, p.15).  In theory, this fund is held in trust 
by the ALBA Bank and controlled by a series of institutions – a ministerial council, an 
executive secretariat, and a Grandnational company – but as with the Petrocaribe 
executive secretariat there is little to suggest that these institutions exist in any 
independent form outside of PDVSA. 
 
Petrocaribe as a Driver of Infrastructure Upgrades 
A final, less direct spur to local development comes through what was originally 
proposed only as a “responsibility [of PDV Caribe] to organise a logistical network of 
ships, storage capacities, and terminals, including … refining and distribution 
capabilities” (PC 2005, III.5).  In practice, it is Venezuela’s BANDES, controlled by the 
presidency, which funds construction or refurbishment of petroleum infrastructure – 
major and minor – in Petrocaribe’s importing countries (Petrocaribe 2009b).  Since 
construction tends to be a major source of low-skilled employment in the Caribbean, 
infrastructural projects also have a socioeconomic impact beyond their immediate 
purpose. 
 
Petrocaribe Governance 
Periodic summits of energy ministers represent the highest level of Petrocaribe’s 
governance, although there is also support from a nominal Executive Secretariat that in 
reality has no independent existence, being part of Venezuela’s Energy and Petroleum 
                                                 
108 PDV Caribe’s Social Management division is meant to check applications against their guidelines 
before passing them to the Venezuelan presidency for final sign-off and allocation of funds.  The recipient 
is obliged to report each trimester on the progress of any ALBA Caribe projects, though monitoring is 
also carried out by PDV Caribe’s roving Department of Social Auditing (I.71).   
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Ministry (Petrocaribe 2005, I).109 The everyday management and monitoring of the 
agreement’s application throughout the Caribbean required creation of a new subsidiary 
of PDVSA called PDV Caribe.  Within recipient states, meanwhile, joint-venture 
companies between PDVSA and local state energy companies have been established to 
collect profits from resale and to provide local operational capacity.  These are governed 
internally by politically appointed boards often dominated by local civil servants or 
professionals and usually including Venezuelan representation.110  Joint ventures report 
both to local governments and to PDV Caribe’s Department of Joint Ventures in 
Caracas. 
 
Intended Effects of a Fully Functional Petrocaribe 
Like the de jure initiatives analysed in preceding chapters, Petrocaribe’s intended 
effects can usefully be grouped around concepts of reasserted autonomy, endogenous 
development, and new sources of legitimacy that are shot through the ALBA literature. 
 
Reasserting Autonomy 
The clearest link here is to autonomy, Petrocaribe being established in 2005, when oil 
prices had doubled in the preceding two years.  A fundamental benefit of Petrocaribe is 
its reinforcement of energy security through providing storage capacity.  This gives 
fuel-dependent Caribbean states a new three-month buffer of local stocks (I.73).  Since 
electricity generation relies on oil supply, any disruption to this supply could cripple 
entire economies.  Turning to trade dependence, Petrocaribe’s founding agreement links 
the vulnerability of Caribbean states to an “unjust economic order, inherited from 
colonialism and imperialism” wherein commodity speculation and erosion of Caribbean 
export prices destabilise the region’s economies and societies (Petrocaribe 2005, 
Preamble).  Given WTO challenges to the preference regimes sustaining agricultural 
exports to Europe (such as the Lomé Convention), as well as pressures on offshore 
financial services and tourism following the financial crisis, this scenario of falling 
export earnings coupled with a rising energy bill is not inaccurate.  Petrocaribe’s 
primary aim is to mitigate the ill effects of oil-price hikes while providing governments 
with the policy space and resources to diversify their exports.  The oil-financing aspect 
aims to address rising energy-import costs, just as ALBA Food reduces the threat of 
                                                 
109 This means also that the Executive Secretary of Petrocaribe him/herself is always Venezuelan (from 
2007 onwards this has been Vice-Minister for Hydrocarbons Iván Orellana). 
110  Usually the local ambassador or a PDVSA-appointed manager, depending on which country has a 
controlling share. 
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food-price shocks, whereas payment by barter at fair-trade prices should open up new 
export channels.  Like the SUCRE, barter trade would reduce the role of the US dollar 
in regional trade, while negotiated pricing should elide the destructive volatility of 
primary-export prices set by international markets (PDVSA 2008, p.6).  Both the 
financing and barter facilities also correspond to the wider ALBA principle of S&D 
enshrined in Petrocaribe’s founding agreement (2005, Preamble). 
The overall aim is to prevent fiscal crises that have often brought down 
Caribbean governments or led them to donors and IFIs whose financial assistance has 
come with an ideological payload.  Honduras’ circumvention of IMF conditionalities 
thanks to Petrocaribe (Corrales 2009, p.101) shows how this initiative can make LAC 
energy and financial dependence an intra- rather than extra-regional matter.  Petrocaribe 
also allows Venezuela to diversify oil exports, thereby reducing its own exposure to US 
leverage (as when PDVSA was sanctioned for trade with Iran).  As with the TCP and 
the SUCRE, this greater LAC interdependence is considered a boon to regional 
integration, enabling a stronger LAC pole while weakening the dominant North 
American pole, a key part of ALBA states’ foreign policy (chapter three, pp.68, 82, 90).  
Nowhere was this clearer than at Petrocaribe’s inception, coming shortly before the 
ultimate breakdown in late 2005 of negotiations towards the US’s preferred option of a 
continental FTA. 
 
Facilitating Endogenous Development 
As with the SUCRE and TCP, the corollary to gains in autonomy is stabilisation of the 
domestic environment in which governments are pursuing their own development 
strategies, principally through buffering of oil-price rises and injection of capital.  The 
clearest benefit here is the simple reduction in state expenditure on oil and the 
consequent availability of resources for other ends.  Since Caribbean small states have 
endured periodic fiscal crises, public spending – especially social spending – is always 
on the chopping block, with knock-on effects for employment, poverty, and human 
development.  Thus, Petrocaribe aims to provide a partial “safety net for the safety net”. 
Petrocaribe’s funding for socioeconomic projects, meanwhile, actively promotes 
human development and the conditions necessary for it.  For left-of-centre de jure 
ALBA members that share certain ideas about endogenous development, this might 
come naturally, with extra Petrocaribe funding only reinforcing the people-centred 
development strategies that distinguish these governments from local opponents.  Yet, 
Petrocaribe differs from the TCP and SUCRE as participation is not restricted to de jure 
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members-states.  Indeed, it began with various right-of-centre governments on board 
(e.g. Belize and Grenada), whereas various others have since participated (notably, 
Golding’s Jamaica Labour Party in Jamaica and even the post-coup Lobo regime in 
Honduras).  Accordingly, there is no assumption of ideological alignment.  Petrocaribe 
respects – in the ALBA mould – “the right of every nation to choose freely its 
economic, political, and social system” (Petrocaribe 2005, Preamble), also holding that 
local knowledge can better address local problems, while offering an empowerment 
dividend to boot.  That said, there is a single “social purpose” criterion for Petrocaribe 
development funding, and this engenders similar effects across the board: 
 
The social projects [supported by the Petrocaribe Agreement] should empower 
everyone within these populations to overcome poverty, guaranteeing 
availability and accessibility of healthcare, education, and microfinancing for 
cooperatives and small- and medium-sized industries [within] an integrated 
process that promotes elimination of social inequality and improves the quality 
of life and real participation of ordinary people… 
(PDV Caribe 2011a, p.1) 
 
Clearly, the main areas covered are those of traditional social policy, along with 
the same prioritisation of small businesses and associative organisations seen in the 
TCP and SUCRE.  Right-of-centre governments might prefer to ignore this criterion and 
divert Petrocaribe funds into practices that undermine wider ALBA principles (setting 
up export-processing zones with lax labour laws, say).  They could also move already 
budgeted social projects into the realm of Petrocaribe to release unrestricted budgetary 
resources and sidestep any compulsion towards social spending.  But PDV Caribe’s 
Social Auditing division exists to monitor ALBA Caribe funds and ensure that benefits 
reach ordinary people, whereas final sign-off by the Venezuelan presidency provides a 
second disincentive to the kind of creative accounting, since it could easily jeopardise 
Petrocaribe’s massive financial benefits.  Thus, Petrocaribe’s simple “social purpose” 
criterion aims to nudge even right-of-centre governments into increasing social 
spending in order to access its broader financial benefits.  This owes to an implicit 
assumption in Petrocaribe and ALBA that improving the welfare of the poorest, 
especially through solidaristic, participative initiatives, favours a leftward shift in 
political consciousness (I.19).    
 Petrocaribe’s remaining barter-trade and agricultural-development elements both 
aim to involve recipient-country exporters in production chains and welfare provision in 
Venezuela, thereby protecting or creating jobs in local industry.  Petrocaribe’s founding 
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agreement specifies that even goods already abundant in Venezuela, such as bananas, 
may be bartered for oil so as to counteract agricultural decline in the Caribbean 
(Petrocaribe 2005, Preamble & IV).  As Regueiro Bello notes, “[Petrocaribe barter] 
irradiates into the preservation of jobs and support for agriculture, a sector severely hit 
by the protectionist trade-defence policies of developed countries” (2008, p.311).  
Products bartered for oil can then supply Venezuela’s subsidised state supermarkets or 
welfare missions, thus becoming a small-scale attempt to achieve the same 
complementarity sought by the TCP and SUCRE.  Furthermore, the ALBA Food fund 
attempts to further reinvigorate and diversify the agricultural sector through provision of 
new technologies or investment in new crops with export potential.  Together, these two 
aspects of Petrocaribe should combine not only to bolster food security in Venezuela – a 
problem disproportionately affecting the poor – but also to defend a sector usually 
employing large numbers of economically vulnerable, low-skilled workers in recipient 
countries.  Petrocaribe’s provision of local oil infrastructure should produce a similar 
effect, albeit irregular, in the construction sector. 
 Overall, the aim is to bring developmental trajectories of signatories into 
ALBA’s “zone of shared development”, with fiscal health, welfare provision, and 
export capacity in importing countries now partially dependent on the stability of their 
oil-exporting neighbour Venezuela. 
 
Bolstering Legitimacy 
Petrocaribe’s impulse towards socioeconomic interdependence in LAC also has a 
political dimension.  For left-of-centre governments it means more freedom to direct 
spending towards their poorer constituencies, with the “social purpose” criterion of a 
regional agreement justifying social spending even in straitened times.  For right-of-
centre governments it means providing at least a semblance of high-impact welfare 
provision so as to maintain Petrocaribe’s financial benefits.  Petrocaribe means to create 
a mild “welfare lock-in” effect that contrasts sharply with the neoliberal lock-in effect 
observed in conventional FTAs (Phillips 2004, pp.35–36) but remains a far cry from the 
“oil for Bolivarianism” conditionality noted by Kourliandsky (2011).  Inasmuch as 
barter trade dampens shocks to local agriculture and infrastructure development 
stimulates construction, Petrocaribe also aims to protect the low-skilled workers at most 
risk of drifting into visible social problems such as homelessness or criminality.  By 
these means, Petrocaribe can bolster the output legitimacy of participant governments.  
From the Venezuelan perspective, the negotiated nature of barter should allow for local 
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sourcing of goods affected by politically damaging shortages, but the importance of this 
depends on the extent of barter participation.  Like the TCP and SUCRE, the barter 
facility also prioritises small and associative producers overlooked by existing regional 
institutions (PDVSA 2008), but this is its only nod towards inclusiveness, with no 
foreseeable effect on input legitimacy beyond enabling pre-conditions of effective 
participation. 
 
  Overall, this fully functional version of Petrocaribe would serve principally to 
restore a measure of autonomy for its inherently vulnerable signatories by dampening 
external shocks that have in the past caused political instability and led to the 
surrendering of elements of economic policy to external actors.  Barter and development 
funds from ALBA Food would link agricultural diversification to the Venezuelan 
economy, whereas social and infrastructure projects would promote human 
development.  This should in turn legitimise left-of-centre governments elected on 
“people-centred” platforms in particular. 
 
Implementation, Impact, and Linkage to Members’ Development Strategies 
Turning to Petrocaribe’s demonstrable implementation and impact, particularly in focus 
countries Dominica, St Vincent and the Grenadines, and Antigua and Barbuda (as laid 
out in chapter one, p.18), we find that results have been impressive if sometimes 
uneven.  Yet, as in the case of the TCP and SUCRE, the specifics of this imperfect 
implementation highlight the problems and possibilities of the overarching ALBA 
project. 
 
The Basic Impact of Petrocaribe as an Oil-Price Buffer 
The huge importance of Petrocaribe’s core oil-financing function is clear from two 
simple graphs.  The first (Figure 16, below) illustrates that Petrocaribe signatories tend 
to run persistent current-account deficits, leaving them reliant on financial markets 
whose vacillations could provoke internal crises. 
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Table 2: Mean annual value of Petrocaribe financing relative to macroeconomic indicators, 2008-2012  
 
Quota 
(kbd)a 
Supply 
(kbd) 
Annual Value of 
PC Financing 
PC Financing / 
GDP 
PC Financing / 
Total Revenue 
PC Financing 
per Capita 
Dominica 1 0.36 $6,073,074 1.3% 3.9% $86 
St Vincent 
& Gren. 
1 0.3 $5,470,398 0.8% 2.9% $50 
Antigua & 
Barbuda 
4.4 0.8 $14,076,416 1.2% 5.8% $160 
Source: Quota and supply data from PDVSA Informes Financieros (pdvsa.com); GDP, revenue, and 
population data from IMF (imf.org). 
a thousands of barrels per day. 
As Table 2 (above) reveals, in our focus countries the difference between quotas 
and real supply is massive, yet Petrocaribe’s impact remains hugely significant.  Over 
the period 2008-2012, the average annual value of the financed portion ranged from 
$5.5 million to $14.1 million.  This translates into 6 per cent of government revenue in 
Antigua, 4 per cent in Dominica, and 3 per cent in St Vincent.  In the most extreme 
individual country year within this sample, Antigua and Barbuda’s 2012 soft loan was 
worth nearly $31 million, approaching 13 per cent of revenue, $350 per inhabitant, or 
2.6 per cent of GDP.  The most striking comparison, however, is with fiscal deficits.  In 
2011 the net deficit for Dominica was $21.1 million, whereas for Antigua it was $32.6 
million;113 even excluding Petrocaribe’s unacknowledged benefits (explored below), 
Petrocaribe helps to keep Caribbean economies on an even keel.  As one ALBA 
Coordinator put it: 
 
It’s a huge deal even in straight financial terms.  But the thinking, man, it’s 
amazing!  Why the hell did no one think of that before?  A lot of big ideological 
talk of cooperation and solidarity and internationalism?  And then this guy 
comes and creates a couple of serious instruments!  The financial crisis has this 
energy-price component, and the guy says “have this damn thing, and the more 
expensive [oil] gets, the more you get to keep and defer payment for!”  It’s 
amazing! 
(I.73) 
 
Even if this basic soft-loan function constituted the full extent of Petrocaribe, we would 
– like veteran Caribbean commentator David Jessop – still be forced to recognise its 
crucial impact: 
 
                                                 
113 The figure for St Vincent and the Grenadines is not representative as it includes unusually high capital 
spending on the Argyle airport project. 
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No one should be in any doubt about the critical importance of Venezuela's 
PetroCaribe programme. If it were not for the energy lifeline that it has 
provided to every Caribbean nation other than Trinidad and Barbados, much of 
the region would by now be in economic freefall. 
(Jessop 2011) 
 
Unacknowledged Benefits of the Soft-Loan Function 
However, the impact of this financing element is even greater than it first appears.  Most 
important is the real-terms depreciation of loans so soft as to be downright floppy (see 
p.163).  Given an oil price of $100, debt is being contracted at conditions that will 
reduce its real value by roughly 25 per cent over its lifetime.  This unacknowledged 
grant element could be as much as $3.5 million or 1.5 per cent of total revenue (in the 
case of Antigua).  75 per cent of the debt remains, of course, but the counterfactual of 
Petrocaribe’s non-existence would require drastic spending cuts, tax rises, or private 
financing at punitive interest rates. 
 Second, entirely overlooked has been Venezuela’s furtive writing-off of long-
term Petrocaribe debt.  Since 2008 PDVSA has cancelled all or part of the financed 
portion of its international agreements against its requirement to pay the Venezuelan 
government royalties on every barrel extracted (PDVSA 2010; 2012).114  That is, the 
government forgoes royalties on exports via international agreements by paying the 
royalty with debt which promptly ceases to exist.  The entire financed portion was 
cancelled out in 2008 and 2009 and half in subsequent years, meaning $4.2 billion in 
2009, $5 billion in 2010, and $4.8 billion in 2011.  Though this relates to all 
international agreements, with Petrocaribe not even the largest, assuming write-offs are 
distributed proportional to supply, in 2010 Petrocaribe debt worth $971 million was 
condoned in this way (PDVSA 2012, p.86).115  “Fair value” adjustments in PDVSA 
accounts have also expunged huge debts from international agreements, with $600 
million written off in 2008 and $650 million in 2009, for example (PDVSA 2010, 
p.41).116 
 Third and finally, local joint-venture companies (between Venezuela and the 
recipient country) are able to reinvest not only resale margins on oil bought with 
minimal transaction costs but also funds set aside to cover amortization of long-term 
                                                 
114 “International agreements” covers Petrocaribe, the Caracas Agreement, the San Jose Agreement, and 
the Integral Cooperation Agreement (with Cuba and Argentina).  Whether write-offs were distributed 
evenly across them is unknown.  In various years the entire debt has been written off, however, 
necessarily including that of Petrocaribe signatories.  For other years, we assume write-offs proportional 
to each agreement’s contribution to total supply. 
115 99.2 kbd (39 per cent) of a total 253.9 kbd exported under all international agreements. 
116 This may be due to the real-terms depreciation of loans, although PDVSA’s fair-value estimates 
reduce the face value by around 45 per cent, far beyond the 25 per cent calculated in this work. 
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Petrocaribe debt.  The simple logic of this uncommon opportunity is not lost on 
Vincentian PM Ralph Gonsalves:   
 
Where are you going to get, on an ongoing basis, funding to facilitate economic 
growth and social development, $20m [Eastern Caribbean] dollars per year 
[$7.4m USD], 2 per cent, 25 years, for heaven’s sake!?  If you give me that 
money, no risk at all, I will take it, invest in a bank at 4 per cent and live off the 
interest happily.  You give me that every year?!  The 4 per cent is $400,000 on 
$10m, $800,000 on $20m.  A fellow’s not going to throw that away! 
(I.68) 
 
At the 1 per cent interest rate stipulated for the current oil price (Petrocaribe 2009a, p.9), 
this creates a spread of 3 per cent to Gonsalves’ not unrealistic 4 per cent rate from 
reinvestment.  With a resale margin of $0.89 per gallon (as in Dominica), in 2012 Saint 
Vincent’s joint-venture company would have made $6.8 million on its 500 barrels per 
day (PDVSA 2013, p.128).  Combined with the $11.8 million accumulating to cover the 
financed portion of the Petrocaribe bill gives annual reinvestment capital of $18.6 
million.  Reinvestment at 4 per cent, taking into account the 1 per cent growth of the 
Petrocaribe debt, would provide the Vincentian state with an extra $550,000 annually.  
As Gonsalves’ energetic response suggests, for small states this is more than a 
decorative cherry on an already substantial cake.  While precise figures are unknown 
and subject to a number of caveats, it is clear that Petrocaribe signatories do engage in 
such reinvestment.117  Antigua and Barbuda’s joint venture PDV CAB, for example, 
employs a portfolio manager specifically to maximise these returns (PDV CAB 2011a), 
whereas Dominica also receives a return on its Petrocaribe savings by placing them in 
the privately owned National Bank of Dominica (Skerrit 2011, p.34). 
 
Impacts of Petrocaribe’s Financial Benefits 
Since the acknowledged and unacknowledged benefits of Petrocaribe’s central soft-loan 
function are so many, various, and extensive, this aspect of the initiative has a clear 
knock-on effect in terms of autonomy, endogenous development, and legitimacy. 
Crucially, Petrocaribe gives governments more leeway to counteract the crises 
that can buffet SIDS in particular: 
 
                                                 
117 For example, whether profits from reinvestment are skimmed off annually or reinvested again; also 
whether funds to cover the financed portion are actually provided – in St Vincent’s case they appear to be 
– or even needed (given Venezuela’s tendency to pardon this kind of debt); or whether funds have been 
removed for investment in social projects. 
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Any downturn is going to affect you significantly.  [The financial crisis] has 
basically come home to us even though we’ve put in some monetary policies to 
soften the effect.  Either there’s no money in circulation or people are holding 
on to their resources.  Things are tough.  We’re in the same place that Greece is, 
only our debt-to-GDP is not outrageous, because we’ve tried to put money into 
circulation, lots of which has come from these initiatives [ALBA and 
Petrocaribe]. 
(I.64) 
 
Given that current-account deficits persist even after Petrocaribe’s establishment, in 
Petrocaribe’s absence these deficits would be even more extreme.  Had these deficits 
spiralled out of control, Dominica and Antigua could have faced sanction from the IMF 
for contravening conditions of earlier bailouts, whereas St Vincent would have had to 
seek financing from the same organisation (I.64).  Dollars from the IMF are the same as 
dollars from Petrocaribe, of course, and in fact the interest-free conditions of IMF 
emergency schemes are even more favourable than those within Petrocaribe.  But the 
key difference is conditionality, which limits the developmental room for manoeuvre, as 
in the cases of Dominica and Antigua (chapter three, p.86).  As Ralph Gonsalves 
explains:  
 
When you take the [Petrocaribe financed portion], it’s a significant amount of 
money, but it’s 25 years at 2 per cent.  The only way you can get money 
cheaper than that is if you go to the IMF for the rapid credit facility after a 
storm or whatever, or go on an IMF programme, but that involves a whole 
series of concessions.  This is money without policy ties. 
(I.68) 
 
While the “social purpose” criterion does constitute a form of conditionality, it applies 
only to investment of funds set aside to cover amortization, whereas reinvestment 
income and real-terms depreciation of Petrocaribe debt provide resources for any 
purpose.  A second significant difference is visibility, as Petrocaribe loans are absent 
from the debt portfolios of our focus countries because debt is technically payable by 
joint-venture companies.  The advisability of this sleight of hand is debatable, but it 
serves to maintain debt-to-GDP ratios that will not increase borrowing costs or cause 
consternation at the IMF.  Indeed, the IMF recognises the off-budget nature of 
Petrocaribe financing, but also the potentially crippling effect of recent oil-price hikes.  
Accordingly, they cite Petrocaribe as the “most notable” bulwark against balance-of-
payments pressures in the region, whispering its praises in their Regional Economic 
Outlook bulletins (IMF 2008, pp.19, 23). 
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 The effect of this autonomy and stability bonus on the potential success of 
development strategies is huge.  First, incumbent governments (of any stripe) are 
somewhat insulated from external shocks and interventions that frequently provoke 
economic, social, and political instability and derail long-term planning.  Increased 
room for fiscal manoeuvre also means that governments have greater leeway to chart 
their own developmental course.  Second, there are signs that these very funds are being 
invested directly in the real economy, particularly in SMEs.  In Dominica nearly $4 
million of the funds to cover Petrocaribe soft-loans has been set aside to provide loans 
to smaller businesses on concessionary terms that would otherwise be impossible 
(Skerrit 2011, pp.34–35).  A similar manifesto commitment was made by Ralph 
Gonsalves prior to his latest election victory in 2010 (ULP 2010c, p.18).  Apart from 
increasing output, this Petrocaribe-enabled investment in smaller businesses should 
create jobs and reduce unemployment, favouring those usually on the sharp end of 
economic volatility.  Third, Petrocaribe’s guaranteed supply and effective price ceilings 
significantly reduce the risk of disruption to electricity generation, which could 
otherwise bring entire economies to a grinding halt and provoke political upheaval.  
This consideration is foremost in the minds of officials in Antigua and Barbuda, which 
has suffered blackouts in recent years (I.81). 
 
The Impact of Investment in Infrastructure 
The latter energy-security advantages are enabled by Petrocaribe’s development of local 
oil infrastructure.  Most ambitious were upgrades to refineries in Cuba, Jamaica and the 
Dominican Republic, which now constitute 4 per cent of Venezuela’s nominal refining 
capacity (PDVSA 2013, p.78).  This shift is small but significant, reflecting ALBA’s 
aim of augmenting developmental interdependence in the LAC region while reducing 
dependence on any aspect of production vulnerable to US political intervention.118  This 
capacity-expansion effort almost reached Dominica, too, with Chávez offering to 
construct a $50 million refinery, though this was ultimately rejected for fear of 
damaging tourism.  Beyond refineries, infrastructure development has prioritised 
storage and end-user supply, as with Dominica’s Waitukubuli fuel-distribution plant, 
which holds three months’ supply and cost some $40 million (PDV Caribe 2009, p.22).  
Given the likelihood of disrupted supply due to extreme weather events, independent 
local availability of three months’ supply is, to quote Dominica’s ALBA Co-ordinator, 
                                                 
118 Most notably the US market itself: PDVSA’s exports to the US constituted 58 per cent of total exports 
in 2002, falling to 39 per cent by 2012.  China, India, and Singapore picked up the slack. 
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“a massive thing!” (I.73).  Beyond this boost to autonomy, the plant’s construction 
created 140 temporary jobs and its operation supports another 38, whereas any $40 
million construction project necessarily implies a significant injection of cash into the 
small local economy (PDV Caribe 2009, p.23). 
Infrastructural development has also meant filling plants for liquefied petroleum 
gas (LPG), commonly used for cooking.  Dominica’s Waitukubuli facility was 
developed with storage capacity for LPG, whereas in St Vincent an entirely new 
bottling plant was built, with construction creating 46 temporary jobs and operation 
sustaining another 172 (PDV Caribe 2009, p.23).  LPG is particularly important to 
Petrocaribe because it is an everyday essential; price hikes and supply failures affect 
everyone, but especially those too poor to afford extra canisters.  By breaking effective 
monopolies, Petrocaribe’s entry into the market can depress prices that have been rising 
inexorably: 
 
Today we can cut prices of LPG and keep supply stable, which keeps social and 
political life stable; it’s huge!  We’re not trying to replace the traditional 
suppliers, but we used to have limits on the number [of canisters] we were 
ordering, and every time the public would order it all up immediately, but now 
we’ve got more options. 
(I.73) 
  
State-driven competition from Petrocaribe, now constituting half of the market (I.69), 
also reduces the leverage of former sole suppliers like Texaco in St Vincent, who had 
threatened to cut off supply in protest at price controls (US Embassy to Barbados 
2006).119  Delivery to customers in remote areas that depend on intermediaries – rural 
Dominica (Da Vibes 2013) and  Barbuda (I.81), for example – is now subsidised, 
lowering and stabilising costs for the neediest.  LPG infrastructure also underpins 
welfare provision in Dominica’s Yes We Care programme, which provides free gas and 
stoves to the eldest and poorest (Douglas 2009).  In the particular case of fisheries, 
Petrocaribe has installed filling stations in strategic locations to eliminate the cost and 
inefficiency involved in transporting fuel to boats, thereby making this industry more 
financially viable.  Not only that, fishermen were encouraged to form cooperatives to 
run filling stations, receiving oil at wholesale prices and reselling it at retail prices.  
Alongside a $0.19 per gallon rebate from Petrocaribe, this margin creates a fund for 
maintenance, small upgrades, and crucially a new pension fund (I.74; Da Vibes 2012).  
                                                 
119 This diplomatic cable revealed by Wikileaks reveals that Texaco was threatening to cut off supply 
shortly before an election, which would have damaged the Gonsalves government’s re-election campaign.  
Petrocaribe sent two irregular shipments to nullify this threat. 
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This neatly illustrates how Petrocaribe bolsters state control over a vital industry to 
enable marginalised sectors to improve their own conditions. 
 
The Failure of Barter 
Less successful is Petrocaribe’s barter facility, whereby Venezuela accepts goods at 
“fair” prices against the financed portion of oil bills.  In the literature this is “perhaps 
ALBA’s most novel and solidaristic element in the area of trade” (Aponte García 2009, 
p.95) and even a departure “beyond the very logic of capitalism” (DeFeo 2010).  But as 
with the TCP (chapter four, p.96), scholars often take specific instances of barter as 
evidence of wider uptake and significance (e.g. Ullán de la Rosa 2012, p.153).  The 
reality is markedly different. 
 PDVSA accounts (2013, p.122) reveal that by 2012 just three signatories were 
utilising Petrocaribe’s barter mechanism: Guyana, the Dominican Republic, and 
particularly Nicaragua.120  As such, barter has had no impact in the remaining fourteen 
recipient states.  Even in the three participating states, since no by-country breakdown is 
available, impact remains inscrutable.  Total barter exports have grown – up 76 per cent 
to $868 million in 2012 ($493 million in 2011) – and this is no small sum, but 
Nicaragua alone represents 82 per cent of the total and nearly all of this year-on-year 
increase (PDVSA 2013, p.121).  Furthermore, fewer than twenty products were 
involved, the vast majority inevitably from Nicaragua.  Since quantities are given in 
weight or units, the “fairness” of prices is obfuscated; this deliberate opacity suggests 
that prices may be beyond “fair” and could favour the opposition’s “giving away the 
oil” discourse in Venezuela.121  Yet, barter is certainly important to Nicaragua 
(equalling 16 per cent of total exports), and to a lesser extent Guyana and the 
Dominican Republic (5 per cent and 1 per cent of exports, respectively).122  From the 
Venezuelan perspective, importing $900 million of goods (mainly food) from 
sympathetic neighbours via state channels has significant benefits in a volatile domestic 
arena where private producers use shortages to stoke political fires (Borges 2010).  
Indeed, goods sourced via barter for Venezuela’s subsidised food network are amongst 
                                                 
120 Again, the lack of figures on Cuba suggests that PDVSA considers its Integral Cooperation Agreement 
with Cuba to be separate from Petrocaribe, contrary to what is often claimed.  
121 “Deliberate” because it is inconceivable that officials of this Venezuelan state company believe that 
unit or weight measures are more informative to those scrutinising its accounts.  It might be possible to 
reverse engineer approximate prices based on commodity averages for the years involved, but apart from 
being time-consuming, the resulting figures would be imprecise. 
122 Total exports 2012 from Trademap (trademap.org, which utilises UN Comtrade data); the Guyana 
figure is based on mirror data.  Prima facie Guyana appears to engage in more barter trade than the 
Dominican Republic, but as noted no by-country breakdown is available.  For want of a better approach, 
here the non-Nicaraguan remainder is split evenly between Guyana and the Dominican Republic. 
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those suffering severe shortages (Oficina Comercial Ecuador-Venezuela 2011, p.13).  
As such, Petrocaribe does have an element of regionalised endogenous development 
underwriting political success.  But if – as was intended – complementary production 
chains materialise and agricultural sectors prosper, any effect is felt principally in two 
countries.  That this constitutes shared endogenous development or greater autonomy is 
doubtful. 
 Amongst Petrocaribe’s other fourteen signatories, there has been no barter trade 
whatsoever, as in our focus countries.  Dominica has previously been identified as a 
participant that pays “up to 40% of its petroleum bill in bananas” (Aponte García 2011, 
p.8), but in fact negotiations over condiments, juices, jams, pepper sauce, and bottled 
water have come to nought (I.73).  In St Vincent discussions have taken place and – true 
to Petrocaribe’s notion of solidarity trade – even plantains were considered despite 
Venezuela’s own abundant production of them (I.66).  Development of fisheries to 
supply barter exports has also been mooted, but again with no concrete result (I.66).  In 
Antigua and Barbuda services such as English-language tuition and tourism were 
considered, and a mutually beneficial agreement was sought for Antiguan construction 
supplies to be bartered into Venezuela’s huge and politically crucial housing 
programme, Gran Misión Vivienda (“Great Housing Mission”).  This proposal to send a 
million bricks per month was to rescue a large employer ravaged by the financial crisis, 
yet just as in Dominica and St Vincent negotiations eventually fizzled into nothing 
(I.81).123   
Thus, with only the clear exceptions of Nicaragua and Guyana, Petrocaribe’s 
barter element has not encouraged LAC interdependence through creation of 
intraregional production chains, through substitution of extra-regional competitive trade 
for intraregional cooperative trade, or through provision of output legitimacy to 
incumbent governments; nor has it entailed savings on foreign exchange or insulation 
from external shocks and leverage. 
  
Funding Social Development 
While Petrocaribe’s financial and barter elements of Petrocaribe are reactive, the social-
development aspect actively targets social ills and reinforces development strategies 
                                                 
123 The company in question is Antigua Masonry Products. 
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adopted by LAC governments.  As detailed in stage one, the funds invested in social 
projects come from:124 
 
A) the margin involved in domestic resale of Petrocaribe oil 
B) monies put aside for future payment of the financed oil bill 
C) the ALBA Caribe fund established via a $50 million transfer from Venezuela 
 
These represent a significant source of capital and social spending.  Whereas resale 
profits (A) and funds set-aside for amortisation (B) are held locally, ALBA Caribe is 
administered by its underwriter Venezuela.  This makes enforcement of the “social 
purpose” criterion – via PDV Caribe, PDVSA, and ultimately the Venezuelan 
presidency – more effective in the latter case.  Yet, nowhere is this one criterion flouted, 
despite the broad scope afforded to recipients.  Though each of our focus countries has 
its own favoured means and ends, Petrocaribe funds have mainly gone towards transfer-
based welfare, non-oil infrastructure, electricity provision, housing, education, and even 
law enforcement.  This hints at the breadth and depth of Petrocaribe’s impact on the 
development of recipient states. 
 
i.) Transfer-based social protections 
Transfer-based safety nets represent the most significant expression of Petrocaribe’s 
social impact, as they reach whole sectors of the population for unlimited periods, 
unlike the targeted and fleeting interventions of much foreign aid.  The fishermen’s 
pension scheme and free-LPG programme mentioned above both fall into this category, 
but they pale into insignificance beside Antigua and Barbuda’s Senior Citizens’ Utility 
Subsidy (SCUSP) and People’s Benefit programmes.  The SCUSP subsidies the utility 
bills of pensioners and the disabled, some 6 per cent of the total population 
(Government of Antigua & Barbuda 2012b).  People’s Benefit provides the disabled 
and the poorest with $80 a month in food vouchers, reaching 2 per cent of the 
population (Government of Antigua & Barbuda 2012a).  Apart from directly benefiting 
disadvantaged groups, these programmes relieve the burden of extended families that 
would otherwise support vulnerable relatives.  This cash injection creates more demand 
in the domestic market while also stabilising the lives of beneficiaries, thereby 
                                                 
124 Separating out funding sources is, in the words of one PDV Caribe employee, “trabajo de hormiga” 
(ant work).  But even with painstaking primary research, there is still no guarantee of complete accuracy.  
Indeed, actors themselves are often unsure of the source of funds. 
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facilitating development of human capital.  It also reinforces the output legitimacy of 
governments elected on platforms of social welfare and people-centred development 
(chapter three, pp.67, 88), especially amongst the poorer sectors most affected by wider 
economic vacillations.  For some this is a first encounter with the idea of social safety 
nets, increasing the likelihood of demands for their wider application.  Since these 
transfer-based benefits stem directly from Petrocaribe, this exemplifies how ALBA 
initiatives can implicate one member in the development and politics of another. 
 
ii.) Non-oil infrastructure 
The second type of spending underpinned by Petrocaribe is investment in non-oil 
infrastructure.  A common theme is airports, with Dominica’s Melville Hall, Antigua’s 
V.C. Bird, and Barbuda’s Codrington undergoing multimillion-dollar upgrades (US 
Embassy to Barbados 2007; Caribbean News Now 2006).  In St Vincent, however, the 
target is the $240 million Argyle airport project, the cornerstone of attempts to 
restructure the economy around tourism in response to the banana industry’s precipitous 
decline (chapter three, p.87).  It will allow St Vincent to receive long-haul flights rather 
than relying on regional carrier LIAT to ferry tourists from neighbouring countries.  
Gonsalves has put $10 million from the local Petrocaribe joint-venture company 
towards the project (Gonsalves 2011, pp.30–31), and since Petrocaribe savings accrue 
naturally, this cheap development funding will be available throughout the project’s 
lifetime.  Since this ambitious project is anything but a guaranteed success, commercial 
credit is prohibitively expensive, but Petrocaribe’s concessionary conditions and local 
control over utilisation allow St Vincent to plot its own escape from agricultural 
decline.125  Away from airports, both St Vincent and Antigua and Barbuda have 
upgraded potable-water systems to curb rationing (Ministry of National Mobilisation, 
Social Development, Youth, and Sports 2011; Government of Antigua & Barbuda 
2012a); Antigua has loaned generator capacity from the Venezuelan state via 
Petrocaribe to tackle blackouts (I.86; Camacho 2005; PDV Caribe 2008, p.19); 
Dominica has improved sewerage, roads, and especially sea defences (PDV Caribe 
2011b; Commonwealth of Dominica 2009, p.12).126  Aside from the inherent social 
utility of particular projects, improved infrastructure reduces costs all round, saving 
locals money while improving external competitiveness, whereas preventative measures 
                                                 
125 The project relies on bilateral funding from various foreign governments. 
126 Tane Tane and Scott’s Head sea-defence projects, costing $2 million and $10.4 million. 
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mitigate causes of social and economic instability.  Construction projects themselves, 
meanwhile, represent a form of social protection that counteracts the seasonality of 
employment in tourism and replaces low-skilled jobs lost in agriculture. 
 
iii.) Education, housing, and law enforcement 
 The remaining projects fall within the traditional bounds of social policy, 
focusing on housing and education, with a side interest in law enforcement.  Both 
Dominica and St Vincent boast “Housing Revolutions” supported by multimillion-
dollar contributions from Petrocaribe, focusing “first [on] the poor poor, followed by 
those without access to credit, and finally those with only limited access” (I.69).127  In 
education, Antigua has resuscitated its national public library project (PDV CAB 
2011b); in Dominica a school has been built in indigenous Carib Territory (PDV Caribe 
2011b, p.1); and in St Vincent there have been projects covering literacy, parenting, 
youth education, and music (Ministry of National Mobilisation, Social Development, 
Youth, and Sports 2011).  Finally, in Dominica ALBA Caribe grants have provided a 
modern coast-guard speedboat, a police station (Grand Bay), and various police vehicles 
decked-out in ALBA-Caribe livery (Commonwealth of Dominica 2008, p.9). 
 
Given the size of these economies, these investments in social projects constitute 
a massive shot in the arm to domestic social spending, particularly in the midst of a 
global economic downturn.  Apart from the inherent benefits of improving the life 
chances and potential for human development of local citizens, in these three cases it 
also allows left-of-centre governments to make good on social initiatives promised to 
their less well-off constituencies.  In the absence of Petrocaribe support, they would 
surely have had to cut social spending or borrow at high rates with many strings 
attached, effectively reducing their autonomy. 
 
ALBA Food: Left on the Shelf 
The final element of Petrocaribe is ALBA Food, designed to finance projects that 
bolster food sovereignty.  In theory this fund is fed by a $0.50 contribution for every 
barrel of oil exported by PDVSA above $100 outside of international agreements.  
Given oil prices in recent years, had this 50 cent contribution been collected, ALBA 
                                                 
127  Though backed by many donors, the $14.8 million from ALBA Caribe in Dominica eclipses any other 
contribution (Girvan 2011b, p.8).   St Vincent’s Housing Revolution used $5 million. 
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Food would be colossal and growing annually by hundreds of millions of dollars.128  In 
practice there is little evidence that this fund exists as a discrete entity at all.  In 2011 
ALBA’s Executive Secretary put ALBA Food’s worth at $50 million, with only $14 
million of that having been invested (AVN 2011).  Despite putative trusteeship by the 
ALBA Bank, recent official documents add the possibility of “other contributions”, 
making it more likely that cash comes from funds at the discretion of the Venezuelan 
presidency such as BANDES and FONDEN (ALBA Secretaría Executiva 2010d, 
pp.14–15).   Moreover, this initiative has not taken off in any coherent form, with only 
infrequent signs of life in Nicaragua and Belize.129  The ALBA Secretariat lists ALBA 
Food projects in eight Petrocaribe signatories, but information is extremely scarce 
(ALBA Secretaría Executiva 2010d, p.16).  This includes St Vincent, where irrigation, 
storage, and processing systems are said to have been upgraded.  While ALBA Food 
has invested $2.1 million in St Vincent, in reality this came as free fertiliser and 
supported the Alternative Sustainable Livelihood initiative that encourages small-scale 
marijuana farmers to pursue less legally challenging careers (Searchlight 2009a; Nanton 
2009).  Though this represents the only project of ALBA Food in the three focus 
countries, it is consonant with the purposes and principles of ALBA – and more 
specifically Petrocaribe – as  it involves Venezuela in the promotion of Vincentian food 
sovereignty and wider sustainable development. 
 
Petrocaribe’s Impact on the Politics of Signatory States 
Despite the relative weakness of its barter and food-sovereignty elements, the impact of 
Petrocaribe’s social aspect combines with that of its financial benefits to create a 
notable effect on both domestic and regional political arenas. 
 Extra resources and their reinvestment towards social ends provide a buffer 
against wider economic forces and foster political stability, irrespective of the 
incumbent party’s political stripe.  Though vulnerability to economic circumstances has 
rendered much of the Caribbean and Central America “pragmatic”, many retain a left-
of-centre preference that is expressed where possible (chapter three, p.86).  For these 
governments especially, Petrocaribe represents a regional-level institution whose social-
purpose criterion compels them towards priorities that they might already share but 
                                                 
128 Exports of 2.56 million barrels per day in 2012 at an average price of $103.42 (PDVSA 2013). 
129 As so often with ALBA, the situation is confused by the existence of other initiatives with the same 
name operating in Nicaragua and El Salvador – the latter a signatory of neither Petrocaribe nor ALBA – 
but in reality these are respectively a Grandnational enterprise and a local agricultural side-initiative of a 
bilateral Venezuelan-Salvadoran oil agreement. 
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otherwise be unable to afford.  That is, if this pragmatism is an ideological neutrality 
provoked by financial constraints, Petrocaribe loosens the bind and nudges to the left.  
There is little doubt that without Petrocaribe support, the governments of our focus 
countries would have been defeated by now, especially those who only narrowly 
achieved repeat terms (Antigua’s Spencer and St Vincent’s Gonsalves).  The huge 
impact of Petrocaribe has even seen right-of-centre opposition parties reverse initial 
scepticism in the face of popular support (with the exception of St Vincent’s New 
Democratic Party).  And even right-of-centre governments cannot stray too far from 
social expenditure for fear of losing the inherent financial benefits of annually renewed 
Petrocaribe deals. 
 Although officials of the three focus countries are straightforward about their 
original motivations for joining Petrocaribe – “an economic thing more than anything 
else” (I.73) or simply “money!” (I.64) – there is a burgeoning awareness of Latin 
America, and not only as a war-torn wasteland of coups and communists: 
 
Even ten years ago, if you were to come and do a simple survey about relations 
with Venezuela, eight out of ten would say we had none … Now we feel a part 
of our region, we have real interactions. … Even critics are more aware.  
Talking about it in whatever way requires some familiarity; they are at least 
thinking about it now.  It’s all positive.  Venezuela used to be just a country 
somewhere down there until Chávez came around. 
(I.66) 
 
Further, this reacquaintance has been on complementary and cooperative terms 
with which officials in the region are unfamiliar: 
 
Sometimes you sit back and wonder “why did they even invite us?”; it’s really 
more to our benefit than theirs … That’s exactly what someone like us would 
want.  Something that benefits us without taking too much out. … You’re 
waiting for the “ah-hah, now we got you, we want this!”  I think sometimes in 
the back of peoples’ minds, when PM Spencer was trying to sell it to the public, 
a lot of people asked “what does Castro want?  What does Chávez want?  
You’re giving us free oil, what do they want?”  And it’s been 6 years, going 
pretty good for us, and yet nothing… 
(I.81) 
 
This positive example of LAC solidarity has not of course brought about a complete 
transformation in the foreign policy of Petrocaribe’s recipient states, but it has 
reinforced the position of sympathisers like “Comrade” Ralph Gonsalves and 
emboldened sometime centrists like Dominica’s Roosevelt Skerrit, whose rhetoric 
continues to bear the hallmarks of Bolivarianism even after Chávez’s death: 
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We as an independent people must decide our destiny … we cannot let 
somebody write a script for us and say we must follow it. We must stand for 
something and when it comes to programmes like ALBA and PetroCaribe we 
Dominicans must stand in defence and promotion of the core and guiding 
principles of these two institutions … you can rest on Dominica’s solidarity, 
friendship, as we move forward in addressing the inequality that exists within 
our society and among nations. 
(Roosevelt Skerrit, quoted in Antigua Observer 2013) 
 
While public pronouncements could be dismissed as dancing for Chávez’s small 
change, diplomatic cables published via Wikileaks reveal that their defence of 
Petrocaribe is equally stout in private (US Embassy to Barbados 2009a; 2009b). 
 Infrastructural projects have also brought many Venezuelans to the shores of 
their Caribbean neighbours, while media coverage on ALBA and Petrocaribe has also 
fuelled a local interest in Latin America.  And with the Cold War in the rear-view 
mirror, the New Left no longer provokes the same fears: 
 
The [Latin American] left before were into pure economic determinism, and 
that’s scary as hell to the population!  Now a Dominican finds he doesn’t look 
at a Latin American guy, a Cuban or a Venezuelan, and get an overwhelming 
sense of otherness.  It’s not solidarity necessarily, it’s more unquestioned, 
accepted, and that’s huge!  More important than most people recognise. 
(I.73) 
 
This is not to suggest that links to Britain, America, and Canada are not foremost in the 
Anglophone Caribbean mind, but ALBA and Petrocaribe have at least forced its people 
to look southward again and re-evaluate what they see.  In a small but significant 
expression of this, both in terms of awareness and solidarity, following devastating 
floods in Venezuela in late 2010, public collections in Dominica and St Vincent for 
those displaced met with a huge response from private citizens and businesses alike 
(I.69; I.73; Petrocaribe 2011). 
 
Petrocaribe’s Effects in the Wider Caribbean 
In terms of LAC relations, veteran Antiguan statesman and commentator Sir Ronald 
Sanders was right to warn in 2007 against exaggeration of the influence of ALBA and 
Petrocaribe: 
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Will the Caribbean begin to adopt President Chavez’s [sic] 21st century 
Socialism with its aspects of nationalisation of foreign owned companies? And, 
will they join the Venezuelan President in hostility towards the US 
government? The answer is unequivocally: “no”. 
(Sanders 2007) 
 
But these extremes are not the only possible outcomes, and there has been a softening 
towards Venezuela, as well as new defiance of the US.  Fears that Petrocaribe existed to 
“buy” favourable resolutions to territorial conflicts with Guyana (Esequibo) and 
Dominica (Bird Island) have proved unfounded, and indeed relations with both have 
been more stable and consensual than in the pre-Chávez era.  Even Trinidad and 
Tobago, the Caribbean state most hostile to Petrocaribe, has slackened its opposition 
despite losing 49,000 barrels per day in exports to the region (Renwick 2009, p.1).  
Instead it has negotiated with Venezuela an extremely rare joint exploitation of the 
massive Manatee gas field.  The relative agility and impact of Petrocaribe and ALBA 
has also fuelled frustration at CARICOM’s perpetual lack of progress, with Ralph 
Gonsalves suggesting in an open letter to fellow leaders that more Caribbean countries 
would follow St Lucia and Suriname in joining ALBA while CARICOM remained “on 
pause” (Gonsalves 2012).130 
As US aid has drifted east, meanwhile, old wounds have reappeared: amongst 
the high-level politicians and officials interviewed for this research, the complaint that 
“they’ve fleeced us for so many years in terms of our educated workforce and being a 
depository for US products; our balance of trade is ridiculous!” was not 
unrepresentative.131  Dominicans are irked by a lack of payback for their support in 
removing Grenada’s communist leader Maurice Bishop, whereas Antigua and Barbuda 
continues its remarkable fight at the WTO against illegitimate US barriers to its online-
gambling industry.  Venezuela has stepped into the vacuum left by US withdrawal, and 
its financial support now eclipses that of any other donor, including the EU and the US 
(on US, Sanders 2009; on aid, Girvan 2010).  The realisation that Haitian president 
Michel Martelly gets 90 per cent of his social-investment budget from Petrocaribe 
(AVN 2013a), or that Bharat Jagdeo’s medium-term economic programme for Guyana 
would be knocked off course by a change to Petrocaribe conditions (Hutchinson-Jafar 
2009), gives an idea of the extent to which the Caribbean’s fate has been intertwined 
with that of Venezuela through Petrocaribe.  
 
                                                 
130 He has been proved right, with St Kitts and Nevis reportedly “in the waiting room”. 
131 This quote is deliberately unattributed. 
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Flexible Governance, Local Autonomy, and Local Legitimacy 
Throughout Petrocaribe there is a common theme that reinforces the impact of its 
successful elements: Petrocaribe’s extreme flexibility in terms of governance of the 
programmes and projects in which its resources are invested.  This is by design in that it 
tallies with the ALBA doctrine of autonomy regardless of size, and it is by accident in 
that no appreciable Petrocaribe Executive Secretariat exists to marshal the varied LAC 
relations under the Petrocaribe umbrella.  Beyond PDV Caribe’s miniscule Department 
of Social Auditing, there is only the arm’s-length monitoring of Venezuelan diplomats.  
Overall, as the ambassador to Dominica asserts: 
 
The Dominican government makes the decision about where [funding] goes; 
we’ve never told them what they should do.  It’s up to them, according to their 
needs; I’ve never gone in there to tell them [to do] anything! 
(I.74) 
 
Though a vague fear of displeasing the Venezuelan government may guide their 
decisions, definition of the “social purpose” criterion is essentially left to recipients.  
This allows debtor governments to use their local advantage in pinpointing obstacles to 
their own development.  This includes prioritisation of issues with peculiar cultural 
resonance and well-being dividends outside of standard development metrics.  Thus, 
Petrocaribe’s funding of the National Public Library project in Antigua should provide 
not only a larger, more practical library, it also scratches an itch troubling the national 
psyche since the original library collapsed in 1974, its failed reconstruction becoming a 
metaphor for the island’s rotten politics via Jamaica Kincaid’s scathing memoir A Small 
Place (2000).132  In Dominica, similarly, it has resurrected 60-year-old plans to 
complete one small but inhospitable section of road (Rosalie-Petite Soufriere) that 
literally and symbolically unites its north- and south-eastern zones.133  Even the focus 
on LPG and housing speaks to the political peculiarities of the Caribbean.  Flexibility 
also brings responsiveness, allowing for pre-emptive safeguards or rapid defence 
against local threats.  When Dominica’s private supplier of LPG failed to meet orders 
prior to carnival (I.73), Petrocaribe dispatched a shipment; with the Cricket World Cup 
imminent, it funded last-minute refurbishment of Antigua’s V.C. Bird Airport; when 
blackouts hit Antigua, Petrocaribe provided generators: 
 
                                                 
132 It should be pointed out that despite Petrocaribe’s support, the National Public Library remains 
unfinished nearly 40 years after the original wooden structure folded during an earthquake in 1974. 
133 Phase one of this project is complete. 
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We were having some challenges with generation, around 2006/2007, with 
frequent outages, capacity issues, and they asked me to approach Venezuela … 
when you say you’re in a crisis situation, they try and help, then we work out 
the finer points later.  So we decided we would do it on the same concessionary 
terms as the Petrocaribe agreement, as if we were purchasing fuel.  They leased 
the generators on our behalf, sent them here, and then we can pay for them with 
finance over a period of time. 
(I.86) 
 
This cession of control over funding targets tallies with the idea that successful 
decisions arrived at autonomously are more empowering and more transformative than 
external impositions.  But the cultural specificity of locally targeted projects also makes 
Petrocaribe particularly important to the output legitimacy of local governments, for 
whom having no cooking gas for carnival, say, would be not only economically 
damaging, but also politically humiliating.  
 
Factors Impeding Progress and Reducing Impact 
Since Petrocaribe has been hugely important to Caribbean political economy, it would 
be easy to conclude that it represents an out-and-out success and a shining example of 
ALBA’s model of cooperative regionalism.  Yet, as with the TCP and SUCRE, the fine 
grain of its implementation is revealing, and again it calls into question the idea of 
ALBA as a regionalised form of endogenous development that reasserts autonomy and 
legitimises member governments. 
 
Governance and the Vulnerability of Venezuela-Centrism 
Ironically, given what we have seen about the value of Petrocaribe’s flexible 
governance, this is also the initiative’s great weakness.  For while Petrocaribe’s impact 
has been great in the recipient states that have been the main focus of this chapter, 
Venezuela’s lynchpin role makes consideration of its side of the Petrocaribe equation 
even more important. 
Economically speaking, the most obvious danger of Venezuela-centrism is that 
domestic problems could require Venezuela to rein in overseas assistance, meaning 
stricter application of Petrocaribe rules, changes to conditions, or even termination of 
the entire initiative.  Since Petrocaribe represents only 3 per cent of PDVSA’s total 
supply (PDVSA 2011, p.165), of which nearly half is sold on normal terms,134 this 
possibility may be overstated.  Domestic drags on foreign exchange such as currency 
                                                 
134 Assuming non-payment of upfront bills is not a general trend.  In Dominica, St Vincent and the 
Grenadines, and Antigua and Barbuda there is no suggestion that upfront obligations are not met. 
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arbitrage and oil smuggling are more draining and could be targeted first.  That said, 
these problems are longstanding and tenacious, meaning that changes to Petrocaribe 
could be favoured if circumstances force Venezuelan policymakers down the path of 
least resistance.  Such circumstances are not unlikely.  Despite massive foreign-
exchange earnings, Venezuela has suffered severe cash-flow problems, obliging it to 
contract foreign loans against future oil production.  Equally threatening are falls in 
production thus far masked by spiralling oil prices (Philip 2010).  Although 
development of the Orinoco Belt should reverse this trend long-term, exploitation has 
stalled amid disputes over the direction of 60-40 state-private ventures that reflect 
fractious state-private relations in the wider economy (Philip 2010, p.7).  Any 
compromise from either side may come too late for Petrocaribe.  The problem is that 
Petrocaribe’s more integrative aspects, particularly barter, are weakly implemented, 
leaving only development funding and the effective grant element of soft loans.  
Impressive though their impact may be, these are essentially transfers, making this one-
way oil-supply link Petrocaribe’s only “glue”.   Any threat to this aspect therefore 
represents a threat to the continued existence of the entire initiative. 
 The political risks are even greater.  Though Petrocaribe’s huge impact on 
Caribbean political economy represents a relatively minor outgoing for Venezuela, its 
politicisation by government and opposition alike inflates its significance 
enormously.135  For government supporters Petrocaribe solidarity is a desirable 
expression of LAC unity, a step towards realisation of a Bolivarian dream on hold since 
Congress of Panama in 1826.  But for the opposition it is one more case of “giving 
away the oil”, inexcusable foreign largesse depriving needy Venezuelans of their own 
resources (Primero Justicia 2010).  Though the former argument is dear to PSUV 
activists and enshrined in the popularly approved 1999 constitution, the latter argument 
also achieves significant traction and has become a cornerstone of opposition 
propaganda.  Primero Justicia (Justice First), the party of the main opposition 
challenger Henrique Capriles Radonski, includes both ALBA and Petrocaribe in the 
“List of Specific Gifts by Country” that it uses to substantiate the “regalando el 
petróleo” discourse (Primero Justicia 2010).  In recent years Capriles Radonski, edging 
ever closer to electoral victory, has repeatedly promised to rein in such “gifts”, meaning 
that Petrocaribe’s existence depends not on Venezuela, but on one Venezuelan party.  
Indeed, since control over Petrocaribe is funnelled via PDVSA and development funds 
at presidential discretion – parts of the parallel state described in chapter three (p.69) – 
                                                 
135 Again, controversial relations with Cuba are covered by a separate international agreement. 
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opposition electoral success would deliver the institutions implementing Petrocaribe 
into the hands of a president committed to its elimination.  This political vulnerability 
means it can only ever cast a short and diffuse shadow into the future.  While it may be 
high-impact, without a heavier anchor in LAC politics it could also prove short-lived. 
 
Cheap Loans and Over-Reliance 
A second potential long-term impact stems from Petrocaribe’s negligent attitude 
towards unsustainable levels of debt.  Generous though its terms may be, the initiative 
still involves debt, and this must be repaid eventually.  Yet, the risk of this debt slipping 
to unsustainable levels is increased by Petrocaribe’s conditions.  Short-term, the low 
upfront cost and grace period make loans extremely attractive, but if future amortisation 
is unaccounted for, accumulated repayments could become onerous (even with real-
terms reductions over time).  The Dominican Republic’s $3 billion debt to Petrocaribe 
is testament to this (Rojas 2013).  This possibility could be mitigated by oversight from 
Petrocaribe institutions, but in reality controls are weakly applied.  In fact, some 
signatories have consistently failed even to pay the upfront bill, making their debt far 
larger than predicted by this work’s calculations.136  Conversely, repeated condonation 
of Petrocaribe debt encourages recipients to rely on Petrocaribe funds to an even greater 
extent, whilst also providing further fuel for the Venezuelan “giving away the oil” 
discourse.  Were Petrocaribe an institutionalised, domestically uncontroversial, broad-
based regional supply network – potentially involving fellow ALBA energy exporters 
Ecuador and Bolivia – then this reliance would be less problematic, but none of these 
conditions obtains.  In reality, any such regional network would require the deeper 
integration that ALBA has thus far failed to provide, whereas it was the conflictual 
nature of Venezuelan political economy that led to creation of the parallel governance 
structures in which Petrocaribe is enmeshed.  As noted above, for all the flexibility that 
this has afforded, it also leaves Petrocaribe hostage to the political and economic 
fortunes of its Venezuelan architects.   
 
Conclusion: ALBA and Petrocaribe 
In the first instance, this assessment of the implementation of Petrocaribe serves to 
clarify much of the confusion responsible for “spinning the heads” of intelligence 
analysts and ALBA scholars alike.  Though the sums involved might not reach the dizzy 
                                                 
136 This appears to be common knowledge, but interviewees were reluctant to specify precisely which 
signatories were abusing the facility in this way. 
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heights of $29 billion as in Colibasanu’s erroneous calculation (2008), the relative 
smallness of recipient economies means that implementation of Petrocaribe’s central 
oil-bill financing aspect has indeed had a massive impact on Caribbean political 
economy.  In the ALBA literature, this is just one of many aspects of Petrocaribe that 
favour a regionalisation of endogenous-development strategies, increase LAC 
autonomy, and legitimise left-of-centre governments.  As in previous chapters on the 
TCP and SUCRE initiatives, it is the detail of how and why the implemented reality 
differs from this account that is most revealing. 
 Of the three initiatives studied, Petrocaribe boasts the clearest impact.  In a 
context where “it is simply a fact that … Central American and Caribbean governments 
have either limited or no capacity to finance policies to address shocks to their 
economies” (Sanders 2009) and signatories run persistent current-account deficits, 
Petrocaribe’s effective buffering of sharp oil-price hikes since 2005 implies financial 
benefits – both acknowledged and unacknowledged – that have engendered otherwise 
unattainable levels of stability and autonomy.  This favoured pursuance of the people-
centred aspect of local development strategies by encouraging maintenance of public 
spending that could easily have fallen victim to fiscal crises.  This support was 
redoubled by grant-based development funding and infrastructure upgrades carried out 
at Venezuela’s cost.  The impact of these aspects of Petrocaribe has been felt in 
domestic politics, where left-of-centre governments have endured and opposition 
stances towards Petrocaribe have softened. 
 However, there are various caveats.  Crucially, these impacts have been 
achieved only by channelling the initiative’s governance through Venezuela’s parallel 
state and thereby eliding many of the conflicts that have hampered implementation of 
the TCP and SUCRE.  More integrative aspects, which target an interdependence 
worthy of the “shared development” label, have largely failed, with ALBA Food all but 
invisible and barter implemented in just three countries and dominated by Nicaragua 
alone.  Not only was this parallel governance arrangement originally a result of the 
tense and often contradictory hybridity of Venezuelan political economy, it also remains 
exposed to the same destructive tensions.  First, given that Petrocaribe is a drag on 
foreign-exchange for a Venezuelan economy that has suffered cash-flow problems, it 
could quickly be terminated if domestic difficulties so demanded.  Second, the 
politicisation of solidaristic international relations combines with centralisation of 
parallel governance around the presidency to mean that Petrocaribe could easily fall into 
the hands of an opposition committed to its elimination.  Thus, while this ALBA 
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initiative in many ways enables progress towards the overarching project’s goals, 
hybridisation of national political economy means that it does so only by means that 
jeopardise a more lasting impact. 
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Chapter Seven: ALBA Reassessed 
 
The Bolivian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) is the continent's retort to 
the Free Trade Area of the Americas, the now buried corporatist dream of a 
free-trade zone stretching from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego. Though ALBA is 
still in its early stages, Emir Sader, the Brazil-based sociologist, describes its 
promise as “a perfect example of genuinely fair trade: each country provides 
what it is best placed to produce, in return for what it most needs, independent 
of global market prices.” … ALBA is essentially a barter system, in which 
countries decide for themselves what any given commodity or service is worth, 
rather than letting traders in New York, Chicago or London set the prices for 
them. That makes trade far less vulnerable to the kind of sudden price 
fluctuations that devastated Latin American economies in the recent past. 
Surrounded by turbulent financial waters, Latin America is creating a zone of 
relative economic calm and predictability, a feat presumed impossible in the 
globalization era. 
(Klein 2007, p.456) 
 
The central contribution of this work’s comprehensive and systematic analysis of 
ALBA’s implementation is to provide new insights into ALBA’s evolution and impact, 
thereby challenging misconceptions in the ALBA literature that feed into wider debates 
about LAC political economy.  To revisit Naomi Klein’s understanding of ALBA in 
light of this work’s reassessment is to realise the extent of the disconnect between 
ALBA in theory and ALBA in practice.  Is ALBA really as insulated from the global 
economy as Klein suggests?  Does it really embody such novel development strategies?  
Are its intraregional relations really so cooperative?  Unlike the many uncritical and 
unsubstantiated accounts of ALBA in the existing literature, this work can begin to 
answer these fundamental questions.  Our most basic finding is that implementation is 
uneven, with the TCP entirely unachieved, the SUCRE a distinctly qualified success, 
and Petrocaribe largely realising its aims.  But it is the fine grain of these 
implementations – and unimplementations – that is most revealing about the 
relationship between ALBA as a novel mode of regionalism and the national and global 
political economies within which its implementation is attempted. 
This concluding chapter will first pool findings relating to national political 
economies and to individual initiatives in order to substantiate the arguments laid out in 
the introduction and woven through the rest of this thesis.  This engages with many of 
the key debates in the ALBA literature and allows us ultimately to address the central 
research question within this work and its consequences for the ALBA literature and 
beyond.  Finally, potentially fruitful avenues for future research into ALBA will be 
discussed, alongside an appraisal of how this work and more recent developments in 
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LAC political economy might impact upon ALBA’s ability to provide the progressive, 
alternative form of regionalism sought by its designers and supporters alike. 
 
The Limits of Regionalised Endogenous Development 
The Regionalisation of Continuity and Change in ALBA Political Economies 
The first major issue in the ALBA literature is one common in the wider field of 
regionalism, where “the regional arena is treated as the ‘nation writ large’, in which 
domestic policy orientations are projected to the regional level” (Phillips 2004, p.35).  
Since the domestic policy orientations of ALBA’s New-Left governments envisage 
radical changes in the structures of their societies, economies, and international 
relations, it is these changes that we find projected to the regional level within accounts 
of ALBA.  Given Venezuela’s political, economic, geographical, and historical 
centrality to ALBA, its model of endogenous development – later radicalising into 
Twenty-First Century Socialism – has been seen as the defining influence on ALBA, 
albeit that Bolivia’s and Ecuador’s development trajectories are frequently considered 
comparable (amongst others, Escobar 2010; Rovira Kaltwasser 2010; Ellner 2013a).  
Essentially, this meant an inward-looking model rejecting market allocation in favour of 
state guidance, bolstering human capital and repaying a “social debt” to the poorest 
through social policy, moving the economy away from oil and towards state and social 
producers, and empowering citizens by facilitating their participation in every aspect of 
development.  Though with less emphasis on participation and less direct state 
participation in the economy (through nationalisation, say) than under Twenty First 
Century Socialism, Correa’s government in Ecuador broadly shared this vision.  
ALBA’s left-of-centre Anglophone Caribbean governments shared at least the pro-poor 
social focus, even if their economies were too exposed to external events and actors to 
allow for coherent development planning. 
 However, in Venezuela particularly the reality of domestic political economy 
diverged significantly from the model, even after more than a decade of attempts to 
implement it.  The private economy remained as dominant as ever – indeed its share of 
GDP had grown – whereas state participation had shrunk despite a swathe of 
nationalisations.  The heavily backed social economy remained miniscule, with a drive 
for widespread cooperativism producing paltry results.  Rather than producing a new 
revolutionary mindset, there was much evidence of corruption and pilfering of state 
resources, particularly through the foreign-exchange commission CADIVI, itself 
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designed to promote endogenous development by protecting local industries from 
foreign competition.  As Fernando Coronil concludes: 
 
Chávez has taken over the state, but cannot so easily revolutionize society.  He 
faces the challenge that all “nationalist” projects confront in the Global South: 
the contradiction or tension between national conditions of state legitimacy and 
the international conditions of capital accumulation, the difficulty of imagining 
a horizon beyond the capitalist market [resulting in] socialism by enumeration 
at best… 
(Coronil 2008, p.25)137 
 
In order to circumvent the tensions and contradictions caused by the persistence of these 
inherited features of Venezuelan political economy, Chávez created parallel governance 
and funding structures around the state oil company (PDVSA), which could be directed 
by the presidency.   
In Ecuador, meanwhile, Correa opted to reform existing institutions while 
focusing on their performance.  His move to focus on the needs of his marginalised 
constituency without directly confronting existing elites provoked less conflict, 
favouring implementation, but in reality a significant split in development policymaking 
was papered over rather than resolved.  Anglophone members remained in perpetual 
need of capital to cover budget expenditures and enable public-sector investment.  With 
traditional sources of assistance withdrawing, they could only attempt to diversify 
declining agricultural economies and maintain their “people-centred” development 
strategies by seeking out new sources of foreign assistance. 
 While ALBA’s model of regionalism might reflect and aim to reinforce the 
development strategies of its New-Left governments, their own dysfunctional 
implementation at the national level makes this extremely difficult.  Rather, ALBA’s 
regional initiatives can just as easily regionalise continuities within member’s hybrid 
political economies, even those that are most politically and socially damaging.  Thus, 
though the TCP had the greatest scope to deliver trade and investment regulations that 
could begin to deliver an “economic zone of shared development”, its implementation 
was hampered by various elements of national political economies not covered by a 
focus on New-Left development strategies.  Pre-existing trade structures and narrow 
export bases cast doubt on the ability of the TCP to produce the complementarities 
necessary to growth of mutually beneficial integration; a lack of state capacity 
combined with technocratic mindsets attuned to free-trade principles to impede 
                                                 
137 Since this quote comes from a rough transcript of an orally presented lecture, basic spelling errors in 
the written version have been removed for the sake of legibility. 
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establishment of a workable TCP-compliant agreement; ultimately, this new ACD 
format was thwarted by unresolved tensions inside the Ecuadorian state between two 
factions advocating for widely different trade and industrial policies. 
The SUCRE, for its part, was implemented in ALBA’s largest economies, 
managing to sidestep many of these issues thanks to its well-conceived design.   This 
delivered benefits to every sector of the economy, from EPS actors able to engage in 
international trade in local currencies, via large multinationals able to improve intra-
ALBA competitiveness by reducing transaction costs, right through to states able to 
save on foreign exchange by compensating SUCRE-zone trade balances every six 
months.  Yet, its progress was also severely hampered by the regionalisation of 
continuities in signatories’ national political economy.  Crucially, Venezuela’s basic 
import dependence translated into the export gains sought by Ecuador’s endogenous-
development model, but this lopsided SUCRE relationship wiped out 70 per cent of 
possible foreign-exchange gains in Venezuela.  Worse still, the SUCRE provided a new, 
large-scale channel for currency arbitrage, effectively allowing for regionalisation of 
longstanding corruption in Venezuelan political economy – involving state and non-
state actors alike – and draining the resources of an already cash-strapped state. 
Finally, Petrocaribe’s Caribbean-wide implementation and impressive impact 
are at once facilitated by and jeopardised by their dependence on parallel governance 
structures in Venezuela that arose from tensions in its own hybrid political economy.  
While this has yet to provoke any major crises, this parallel state’s lax accountability 
and oversight risk allowing Petrocaribe debt to creep up to unsustainable levels, 
whereas long-term impact is imperilled by the political fragility of this parallel’s state 
dependence on a sympathetic Venezuelan presidency. 
 
Asserting Autonomy Amidst International Constraints 
The second major issue relates to the international limits on ALBA’s ability to reassert 
the autonomy of its members and of LAC more widely.  New-Left governments in 
Venezuela and Ecuador share a common desire to promote LAC integration in order 
both to reduce dependency on extra-regional actors and also to favour creation of a LAC 
pole within a multipolar world order.  Indeed, even ALBA’s Anglophone Caribbean 
members have moved in this direction as the US has withdrawn from the Caribbean. 
 Implementation of the SUCRE and Petrocaribe has reflected and reinforced this 
process in various ways.  By design the SUCRE significantly improves the 
competitiveness of SUCRE-zone producers, favouring displacement of extra-SUCRE-
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zone imports by intra-SUCRE-zone imports and creating the kind of developmental 
interdependence sought by ALBA governments.  To the (apparently large) extent that it 
replaces trade by traditional channels it also removes the US dollar from SUCRE-zone 
trade, at once eliminating the usual seigniorage enjoyed by the Federal Reserve and 
defending the foreign-exchange reserves of participating countries.  Though not 
currently envisaged, this could be particularly significant if Ecuador opted to de-
dollarise its economy, since its clear position as a net SUCRE exporter means it benefits 
disproportionately from the positive sum of total foreign-exchange savings.  
Petrocaribe, meanwhile, is even more significant, effectively insulating almost the entire 
independent Caribbean from a doubling in oil prices.  This has shielded recipient states 
from the kinds of crises that have in the past led them to seek assistance – with strings 
attached – from IFIs.  Petrocaribe funds come only with a light “social purpose” 
conditionality, essentially allowing recipients to put funds towards pursuance of their 
own development strategies. 
 Yet, the TCP’s failure and problematic elements of the SUCRE also reveal how 
international commitments constrain this autonomy, not least because one state’s 
utilisation of ALBA initiatives to promote endogenous development can curtail 
another’s.  Prior even to the TCP, ALBA’s founding agreement was forced to work 
around the existing sub-regional commitments of CAN-member Venezuela, a problem 
only amplified in negotiations towards a multilateral TCP.  Nicaragua’s autonomy was 
circumscribed by its participation in CAFTA-DR; Anglophone Caribbean members 
could not risk further damage to their own ailing sub-regional CSME initiative; and, 
most surprisingly of all, Cuba clung tenaciously to WTO templates.  Even the bilateral 
TCP-ACD process was influenced by Venezuela’s and Ecuador’s common membership 
of the WTO, since technocrats charged with codifying the agreement feared that 
straying from established rules could provoke destructive trade sanctions from fellow 
members.  When the first Cooperation Framework Agreement was agreed, meanwhile, 
proposed political coordination of trade policy was undone by the threat posed to 
Ecuadorian producers by Venezuelan foreign-exchange controls (CADIVI).  These 
measures, designed to promote endogenous development, were so badly administered as 
to create an effective non-tariff barrier to Ecuadorian exports, whereas Ecuador was to 
open up its market with no such protection.  Thus, when Venezuela’s endogenous 
development model clashed with Ecuador’s via this international channel, Venezuela 
effectively constrained Ecuador’s involvement, ultimately leading Ecuador’s top-level 
trade institution COMEX to reject changes to existing CAN rules.   
 199 
 
 Though institutional constraints of this kind are less significant in the case of the 
SUCRE, the one clear exception is the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union, membership 
of which required that all three Anglophone ALBA be footnoted out of the original 
SUCRE agreement.138  More important here, however, is the way in which this 
international initiative can make one participant the constraint of another.  Thus, the 
severe imbalance in trade between Venezuela and Ecuador effectively enabled 
Ecuador’s endogenous-development drive while restricting the productive aspect of 
Venezuela’s.  Venezuelan officials tried to prevent this by restricting the SUCRE to 
somewhat peripheral product groups, but this would have nullified any effect of the 
SUCRE, whose benefits to states accrue proportional to the value of trade compensated.  
Venezuelan insistence on CADIVI approval for SUCRE transactions despite their 
supposed use of local currency, meanwhile, again acted as a barrier to Venezuelan 
exporters, albeit that underlying concerns about the system’s facilitation of currency-
arbitrage were justifiable. 
 
Legitimacy Bestowed: Better Out Than In 
The third key issue in the ALBA literature is the nature of any legitimacy reflected and 
reinforced by specific initiatives.  Existing accounts have tended to focus on the input 
legitimacy implied by participatory reforms and on the output-legitimacy dividend 
involved in providing effective solutions particularly to poorer sectors that brought 
New-Left governments to power.  Yet, any potential significance of input legitimacy 
was seriously undermined when this work consciously debarred analysis of ALBA’s 
Social Movements Council on the basis that it simply did not exist (chapter one, p.14).  
To the extent that all three initiatives made special provision for social-economy 
organisations, any demonstrable impact in this direction could at least be said to favour 
empowering participatory forms of economy at the national level.  Utilisation of the 
SUCRE by EPS producers – or their umbrella organisations – and Petrocaribe’s creation 
of fishing cooperatives in Dominica do represent evidence of this.  Yet, the 
groundbreaking inclusion of this sector in TCP-ACD negotiations via new EPS-
promotion institutions in Ecuador can only have resulted in a delegitimisation, since 
their input was effectively ignored when existing CAN rules were renewed. 
                                                 
138 That said, if applications for full ALBA membership from St Lucia and St Kitts and Nevis proceed to 
completion, ALBA members could soon represent a majority within this grouping.  Collectively, its 
member-states could decide to enter into the SUCRE. 
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 There is better support in this research for the idea that ALBA regionalism 
reinforces output legitimacy, though not only amongst the core constituencies of 
member governments.  While the appeal of ALBA initiatives as designed may be 
strongest for these constituencies, their implementation – and therefore impact – is best 
achieved where gains are distributed widely and more secularly than ideologically 
attractive.  Thus, the SUCRE’s expert design creates positive-sum gains across the 
board, one of which happens to be the creation of new export channels for EPS actors 
more likely to figure amongst incumbent governments’ supporters.  However, an 
inherent reduction in transaction costs and the consequent boost to SUCRE-zone 
competitiveness is equally beneficial to a multinational like Continental Tyres and even 
to an opposition-linked Venezuelan giant like Polar.  States themselves also achieve 
foreign-exchange savings proportional to the amount of normal trade replaced by 
SUCRE trade.  With the SUCRE achieving such broadly distributed benefits, essentially 
no social group or individual state stands to lose; even if gains are uneven, they are still 
gains in all cases.  This discourages any direct or indirect conflict, allowing 
implementation to proceed more effectively.  This more efficacious, broad-based 
implementation could in turn see the SUCRE reinforcing a wider trend towards regional 
currency arrangements that favour the multipolar world order sought by ALBA’s larger 
states. 
 Similarly, Petrocaribe’s openness to every independent state of the Caribbean, 
irrespective of the ideological leanings of incumbent governments, allows it to achieve 
its impressive reach and impact.  Petrocaribe does favour a social focus more commonly 
associated with left-of-centre governments through its simple “social purpose” criterion 
for utilisation of associated funds.  Since this mild conditionality complements the 
platforms of left-of-centre governments and emanates from a regional institution, it is 
particularly useful in legitimising prioritisation of their favoured “people-centred” 
strategies.  But while it also constitutes a leftward nudge for right-of-centre 
governments fearful of jeopardising Petrocaribe’s wider financial benefits, the “social 
purpose” criterion is broadly interpreted and only weakly applied, weighing lightly in 
the balance alongside the basic foreign-exchange savings and access to grant funding at 
the heart of the initiative.  Since Petrocaribe provokes little ideological rejection – 
indeed, many opposition parties have reversed initial hostility – the autonomy of the 
entire Caribbean region is boosted and its developmental destiny interlinked with that of 
Venezuela.  This broad-based and effective implementation brings the peoples and 
politicians of LAC into greater contact, which is a necessary first step on the road 
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towards ALBA’s long-term goal of converting its current “offer” to all of LAC into a de 
jure pan-regional grouping.  With Dominica, St Vincent, and Antigua all having 
transitioned from participation in Petrocaribe to full ALBA membership; St Lucia and 
Suriname in the process of doing the same; and St Kitts “in the waiting room” (ALBA 
Secretaría Executiva 2013), there are signs that this light-touch regionalism is at least 
beginning to provoke deeper integration. 
 The greatest threat to the output legitimacy provided by ALBA initiatives is a 
concomitant lack of control legitimacy, with accountability undermined by 
centralisation, opacity, and poor monitoring.  The clearest example here is Venezuela’s 
foreign exchange commission CADIVI, whose uncertain mix of incompetence and 
corruption hampers implementation of the SUCRE and Petrocaribe in particular.  In the 
SUCRE’s case false transactions for currency arbitrage mean that at least a quarter of all 
SUCRE trade serves only to enrich elements wealthy enough to participate on a large 
scale.  In Petrocaribe’s case, meanwhile, the centralisation and deficient monitoring of 
the parallel state through which its governance is channelled favour the accumulation of 
unsustainable debts in recipient countries.  The longevity and orientation of this parallel 
state around PDVSA are also dubious given the politicisation of its existence and 
activities in Venezuela.  Should these parallel governance structures be dismantled or 
pass into opposition control, Petrocaribe could slowly peter out, with individual states’ 
annually renewable supply contracts simply left to expire. 
 
Misinterpretation of Venezuela and Neglect of Other Member-States 
The fourth issue in the literature relates to the role of Venezuela in particular.  Though 
justifiably identified as the key source of the ideas and funding behind ALBA, this work 
reveals that Venezuelan involvement in specific initiatives frequently comes at a cost to 
their implementation and impact. 
 Implementation of the TCP failed at the first attempt because the text of the 
CFA put forward by Venezuela simultaneously failed to codify the principles of the 
TCP and made changes to tariff regimes so sweeping that they provoked opposition 
from conservative elements within Correa’s government.  This was partly because – by 
accident or by design – the unavailability of foreign exchange from Venezuela’s 
CADIVI would have protected its producers just as Ecuador’s were exposed to new 
competition from Venezuela.  Implementation of the SUCRE was temporarily stalled 
and almost thwarted by Venezuelan insistence on its restriction to products peripheral to 
Venezuela-Ecuador trade, which – owing to its centralised governance – could only be 
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resolved by direct presidential discussions.  Again, a combination of incapacity and 
corruption in CADIVI allowed Venezuelan importers to drain hundreds of millions of 
dollars from state coffers, with the most alarming aspect of this being involvement even 
of state enterprises.  This only exacerbates domestic cash-flow problems that have 
affected the quality of public services in Venezuela, thereby damaging the government’s 
output legitimacy.  Since Petrocaribe – amongst other international oil agreements – 
represents a further drag on foreign-exchange and is controlled through parallel 
governance structures centring on PDVSA and the presidency, the Venezuelan 
opposition has been able to link domestic problems with Petrocaribe, branding it an 
anti-democratic and indefensible example of “giving away the oil”.  The fact that 
Petrocaribe is indeed reliant on this parallel state and does involve transfers to importing 
states allows this discourse to achieve a level of traction that makes it a real threat to the 
initiative’s continued existence. 
 This is not to lay the blame entirely at Venezuela’s door.  Contrary to the 
existing literature’s focus on Cuba – and occasionally Bolivia – Ecuador’s role has also 
been highly significant.  Correa’s less confrontational posture towards existing elites in 
Ecuador has strengthened the institutionalisation and efficacy of his Citizens’ 
Revolution, but it has only papered over ideological schisms between his Alianza PAIS 
and conservative elements linked to large agro-exporters.  It was ultimately this division 
that dealt the death blow to the TCP-ACD process, for example.  But, overall, 
Ecuador’s role has been positive.  It was Ecuadorian technocrats that produced the 
ACD, which remains the closest thing to a practicable TCP yet created, despite its non-
implementation.  In a remarkably short time the same team managed to design and 
implement the SUCRE such that its functionality and utility were clear to all 
stakeholders.  In practice, excepting transactions involving Venezuela, officials report 
no problems whatsoever, with low levels of pre-existing trade representing the main 
brake on non-Venezuelan SUCRE trade (I.45).  Thus, despite problems relating to 
Venezuelan political economy, Ecuadorian expertise has ensured generalised uptake of 
the SUCRE, with the mechanism attracting interest even outside of ALBA.  Though the 
depiction of Anglophone ALBA members as “region-takers” rather than “region-
makers” is largely accurate – and somewhat inevitable given their size – they do share 
elements of the domestic and foreign policies of their larger Latin American partners.  
Petrocaribe signatories – to whom ALBA remains only an “offer” – also retain broad 
control over the internal effects of the initiative thanks to its hands-off governance.  For 
both reasons the Caribbean experience of ALBA undermines the claim that the project 
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reflects Venezuelan geopolitical expansionism, even if Caribbean involvement is 
primarily a question of economic need. 
 
Failed Implementation, Failed Transformation 
Fifth and finally, whilst existing accounts of ALBA frequently endow it with 
appreciable transformative power, this research suggests instead that ALBA’s 
implementation is best achieved where initiatives have the least transformative 
potential.  Since failings in implementation mitigate impact, poor implementation 
effectively precludes the kinds of transformation envisaged in the literature. 
 The initiative with the most potential to deliver the “economic zone of shared 
development” sought by ALBA is the TCP, since this was designed to enable 
negotiation of a comprehensive multilateral agreement.  This aimed to invert many of 
the liberalising principles of traditional FTAs and regulate intra-ALBA trade and 
investment in such a way as to exploit or create complementarities between its parties.  
This having failed, the bilateral TCP-ACD process looked to establish a TCP-compliant 
trade relationship at least between ALBA’s largest trading partners, with any deal 
representing a possible template for other intra-ALBA bilateral agreements.  However, 
since neither the multilateral nor the bilateral negotiations produced any change in trade 
and investment regulations, this initiative has been anything but transformative.  In fact, 
if it has had any impact at all, this has been negative.  Fraught and protracted talks 
ultimately proved fruitless, delegitimising the TCP in the eyes of officials within ALBA 
member-states and surely also within those LAC countries to whom ALBA represents a 
permanently open “offer” of integration.  The TCP thus holds “the threat of the bad 
example”, its logic invalidated purely by its poor execution. 
 As noted above, the SUCRE as implemented presents secular gains across the 
board, even if it does present new opportunities particularly for SMEs and the social 
economy.  Domestically, therefore, it is not likely to engender any radical shifts in 
social structures.  Indeed, if its use owes to participation of big business, this sector may 
gain the most from the SUCRE, thereby exacerbating the very inequalities that ALBA 
seeks to address.  Worse still, where the SUCRE is abused for currency arbitrage, it 
reinforces the position of those with the capital to participate, without even the 
consolation of stimulating real production.  The one element designed to favour 
participant states with weaker export sectors, the Reserves and Commercial 
Convergence Fund (FRCC), is underfunded and has barely been implemented.  Even if 
it had been implemented fully, its design means that the unnatural imbalance in SUCRE 
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trade between Venezuela and Ecuador would see the richer partner benefitting.  
Regionally speaking, however, the provision of a competitive advantage to SUCRE-
zone producers is indeed significant.  Inasmuch as the SUCRE grows to include other 
LAC countries, the displacement of extra-LAC trade by intra-LAC trade will grow.  But 
since Venezuela has blocked Ecuadorian calls to expand the system beyond ALBA 
(I.45), this potential has been limited to the future addition of Nicaragua and the 
Anglophone states (assuming this could be agreed with other ECCU members).  Outside 
LAC, however, the SUCRE’s relative success does reinforce a trend towards regional 
currency arrangements that could eventually have wider implications for the global 
political economy. 
 While the largely implemented Petrocaribe initiative has become hugely 
important to Caribbean political economy, even its impact could not be considered 
transformative.  It has helped signatories to stay on an even keel and to undertake 
changes in their developmental trajectories that would otherwise have proved even more 
difficult, but the underlying vulnerabilities remain.  Petrocaribe’s barter element – much 
vaunted in the ALBA literature – and ALBA Food are largely unimplemented, yet 
between them these two features aimed to provide new export channels that could best 
counteract a decline in agricultural exports and the capriciousness of tourist demand.  
With Petrocaribe unidirectional and narrowly focused on Venezuelan oil, its long-term 
impact remains contingent on the vagaries of a Venezuelan political economy not 
known for its stability.  That said, Petrocaribe as implemented has favoured closer 
relations between the Caribbean and Latin America, though it remains too early to judge 
whether this increasing interaction heralds a more significant shift. 
 
Returning to the Research Question 
At its outset this work asked to what extent ALBA represents a coherent model of 
regionalism reflecting and reinforcing the reforms of its New-Left member-states.  The 
preceding exposition and analysis of ALBA’s implementation allows us not only to 
respond in ways that diverge markedly from dominant accounts in the literature, but 
also to achieve a greater degree of confidence in these responses thanks to the extensive 
primary research and comprehensive, systematic approach that shaped them. 
In truth the precise wording of the question is secondary, for its value has been 
to guide a critical examination of ALBA as a regional project and its relationship to the 
political economy of its members.  Yet, because implementation is uneven and fine-
grained, the inclusion of “extent” is key, though it applies to each aspect of the question 
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individually.  This research reveals that ALBA is coherent as a model aiming to use 
states-led regionalism to reinforce the development strategies of its member-states.  But, 
the implementation of this model is incoherent, for any reinforcement is partial and 
often contradictory.  Though ALBA does reflect changes in national political economy 
associated with its New-Left governments, they are not necessarily the changes or 
governments foregrounded in a literature focusing heavily on Venezuela and Cuba.  
Further, the reforms of ALBA governments represent only the volitional, guided aspects 
of political economy that are under effective state control, but ALBA’s core economic 
initiatives allow a plethora of actors to regionalise wider aspects of political economies 
that are more hybridised and dysfunctional than the ALBA literature would have us 
believe.  ALBA’s aims have been advanced by the SUCRE and Petrocaribe, but more 
fundamentally integrative aspects like the TCP and Petrocaribe barter have foundered.  
Thus, while it is unfair and inaccurate to claim that “[ALBA] has not advanced and rests 
for the moment in declarations and on paper” (Eric Toussaint in Ferrari 2010), its 
cooperative, complementary “economic zone of shared development” does remain – por 
ahora – a distant dream.139 
 
Removing the Brackets 
Before settling on this conclusion, however, we must consider whether or not the 
restriction of our analysis to these initiatives in these countries pre-defined its results.  
That is, could examination of the ALBA not covered here significantly alter our 
findings? 
 As was outlined in chapter one (pp.11-19), much depends on how we define the 
limits of ALBA, but even with this rider, it is unlikely that removing the brackets from 
the rest of ALBA’s multifarious initiatives could shake this central conclusion.  The 
most serious objection is undoubtedly that regionalised misiones cannot be ignored.  
Yet, to reiterate an earlier argument (chapter one, p.15), with the exception of Barrio 
Adentro in Venezuela – and to a lesser extent Bolivia – their impact is inherently 
irregular and periodic, remaining a far cry from the goal of a complementary and 
cooperative zone of shared development.  Though their particular travails demand 
greater research, it is also clear that other much-touted initiatives such as the Social 
Movements Council, the ALBA Bank, and Grandnational companies and projects have 
largely failed to achieve traction, whereas Structural Convergence Funds never even left 
                                                 
139 “Por ahora” (“for now”) was the phrase used by Hugo Chávez in publicly accepting the failure of his 
1992 coup.  It established the expectation that he would return, thereby reinforcing his ability to do so. 
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the drawing board.  Beyond these initiatives, however, ALBA’s offshoots are so many 
and various that some have not even been mentioned in this work.  In this category we 
find, for example, a small chain of Venezuelan shops selling subsidised clothing 
sourced from ALBA countries (Tiendas ALBA);140 a cultural fund promoting the arts via 
events and some remarkably generous annual awards (ALBA Cultural/Fondo Cultural 
del ALBA);141 and a biennial ALBA Games welcoming athletes from across the LAC 
region.142  There are even micro-initiatives about which virtually nothing is known, as 
with the extension of a Cuban-Venezuelan physical-education misión to Ecuador 
(Ministerio del Deporte 2010).143  Yet, even if these initiatives do produce significant 
results in their own arenas – itself a dubious supposition given this work’s findings on 
implementation – the sum of their impact would not represent an integration of the kind 
sought by ALBA and reflected in the literature.  This is not because the economic 
domain is inherently the domain of regionalism, but rather because it modulates levels 
of intraregional interaction, which is the source of those interpersonal and cultural links 
that could make a regional community of once discrete national elements.144  Even those 
accounts that include the “offer” aspects of ALBA in de jure non-member states still 
have at their core the economic initiatives dealt with here.  If this core is as 
dysfunctional as suggested by our analysis, can the variegated periphery of ALBA 
really compensate for this weakness?  The declarations of its leaders (see Castro 2012) 
and their repeated returns to issues of economic integration suggest that it cannot. 
 
The Implications of an Incomplete ALBA 
ALBA’s largely frustrated attempts to implement a progressive alternative to the 
neoliberal model of regionalism have implications not only for research into ALBA 
itself, but also for scholars of LAC political economy and of regionalism. 
 
                                                 
140 “ALBA Shops”.  There were four in Caracas during fieldwork for this research, and they did start out 
selling Bolivian goods, though the provenance of later merchandise was less clear. 
141 There are in fact two organisations with similar names and remits: the Fondo Cultural del ALBA 
(“ALBA Cultural Fund”) in Caracas and ALBA Cultural (“Cultural ALBA”) in Havana.  Prizes for 
literature and arts are worth $75,000 each. 
142 Four such meets have been held since 2005, alternating between hosts Cuba and Venezuela.  The 2013 
games were to be held in Ecuador but did not materialise (perhaps owing to the death of Hugo Chávez). 
143 Between Venezuela and Cuba this is Barrio Adentro Deportivo (“Sport in the Neighbourhood”), 
becoming in Ecuador Barrio Activo (“Active Neighbourhood”). 
144 London is now France’s sixth largest city, for example, only because the EU’s single market facilitated 
this mass migration. 
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Interrogating ALBA Anew 
This work suggests that a key question for scholars of ALBA should be, how can a 
model of regionalism advocating for alternative forms of economic and international 
relations be built within national and global political economies shaped by the 
neoliberal model that they oppose?  Or, as Félix Arellano puts it, is it possible to 
overcome the basic “contradiction … that ALBA demonises free trade yet is constructed 
on free-trade foundations”? (in Lander 2007, p.23).  This means a move away from 
analysing the inspirations and aspirations of ALBA and towards the interface between 
its proposals and their reality, the interests, attitudes, and institutional commitments of 
those building, blocking, or simply ignoring ALBA initiatives. 
Furthermore, it highlights the fact that ALBA’s superficial novelty only papers 
over many of the traditional problems of regionalism.  For example, ALBA has tried to 
sidestep the issue of what “glue” can bind the regional project together by maintaining a 
flexible “à la carte” form of non-treaty institutionalisation (Girvan 2011b).  This allows 
member-states to participate selectively in individual institutions which do not require 
ratification in domestic parliaments.  When ALBA stagnates – as is the “two steps 
forward, one step back” nature of all regional projects (Breslin & Higgott 2000, p.334) 
– what will prevent its members from drifting apart?  ALBA explicitly revives the 
politics of LAC identity and implicitly suggests that material quality-of-life 
improvements delivered by the regionalisation of solidarity logics will effectively make 
“el pueblo” the institutional memory of ALBA (as confirmed by I.19).  But is this 
“glue” strong enough to neutralise the pull of other regional and multilateral 
institutions?  Or will the reinvigoration of Mercosur and the invention of the anti-ALBA 
Pacific Alliance (of Mexico, Colombia, Peru, and Chile) split ALBA’s “offer” in two?  
Indeed, if ALBA’s level of implementation fails to demonstrate progress on its own 
terms, would this “offer” be attractive enough to increase ALBA membership even in 
the absence of other competing offers?  Meanwhile, ALBA has also justified the 
dominant role of its sub-regional hegemon Venezuela in terms of a principled 
commitment to S&D in economic relations, but this work raises doubts about the extent 
to which this “asymmetrical solidarity” (Girvan 2011b) can be insulated from domestic 
politics in a state where “sowing the oil”145 at home can trump “giving away the oil” 
abroad. 
 
                                                 
145 “Sembrando el petróleo” like “regalando el petróleo” is a classic trope of Venezuelan political 
discourse, suggesting investment of oil profits for the benefit of the nation. 
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Implications for Early Theorisations of Contemporary LAC Regionalism 
For scholars of contemporary LAC regionalism, meanwhile, this work at once supports 
and questions theorisations of a new wave of “post-liberal” regionalism substantiated by 
the emergence of ALBA and UNASUR.  These theorisations have centred on various 
returns vis-à-vis the preceding open-regionalism wave: the return of the state, of 
politics, of the development agenda, and of sovereignty as valid means and ends of 
regionalism (Sanahuja 2008; Serbin 2011).  Yet, since UNASUR is relatively young – 
dating from 2008 – and has neither achieved nor sought to achieve a clear approach to 
economic issues, their empirical basis is dominated by ALBA.  Whilst ALBA initiatives 
as designed certainly favour these “returns”, that they do so as implemented is less 
clear.  Though there is also a recognition of continuities in national political economy, 
the emphasis – as in the ALBA literature – is on the more eye-catching, novel elements 
of contemporary LAC regionalism. 
Diana Tussie’s “defensive regionalism” sees ALBA, UNASUR, and Mercosur 
as curbs on the political, economic, social, and cultural power of the US.  Again, there is 
an acceptance of aspects of liberalisation, but alternative regional projects serve also to 
elide, forestall, or redress associated adjustment costs, allowing the state to resist and 
shape international markets on behalf of domestic actors and create an “inner circle of 
consensus with key domestic constituencies and some other selected states” (Tussie 
2009, p.188).  There is “no grand strategy” in these essentially contestatory projects, 
which remain “diverse and brittle” (Tussie 2009, p.188).  While this captures some of 
the reality of ALBA as implemented, it also underestimates the extent to which ALBA 
does represent a grand strategy, but one whose realisation is undermined by a lack of 
inner consensus.  ALBA is – as in Sanahuja’s post-liberal regionalism (2008) – 
genuinely concerned with “positive” regionalism that creates new cooperative structures 
as opposed to “negative” regionalism that dismantles barriers; its initiatives are more 
than palliatives to wider liberalisation. 
 Olivier Dabène, meanwhile, sees contemporary LAC regionalism as a 
transitional lull of hybridity between the preceding open-regionalism wave and a model 
yet to be fully defined but referring back to the structuralism of the ISI period.  As such, 
his “post-trade regionalism” brings a renewed emphasis on autonomy and shared 
productive development, alongside “an active role of the State, supplemented by civil 
society participation and granting the regional institutions with redistributive capacities” 
(Dabène 2012b, p.17).  This theorisation clearly draws on and corresponds to many 
elements of ALBA as designed, but this work has argued that civil-society involvement 
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is minimal; redistributive regional initiatives have been overplayed; and cooperative 
productive development has had lopsided results.  Dabène differs from other scholars of 
contemporary LAC regionalism, however, in his emphasis on the inherent “sovereignty 
trap” created by promotion of autonomy and regional integration at one and the same 
time (Dabène 2012b, p.26), a notion substantiated by member-states impingement on 
each other’s autonomy when brought into contact by ALBA’s regional initiatives. 
 
Implications for the Study of Regionalism 
There has been a growing recognition in the field of regionalism that implementation 
can no longer be ignored, and this work only reinforces this recognition.  As Rick Fawn 
concluded in a wide-ranging review of the literature of regionalism: 
 
The degree of institutionalisation – formal procedures and structures that 
regulate and facilitate the functioning of the region ... serves as a means to 
determine the group’s aims and evaluate them ... We need thereafter, to ask 
how existing these institutions are. 
(Fawn 2009, p.19) 
 
While – in the absence of reliable primary data – the literature of ALBA has tackled the 
former element of regionalism, it has tended to be very quiet on the latter.  The design 
and approach of this work, on the other hand, have heeded Fawn’s advice and 
demonstrated the utility of studying this oft-ignored “implementation gap” (Gray 2013). 
 Yet, there is more to it.  A focus only on the implementation of proposed 
initiatives and institutions does not necessarily imply the study of their 
“unimplementation”.  This approach still directs studies of regionalism towards those 
areas designated for regional interaction; we may observe that the ALBA Bank has not 
been fully implemented, but the natural inclination is to consider it mainly in terms of 
the utility of intra-ALBA development financing, though its implementation may be 
hindered by any number of other problems.  Essentially, though the acceptable ambit of 
regionalist scholarship has grown ever broader and deeper, it has continued to focus 
primarily on states-led regionalism and its relationship to multi-actor regionalisation 
within its own proposed domains of action; where states agree an FTA, for example, we 
might predictably consider the regionalisation involved in new private-sector trade 
between member-states.  But this work has shown that states-led initiatives can also 
bring about the unintended regionalisation of aspects of national political economies 
that defy governmental control, as in the case of Venezuelan currency arbitrage via the 
SUCRE.  These are the often overlooked areas of “ungovernance” (Leander 2002; 
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Meagher 2007).  This work also shows that the net effect of the interaction between 
regionalism and regionalisation, between an institutionalised regional project and areas 
of “ungovernance”, can be either disintegrative or integrative, as recognised by the New 
Regionalism (Hettne & Söderbaum 2002). 
 
Avenues for Future Research 
Given that the ALBA literature is small and self-referential, there are a plethora of 
research areas and approaches that could produce valuable new insights. 
 In terms of the empirical focus, this work discounted at its outset any analysis of 
various initiatives frequently deemed central to ALBA’s nature and purpose.  This owed 
primarily to their relative marginality to ALBA’s proposed “economic zone of shared 
development”, but partly also to the apparent tenuousness of their existence.  This 
work’s demonstration of the value of studying “unimplementation” suggests that much 
could be learnt from considering also the specific travails of the ALBA Bank, 
Grandnational projects and enterprises, and the Social Movements Council, amongst 
others.  Though regionalised missions have received much attention in the literature, 
their full extent and impact has yet to be probed in real depth.  This work’s approach 
could also be extended into the remaining de jure member-states, Cuba, Bolivia, and 
Nicaragua, so as to verify that its findings can be applied to the entire formal region.  
Beyond the de jure ALBA, studies to date have considered “offer” countries only from 
ALBA’s point of view, yet a simple survey of postures towards ALBA in non-member 
LAC states could gauge the potential of this “offer”.146  This should prove particularly 
revealing in the Anglophone Caribbean, where Petrocaribe increasingly acts as a 
halfway house for states moving on to deeper involvement with Latin America.  Given 
the dominant yet opaque role of Venezuela in ALBA governance, a sustained attempt to 
clarify how decisions and policies are made and executed within ALBA might help us 
to understand the nature of the project and of Venezuela’s own complex and often 
contradictory governance. 
 There are also a number of alternative approaches to the same processes that 
could build upon the findings of this research.  Given the apparent importance of 
networks of actors inside and outside of the state, new insights might be gained from 
approaching ALBA regionalism as a question of developmental regimes, as recently 
applied by Christopher Wylde in the southern cone (2012).  This concept focuses on 
coalitions of interest characterised by “a sustained fusion among the institutions of the 
                                                 
146 Data could be gleaned from official or media sources, thereby negating the need for costly fieldwork. 
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state, particular segments of the socioeconomic order, and a particular bias in public 
policy orientation” (Pempel 1999, p.157).  This is redolent of divisions in Venezuela 
and Ecuador and their influence on progress of the TCP and SUCRE.  This might be 
complemented by – or indeed combined with – the idea of regulatory regionalism, 
wherein postures towards regional projects are disputed across the institutional space of 
the state, with “regionalisation” of certain issues a strategic move to keep them in or out 
of national political contestation (Hameiri & Jayasuriya 2011). 
 In a similar vein, given the observed hybridity of ALBA’s regional political 
economy and the fact that its “unimplementation” – the aspects of its initiatives that 
remain absent – dwarfs its implementation, ALBA’s uneven imprint could also be 
studied in terms of “variegated neoliberalization” (Brenner et al. 2010).  That is, ALBA 
could be seen as a regional challenge to a wider neoliberalisation process, its initiatives 
stalling and at times inverting elements of this process, but elsewhere being swept away 
by it.  Analysis of how and why particular initiatives stand and fall could improve our 
understanding both of ALBA and of neoliberalisation more broadly.  Zooming in to the 
micro level, the Cultural Political Economy approach developed by Bob Jessop and 
Ngai-Ling Sum – thus far copious in theoretical depth but thin on empirical applications 
– could be employed to study how ALBA political economy contributes “to the ongoing 
struggles around the future of a (post-)Washington Consensus world (dis-)order” (Sum 
2009, referring to Venezuela).  While this approach, like that of “variegated 
neoliberalization”, tends to consider processes, mechanisms, and practices that 
reproduce forms of capitalism (Sum 2005), its focus on the complex relationship 
between material and discursive resources could equally be applied to the minutiae of 
(often thwarted) alternative projects to halt and reverse these processes.  Particularly 
interesting in this regard might be a comparative study of the concretisation of ALBA 
versus that of its newly minted antithesis the Pacific Alliance; while the latter goes with 
the grain of continuities in national and global political economy, ALBA has 
consistently had to go against it. 
 
The Future of ALBA 
The findings of this research have in many ways been corroborated by changes in 
ALBA political economy since the period covered, whereas its insights also enable us, 
finally, to make informed judgements about its future trajectory. 
 As noted above, the continued centrality of ALBA’s economic domain was 
illustrated in 2012 by the EcoALBA initiative, which resurrected the TCP’s goal of 
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creating an “economic zone of shared, interdependent, sovereign, and solidaristic 
development, destined to consolidate and expand a new alternative model of economic 
relations” (ALBA-TCP 2012, Article I).  Though the death of Hugo Chávez in early 
2013 brought new uncertainties about the future of an organisation built and guided by 
his hand, his successor Nicolás Maduro has delivered successive election victories for 
the ruling PSUV.  Having initially promised simply to maintain Venezuelan support for 
ALBA, he has since taken a path towards reform that could yet prove to be the death or 
the consolidation of ALBA as an alternative mode of regionalism.  Many of his changes 
have targeted the obstructive tensions detailed in this work.  At home Maduro has 
launched a crusade against state and private corruption, publicising and politicising 
currency arbitrage, an issue to which previous administrations had turned a blind eye.  
He has reformed foreign-exchange allocation and dismantled CADIVI, the body 
undermining the implementation of the TCP and SUCRE.  Following Nicaragua’s 
adoption of the SUCRE, Maduro has – unlike Chávez – authorised its expansion to 
wider LAC, with Uruguay already seeking to join.  He has also overseen Venezuela’s 
graduation to full membership of Mercosur.   
Again speaking to the relevance of our findings, Maduro’s counterpart in 
Ecuador, Rafael Correa, has formalised the observed split in trade policy by dividing 
MRECI into a Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility (under Ricardo Patiño) 
and a new Ministry of Foreign Trade (under former Vice-Minister for Trade Francisco 
Rivadeneira, with Nathalie Cely becoming ambassador to the US).  Accordingly, the 
ACD concept has been gutted of any radical content, and Ecuador has reopened 
negotiations with the EU over the same multipart agreement that it rejected in 2009.  
Correa has also begun to investigate the possibility of full membership of Mercosur.  In 
the Caribbean conditions remain unforgiving, with St Lucia, Suriname, and St Kitts and 
Nevis all in the process of upgrading from Petrocaribe to full ALBA membership.  The 
eternal controversy over its own sub-regional integration processes rumbles on, belying 
the urgency implicit in the title of the Time for Action report to which the debate has 
repeatedly returned (West Indian Commission 1992). 
 ALBA’s response to these changes has been to propose a grand regional 
convergence, as outlined by Venezuela’s Energy Minister and president of PDVSA at a 
joint Petrocaribe-ALBA summit in December 2013: 
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Our strategic orientation is to link Petrocaribe’s economic zone with an ALBA 
economic zone, with CARICOM, and with Mercosur.  That is, to create a 
powerful space of economic, political, and social exchange between our 
countries.  
(Rafael Ramírez, quoted in El Comercio 2013) 
 
Again in line with our findings, the task of analysing this potential convergence has 
wisely been assigned to the same capable Ecuadorian technocrats responsible for the 
SUCRE and ACD.  Yet, given what we have seen about ALBA’s ability to achieve this 
degree of integration even between its core Latin American members, the omens for 
such an ambitious multilateral agreement are not good.  Though the outcome is clearly 
uncertain, current trends in the region suggest that any convergence could easily see 
ALBA’s progressive character diluted into an expanded and essentially unreformed 
Mercosur. 
If “those fighting for a better world” are to avert this possibility and to continue 
“building their hopes with [ALBA]” (Regueiro Bello 2008, p.327), this work’s analysis 
of ALBA’s implementation shows that they must begin by reconciling its romance with 
its realities. 
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Appendix One: Interviews 
 
Relevant acronyms: 
ALP  Antigua Labour Party; largest opposition party in Antigua and Barbuda 
FLACSO Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences, Quito 
IAEN  Institute of Higher National Studies; Ecuadorian state diplomacy school 
IPG  Pedro Gual Institute, Caracas; Venezuelan state diplomacy school 
MAGAP Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, Aquaculture and Fisheries, Ecuador 
NDP  New Democratic Party; largest opposition party in St Vincent 
PDV CAB PDV (Petróleos de Venezuela) Caribe Antigua and Barbuda 
PDV Caribe Petróleos de Venezuela Caribe; PDVSA subsidiary executing Petrocaribe 
PSUV  United Socialist Party of Venezuela; ruling party of Chávez and Maduro 
RCTV  Radio Caracas Televisión; opposition aligned TV station, Venezuela 
SELA  Latin American Economic System; Caracas-based regional institution 
SENPLADES National Planning and Development Secretariat, Ecuador 
UBV  Universidad Bolivariana de Venezuela, Caracas, Venezuela 
UCV  Universidad Central de Venezuela, Caracas, Venezuela 
ULA  Universidad de los Andes, Mérida/Táchira, Venezuela 
ULAC  Universidad Latinoamericana y del Caribe, Caracas, Venezuela 
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme 
UWI  University of the West Indies 
 
Venezuela: 
 
No. Date Participant 
1 14/9/10 ALBA specialist, IPG 
2 16/9/10 Journalist, with Globovisión and El Nacional 
3 22/9/10 ALBA researcher at ULA, Mérida 
4 29/9/10 Expert in international relations, formerly of UCV  
5 4/10/10 Mid-level official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
6 5/10/10 Journalist, formerly of RCTV 
7 10/10/10 Official of state bank involved in financing international trade 
8 15/10/10 Former Director General of the Andean Community 
9 16/10/10 Convenor of ALBA Social Movements Council’s Venezuelan Chapter 
10 18/10/10 Official of the ALBA Secretariat 
11 18/10/10 Two officials of state bank involved in financing international trade 
12 20/10/10 Corporate participant in SUCRE workshop 
13 20/10/10 Corporate participant in SUCRE workshop 
14 20/10/10 Corporate participant in SUCRE workshop 
15 22/10/10 Caribbean specialist of UCV 
16 27/10/10 Member of PSUV national directive committee 
17 4/11/10 Historian of Guayana (known for heavy industry and radical politics) 
18 12/11/10 High-ranking official, SELA 
19 15/11/10 Official of the ALBA Secretariat 
20 16/11/10 Caribbean specialist at ULAC 
21 22/11/10 Ambassador of Bolivia to Venezuela 
22 25/11/10 Former high-ranking diplomat 
23 25/11/10 Expert on Latin American history and regional integration, ULA  
24 26/11/10 Expert in inter-American affairs, Universidad Nacional de Colombia 
25 26/11/10 Expert on regional integration, ULA 
26 29/11/10 Expert on ALBA, ULA 
27 1/12/10 Emeritus professor, ULA 
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28 13/12/10 Executive Secretary of ALBA Secretariat 
29 13/12/10 Official of ALBA Secretariat 
30 17/12/10 ALBA specialist at UBV 
31 9/8/11 ALBA specialist at UBV 
32 10/8/11 High-ranking official at Ministry of Petroleum and Mining 
 
Ecuador: 
 
No. Date Participant 
33 12/5/11 Official of the constitutional court 
34 23/5/11 Expert on regional integration, FLACSO 
35 11/6/11 ALBA specialist, FLACSO 
36 14/6/11 Former high-ranking official under Correa 
37 14/6/11 Specialist on ALBA and regional integration, IAEN 
38 16/6/11 Official at Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
39 16/6/11 High-ranking official at Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
40 17/6/11 High-ranking official at MAGAP 
41 17/6/11 Minister at MAGAP 
42 17/6/11 Official dealing with economic integration, SENPLADES 
43 21/6/11 High-ranking official, SENPLADES 
44 22/6/11 Activist involved in ALBA Social Movements Council negotiations 
45 23/6/11 High-ranking official, SENPLADES 
46 24/6/11 High-ranking official, SENPLADES 
47 24/6/11 Official of the National Assembly’s Foreign Affairs commission 
48 27/6/11 Head of FLACSO 
49 28/6/11 Former official of Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
50 29/6/11 Negotiator in talks towards US-Ecuador FTA 
51 30/6/11 Official of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, trade division 
52 5/7/11 Official of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, trade division 
53 6/7/11 High-ranking official of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, trade division 
54 7/7/11 Former Finance Minister 
55 11/7/11 High-ranking official of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, trade division 
56 11/7/11 Former Minister of Foreign Affairs 
57 12/7/11 Official of Social Development Ministry 
58 12/7/11 Employee of foreign development agency 
59 15/7/11 Official at Ministry of Health, dealing with international cooperation 
 
Trinidad and Tobago: 
 
# Date Participant 
60 17/8/11 International relations specialist, UWI 
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St Vincent and the Grenadines: 
 
# Date Participant 
61 20/8/11 Official of UNDP 
62 23/8/11 Official at Ministry of National Mobilization and Social Development 
63 23/8/11 Head of local social movement  
64 23/8/11 Senior Official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
65 24/8/11 Former minister 
66 25/8/11 Minister of Foreign Affairs 
67 25/8/11 Permanent Secretary of Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
68 25/8/11 Prime Minister of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
69 26/8/11 Ambassador of Venezuela to Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
70 26/8/11 Leader of opposition NDP 
 
Dominica: 
 
# Date Participant 
71 29/8/11 Official of PDV Caribe 
72 30/8/11 Local historian 
73 31/8/11 ALBA Coordinator and Ambassador of Dominica to Venezuela 
74 31/8/11 Ambassador of Venezuela to Dominica 
75 1/9/11 Local author and journalist 
76 2/9/11 Opposition UWP parliamentary candidate  
77 2/9/11 Official at Ministry of Carib Affairs 
78 2/9/11 Official at Ministry of Culture 
79 2/9/11 Ambassador of Venezuela to Dominica 
 
Antigua & Barbuda: 
 
 
 
  
# Date Participant 
80 5/9/11 Official at Ministry of Finance and Economy 
81 6/9/11 Employee of PDV CAB 
82 6/9/11 Community activist involved in Petrocaribe programme 
83 7/9/11 Ambassador of Venezuela to Antigua and Barbuda 
84 7/9/11 Official of Ministry of Finance and Economy 
85 8/9/11 Employee of PDV CAB 
86 8/9/11 ALBA Coordinator and Ambassador to Venezuela for Antigua & Barbuda 
87 9/9/11 Ambassador of Cuba to Antigua and Barbuda 
88 9/9/11 Chairman of opposition ALP 
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